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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies empirical corporate finance and investment. In Chapter 1, we utilize
big data and machine learning tools to examine the information content of executive social
media with regard to applications on forming investment strategies. The 2-4 articles focus on
the relationship among payout policy, executive compensation and earnings management.
To establish a causal effect, we are revisiting and expanding previous research questions
and examining them from another viewpoint with identification strategies. Specifically,
we are seeking to understand whether Earnings Per Share (EPS) dilution due to options
exercises causes firms to manage earnings in Chapter 2, whether having a high level of
institutional ownership mitigates the problem of conducting repurchases through Accelerated
Share Repurchases (ASR) for the purposes of EPS manipulation in Chapter 3, and whether
payout choices affect executive compensation decisions in Chapter 4. Moreover, Chapter
5 explores machine learning algorithms with an effort to improve Fintech lenders in their
selection process for online borrowers.
Chapter 1 “The Information Content of CEOs’ Personal Social Media: Evidence from
Stock Returns and Earnings Surprises” demonstrates a previously unexplored and close
connection between firm performance and CEO Tweets. Utilizing big data, we implement a
novel dataset about the personal social media of CEOs, which mostly deals with CEOs’ per-
sonal activities and opinions, and the analysis further employs machine learning algorithms
to identify and exclude Tweets that have relevance for firm operations. The results show that
a high proportion of positive words in the CEOs’ Tweets predicts positive future abnormal
returns and firm performance. These results suggest that the content of personal Tweets can
elicit the moods of CEOs. Executives tend to embark on pleasurable activities like going on
vacation when they are confident and satisfied with their firm’s performance. This project
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provides a framework for future research using big data as a tool to gain additional infor-
mation about the behaviors of managers and shed additional light on corresponding firm
performance.
Chapter 2-4 embark on three innovative projects devoted to understanding the causal rela-
tionships among executive compensation, payout policy and earnings management. Chapter
2 entitled “Equity-based Compensation, Dilution, and Earnings Management: Evidence from
a Regression Discontinuity” for the first time we show that firms engage in earnings manage-
ment to counter the dilutive effect on EPS due to option exercises, in lieu of using buybacks
as suggested by the literature. To isolate the effect of option exercises on payouts, we explore
what firms do in response to plausibly exogenous option exercises using a fuzzy regression dis-
continuity framework. We show that these quasi-exogenous exercises do not cause additional
buybacks, but they cause firms to reduce R&D spending and increase accruals. Therefore,
we conclude that instead of buying back shares, firms have alternative ways of countering
EPS dilution from option exercises, such as boosting income through real- and accrual-based
earnings management. Furthermore, we examine the methods of repurchases in Chapter 3
“The Effects of Institutional Investors on Earnings Per Share Bonuses and Methods of Share
Repurchases: Evidence from Accelerated Share Repurchases”. Using hand-collected, origina-
tive data on Accelerated Share Repurchases (ASR), this article concludes that firms with a
high level of institutional investors are less likely to conduct ASR, because of concerns about
managing EPS for compensation motives. We further explore the determinants of stock op-
tion grants in Chapter 4 “Do Dividend Affect Stock Option Award? Evidence from Job and
Growth Tax Relief Reconstruction Act.” Employing a difference-in-difference framework to
identify an exogenous increase in individual level dividend payments, the paper finds that
an expected increase in dividends due to dividend tax decrease causes firms to shift future
compensation plans away from option grants. Therefore, we conclude that the exogenous
change in shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences leads to a new equilibrium in terms
of executive compensation and payout choices.
Lastly, we use machine learning to improve Fintech lenders in their selection process for
online borrowers in Chapter 5 “Predicting the Performance of Peer-to-Peer Loans using Ma-
chine Learning”. We show that machine learning algorithms provide a higher accuracy than
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the benchmark model in prediction loan default, especially for out-of-sample predictions.
Moreover, using feature selection mechanism, we identify independent variables of borrower
and loan characteristics that are the most important features in predicting default. There-
fore, machine learning algorithms are valuable to select the most relevant features and can
achieve higher accuracy in predicting the performance of Peer-to-Peer loans.
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CHAPTER 1
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF CEOS’
PERSONAL SOCIAL MEDIA
In this chapter, we study the personal Twitter accounts of 226 CEOs, and examine whether
the content across 127,916 Tweets hold information about future firm performance. The
content of these Tweets mostly deals with CEOs’ personal activities and opinions, and the
analysis further employs machine learning algorithms to identify and exclude Tweets that
have relevance for firm operations. The results show that a high proportion of positive words
in the CEOs’ Tweets predict positive future abnormal returns. This pattern is especially
strong before earnings release. Using Tweets posted before earnings announcements, a daily
calendar-time spread portfolio that buys stocks with a high proportion of positive words
and sells stocks with a low proportion delivers a return of 10.8 to 19.6 basis points per day.
Furthermore, the cumulative proportion of positive words can predict quarterly earnings
surprise, earnings and cash flows. These results suggest that the content of personal Tweets
can elicit the moods of CEOs, and that executives tend to spend time doing enjoyable
activities when they have achieved the performance targets.
1.1 Introduction
Research has examined important information sources about firms’ fundamentals: analyst
forecasts, accounting variables of financial statements, and media coverage of firms, such as
in The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Services. This paper looks at an alternative
data source: Chief Executive Officers (CEO) personal social media. We use the Tweets of
CEOs made during their tenure, and find a close connection between the proportion of
positive words in their tweets and firms’ fundamentals. Unlike public social media, which
reports firm operations and prospects, CEOs tweet their personal life activities and opinions
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using their personal Twitter accounts.
We classify words with positive or negative sentiment using the natural language toolkit,
which contains 2006 positive words and 4783 negative words, to capture the information
in Tweets. For example, “A wonderful evening incredible food merci lachevredor” contains
2 positive words (“wonderful” and “incredible”) out of 7 words. Another example, “What
a gorgeous Saturday morning in Miami. May jump to the Caribbean one day this week.
Barbados has a nice ring to it” includes 2 positive words (“gorgeous” and “nice”). Finally
the example “DC today, NYC tonight and back to DC tomorrow. Crazy schedule with
lots of good things going on” has only one positive word (“good”). We use the proportion
of positive words as a proxy for information about firms. If the fraction of positive words
in Tweets is a noise measurement of positive information about the firm, the coefficient
of positive words in the regressions on firms’ fundamentals should be zero. Similarly, if
the proportion of positive words in Tweets is a proxy for positive information about firms’
fundamentals that is already incorporated into stock prices, we should find that it has no
predictability for future market activities.
We find a positive correlation between the proportion of positive words in the Tweets of
CEOs and firms’ stock returns. That is, the higher the proportion of positive words in a
Tweet, the higher the daily stock return. This is particularly shown to occur before earnings
announcements. The positive correlation can be driven by three competing hypotheses: sen-
timent, conspiracy and information. First, sentiment theory believes that irrational investors
misinterpret the positive words in the Tweets and buy stocks, which causes a stationary in-
crease in returns. Thus, returns rebound during the next period when there is a new belief
about the stock. Second, believers in the conspiracy hypothesis believe that a temporary
increase in the stock price is caused by false information due to CEO corruption. Thus,
stock prices will fall when investors learn the true information. Third, information theory
supports the contention that the positive words in Tweets are proxies for firms’ fundamentals
that are not currently incorporated into stock prices. We examine the cumulative abnor-
mal return around earnings announcements and find that the cumulative abnormal return
increases without a reversal around the day of the Tweet, which supports the information
theory.
2
We also find that positive words in Tweets posted before earnings announcements can
predict subsequent stock returns. This is because CEOs already know whether their firms’
earnings have beaten analysts’ forecasts, while investors are not informed of such information.
Compared to CEOs who have failed to meet the analysts forecasts, CEOs who have achieved
the performance target are more likely to be happier and engage in enjoyable activities,
which are reflected in Tweets as positive words. Therefore, we can use CEO Tweets to infer
the mood of CEOs before earnings release. Consequently, we construct daily calendar-time
spread portfolios that buy stocks with a high proportion of positive words in their CEOs
Tweets and sell stocks with a low fraction of positive words in Tweets posted during 14 days
prior to earnings announcements. The portfolio of stocks with positive words in the top
10th and the portfolio with stocks in the bottom 10th percentile have an alpha of 12.8 and
-4.4 basis points, respectively. A spread portfolio that buys stocks with the proportion of
positive words in the top 10th percentile and sells stocks in the bottom 10th percentile has
an alpha of 17.2 basis points per day.
We further show that the proportion of positive words has a predictive power on firms’
earnings. That is, the cumulative fraction of positive words can predict the difference be-
tween actual earnings and analysts’ forecasts, which is known as “earnings surprises.” These
findings are consistent with the information hypothesis. That is, when CEOs are confident
and satisfied with firm performance, they tend to spend time doing enjoyable activities and
are in a pleasant mood. For example, they may spend time with family and friends, and
tweet about dining out or vacations. Or, they may simply be happier and enjoy the weather
or scenery. Thus, they use more positive words in their Tweets, such as “gorgeous, incredible,
good, happy, nice, terrific, amazing, wonderful and beautiful.”
We next examine whether the content of Tweets is an unintentional informational release
without an agenda, or a case of CEOs strategically choosing the time to disclose the informa-
tion in order to maximize their personal payoff. We compare the characteristics, including
the proportion of positive words, in various Tweets posted around the time of CEO option
exercises and stock sales. In a manner consistent with the timing hypothesis, the Tweets of
CEOs contain a higher fraction of positive words before, as opposed to after option exercises
and stock sales.
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In a nutshell, by using a novel dataset about CEO personal activities and opinions, we find
that the positive words in the personal Tweets of CEOs can predict daily stock returns and
quarterly earnings. In addition, the Tweets of CEOs contain a higher proportion of positive
words when they are incentivized to increase the stock price, such as before option exercises
and stock sales. Together these actions show that CEOs strategically time the release of
Tweets, which contain information about the firms’ fundamentals. These findings can be
used to form trading strategies. For example, long stocks that belong to firms which have
positive words in their CEO Tweets, while shorting the stocks which lack positive words.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents research literature on information
content and earnings manipulation. It also reviews papers using text data from news stories.
Section 1.3 will discuss the methodology, data sources and variable constructions used in the
study. Section 1.4 and 1.5 will present the main results on predicting stock returns and
earnings using positive words in Tweets, respectively. Section 1.6 explores CEO motivation
to utilize positive words. Section 1.7 concludes the paper.
1.2 Related Literature
Stories from financial media provide qualitative information that can be used to study the
effect on market activities. Matching news stories from The Wall Street Journal and Dow
Jones News Services to firms, Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) show that
the negative words in the financial press have predictive power regarding firms’ earnings and
stock returns. Thus, they show that there is information content in the linguistic descrip-
tions in social media about firm operations, which is not yet incorporated into quantitative
accounting variables. In contrast to the information channel through which stories in finan-
cial press affect investors, Tetlock (2007) finds that negative words in the “Abreast of the
Market” column of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) influence investors though sentiments.
That is, media pessimism, measured by the negative words in WSJ, can predict lower mar-
ket returns. Since the author finds that temporarily low returns are reversed shortly after
news stories releases, he interprets this temporary effect on market as merely sentiments.
Antweiler and Frank (2006) use the computational linguistics methods to classify topics of
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corporate stories from WSJ. They find that the market overreacts to news information, and
returns reverse after 10 days of the news event.
Financial statements, earnings announcements and messages from internet chat rooms are
other important sources of qualitative text information. Li (2006) measures the “risk senti-
ment” in annual statements by counting the frequency of “risk” and “uncertain”. He finds
that an increase in “risk sentiment” can predict lower earnings. Davis, Piger, Sedor et al.
(2006) use a dictionary-based content analysis program to measure the level of optimistic
and pessimistic language in earnings press release. They show a correlation between the
level of optimistic language usage in earnings announcements and firms’ future performance.
Messages from internet chat rooms are used to study trading patterns. Antweiler and Frank
(2004) identify “sell”, “buy” and “hold” activities from internet stock message board, which
predict market volatility.
In this study, we use the personal social media of CEOs as a source of information about
firms, which is different than the previous literature that uses corporate news releases, fi-
nancial press stories, and financial statements. Firms and CEOs have separate Twitter
accounts: the former concerns about firm operations, and business prospects, similar to
corporate news releases, and the latter concerns CEOs’ personal activities and opinions.
These personal Tweets cover topics that include vacation, food, traveling, time spent with
family and friends, games, weather, scenery and so on. A small proportion of them concerns
firm activities, and we try to exclude them. To be more specific, in a thousand randomly
selected Tweets of CEOs, we identify twenty-seven firm-related Tweets. We then use ma-
chine learning algorithms to identify and exclude these Tweets which are related to firm
operations.
This paper relates to the information content of CEOs’ activities. Tracking corporate jet
flights, Yermack (2014) finds a connection between CEO vacation traveling and the timing
of corporate information releases. He finds that there is an information content regarding
CEO absences from headquarters, where corporate news will be withheld and released right
after CEOs are back. Similarly, we identify the information content of CEOs’ activities by
tracking their Tweets. Intuitively, when CEOs are confident and satisfied with their firms’
performance, they tend to feel happier or engage in enjoyable activities. For example, they
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use positive tones to describe weather or scenery, and positive words to express the activities
they engage in when they spend with family to dine out. Therefore, the positive words in
CEOs’ Tweets can predict firms’ future performance.
This study contributes to literature related to managers’ manipulation of the timing of
corporate voluntary disclosures. CEOs are incentivized to lower the stock price on option
grant dates, because option exercise price is set to be the stock price on grant days. Aboody
and Kasznik (2000) find that CEOs manage to quickly release bad news and delay announce-
ments of good news about earnings before option grant dates to increase the fair value of
executives’ compensation. In a manner that is consistent with this reasoning, Chauvin and
Shenoy (2001) show that the stock prices prior to stock option grants tend to decrease due
to the release of bad discretionary news about earnings, dividends and forecasts. Yermack
(1997) examines stock price movements after option awards and finds that price increases
following option grants are caused by favorable earnings announcements.
In this paper, we find another informal communication channel through which executives
transmit information to investors, which is the personal social media of CEOs. As Chauvin
and Shenoy (2001) point out, executives do not want to spoil their compensation packages
before compensation committee meetings by formally releasing bad news. Instead, execu-
tives manage to manipulate stock prices downward using informal or private communication
methods such as rumors and innuendo, which can be attributed to market misinformation.
In addition to the timing of the release of corporate news, there are other methods execu-
tives can use to manipulate and maximize their compensation. Baker, Collins, and Reitenga
(2003) show that managers use income-decreasing discretionary accruals to lower stock prices
prior to option grants. Managers are also incentivized to manipulate stock prices upward,
leading up to option exercises. Balachandran, Chalmers, and Haman (2008) suggest that
firms use buyback programs to maximize option payoff. However, this positive correlation
between share repurchases and exercisable options can be driven by confounding variables
such as firm life cycle or investment opportunities. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) show that
executives use private information about positive earnings to time abnormally large option
exercises.
Finally, this study is related to research which uses big data and machine learning. Huang
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(2018) examines 14 million customer product reviews on Amazon.com, and documents the
information content of consumer opinions concerning stock prices. Luca (2011) similarly
examines customer review ratings on Yelp.com and shows a causal impact on revenue using
a framework of regression discontinuity. In terms of machine learning, Erel, Stern, Tan, and
Weisbach (2018) develop algorithms to select board of directors based on firm characteris-
tics and director features. They claim that compared to ordinary least square regressions,
machine learning techniques achieve more accurate out-of-sample predictions. In this paper,
we use a linear stochastic gradient descent classifier to identify and remove Tweets related
to firm operations.
1.3 Methodology and Data
We construct the sample by manually identifying the personal Twitter accounts of CEOs
at Twitter.com. We start with a list of three thousand CEOs who are in position on or
after 1/1/2011 using the Annual Compensation dataset from ExecuComp. As Twitter was
founded in 2006 and it became more popular after 2011, we exclude CEOs who left their
positions before 2011. We identify CEO Twitter accounts using a name search and care-
fully examine accounts descriptions, profile pictures, the number of followers and Tweets
to distinguish the real CEO from people with the same names, and fake or propaganda
accounts. For example, when we search for “Tim Cook,” the CEO of Apple Inc., we find 46
accounts with the same name, or similar names, including “Timothy Cook”. However, the
real account is verified by Twitter and followed by 11 million people. In the description, it
includes “Apple CEO”. We find 327 CEO personal accounts, which belong to 335 firms. It
is important to note that, we do not collect any Tweets from the firms’ official Twitter ac-
counts, which contain information about products, services, operations and prospects. Next,
we download the Tweets from the personal Twitter accounts of CEOs and remove Tweets
that are posted outside of CEO tenure. We use “date became CEO” and “date left as CEO”
from ExecuComp to define CEO tenure. If a CEO has served in multiple firms, some Tweets
are attributed to previous firms based on the dates he was the CEO. We drop the accounts
if all of the Tweets are posted before or after CEO tenure, if they are of a private nature
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and prohibit me from downloading the Tweets, or if they belong to firms that have assets of
less than 1 million dollars. We end up with 226 CEO personal Twitter accounts and 127,916
Tweets during their tenure.
CEOs tweet messages about various topics, such as cooking, dining out, traveling, vaca-
tions, doing sports, appreciating arts, kids’ progress, hanging out with friends, spending time
with family, watching games, attending social rituals, firm operations and so on. This study
focuses on the information content of their personal activities. Thus, we exclude Tweets
about firm operations. To do this, we first randomly draw 1000 Tweets, which include 500
for training and 500 for testing purposes, and manually identify which of them are related to
firm operations. We find 27 Tweets that are related to firm activities from 1000 randomly
selected Tweets. It makes sense because firms have other official Twitter accounts to disclose
information about firm activities or to promote firm products and services. Next, we design
a linear stochastic gradient descent (SGD) classifier algorithm on the training dataset and
perform classification on the test dataset. To be more specific, the algorithm breaks the text
of a Tweet into tokens, which are used to construct a bag of words. It transforms a text
document into a matrix that counts the number of times the words appear in each Tweet.
Linear SGD classifier uses a logistic regression with a cost function, specifying the loss of
over-fitting. This machine learning algorithm achieves an accuracy rate of 98% on the test
dataset. Next, we perform classifications on the remaining one hundred thousand Tweets.
In order to measure the information content of Tweets, we start with cleaning up the
Tweets by removing all hash-tags (#MAGA), Twitter handles (@KellyannerPolls), URLs,
and punctuation. Natural Language Toolkit contains 2006 positive words and 4783 negative
words. For instance, the first ten positive words are “a+, abound, abounds, abundance,
abundant, accessible, accessible, acclaim, acclaimed, acclamation.” The first ten negative
words are “2-faced, 2-faces, abnormal, abolish, abominable, abominable, abominate, abom-
ination, abort and aborted.” Next, we count the number of positive words and negative
words in each Tweet. For example, a Tweet of “What a gorgeous Saturday morning in Mi-
ami. May jump to the Caribbean one day this week. Barbados has a nice ring to it” contains
two positive words (“gorgeous” and “nice”) and zero negative words. Next, we define the
proportion of positive words, the proportion of negative words and the total number of words
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in each Tweet. In the above example, the fraction of positive words is 0.09, the fraction of
negative words is 0, and the total number of words is 21.
Stock price data is drawn from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We
match daily stock price information with Tweets using the timestamp of each Tweet. If
the Tweet is posted when stock market is closed, then the Tweet is matched with the stock
information for the next day. We also include the Fama-French three research factors from
the Kenneth R. French Data Library. Control variables on firm characteristic and CEO
features are collected from the Compustat and ExecuComp databases, respectively. These
variables include firm size (log of total assets), cash-to-assets, market-to-book ratio, return-
on-assets, market leverage, CEO total compensation, CEO age and CEO tenure (current
year minus year became CEO). These control variables are measured at the end of the
preceding fiscal year.
Data about earnings surprise comes from the surprise history of summary history of the
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES). We collect variables including date of the
actual earnings announcement, actual earnings, and the mean and the standard deviation
of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is defined as the
difference between the actual earnings and the mean of analysts’ earnings forecasts (earnings
surprise), divided by the standard deviation of the earnings surprise. We use quarterly
frequency, which is the highest frequency of earnings data.
Other measurements of earnings include earnings per share (EPS) and normalized earn-
ings, which are constructed using data drawn from Compustat. Earnings per share are
measured in various ways: diluted EPS divided by lagged stock price, basic EPS divided
by lagged stock price, income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock equiv-
alents divided by lagged capitalization, and income before extraordinary items available for
common divided by lagged capitalization. For normalized earnings, we define them as the
following alternatives: four times net income divided by lagged assets, income before ex-
traordinary items adjusted for common stock equivalents divided by lagged assets, income
before extraordinary items available for common divided by lagged assets, and cash flow
(sum of net income and depreciation expenses) divided by lagged assets. These outcome
variables on earnings are measured at the end of each quarter.
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Data about stock option exercises and stock sales is collected from the Table 2 and Table
1 from the Thomson Reuters database. We use the managers’ role titles to restrict the
sample of managers to CEOs only. For the option exercises from the Table 2 dataset, we
restrict the form type that the insiders file to be 4, the nature of the underlying transaction
to be exercise, and the derivative type to be employee stock options, incentive stock options,
options, non-qualified stock options, or call options. For stock sales from Table 1 dataset,
we limit the form type to be 4, the transaction type to be open market or private sale, and
the security title to be common stocks. We collect the dates of CEO option exercises and
stocks sales.
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics concerning Tweets in Panel A, and firm and
CEO characteristics in Panel B. Among the 127,916 Tweets posted during CEO tenure, the
average proportion of positive words is 0.072 and the mean of proportion of negative words
is 0.018. The total number of words in a Tweet is 14.19 on average. The average fraction
of Tweets related to firm operations is 0.018. The mean of stock returns on Tweet days is
0.01, small minus big factor is 0.012, high minus low factor is -0.017, and market premium is
0.055. Panel B of Table 1.1 shows firm and CEO characteristics at the end of the preceding
fiscal year. The cash to asset ratio is 0.2, and total assets is 20 billion dollars on average.
The mean of market-to-book is 5.197, return-on-assets is 0.037 and market leverage is 0.342.
The mean of total compensation is 6.8 million dollars, which includes salary, bonuses, other
annual sums, the total value of restricted stock grants, the total value of stock option grants,
and long-term incentives payouts. The average age of CEOs is 53 years and they have been
in the position for 7 years.
1.4 Using CEOs’ Tweets to Predict Stock Returns
1.4.1 Contemporary Returns
In this section, we test the hypothesis that positive words in the Tweets of CEOs contain
information that can predict stock returns. First, we explore the relationship between pos-
itive words used in Tweets and daily stock return on the days of Tweets. Next, we use
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regression analysis to explore the predictive power of the proportion of positive words for
stock returns, followed by examining the cumulative abnormal returns around Tweet days
in an event study framework.
To start with, Figure 1.1 presents an intuitive relationship between positive words in
Tweets and stock returns. Panel A plots daily stock returns after CEOs post Tweets on
bins with regards to the proportion of positive words in Tweets. The proportion of positive
words is defined as the number of positive number words divided by the total number of
words in each Tweet. Bin 0 includes Tweets with zero positive words, bin 1 contains Tweets
with a (0, 0.1] proportion of positive words, bins 2 to 4 contain a (0.1, 0.2], (0.2, 0.3] and
(0.3, 0.4] proportion, respectively, and bin 5 contains Tweets with more than a 0.4 fraction.
The mean of daily returns of CEOs with zero positive words is 3 basis points. The average
stock return for firms within bin 1 increases to 5 basis points. The average return in bin 5,
which includes Tweets that have more than 40% positive words, is 13 basis points. As the
proportion of positive words increases, the stock return also increases. Panel B plots the
daily stock return on the number of positive words. The bars from left to right correspond
to Tweets that have 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or more positive words. If a Tweet contains more
than 5 positive words, it is included in the last bar with 5 positive words. Similar to Panel
A, as the number of positive words increases, the stock return also increases.
There are competing theories explaining the positive relationship between positive words
in Tweets and stock returns. First, sentiment theory believes that irrational investors misin-
terpret the positive words in Tweets and they buy stocks that will cause a stationary increase
in returns. Thus, based on sentiment theory, returns will rebound in the next period when
there is a new belief about the firm in the market. Second, the conspiracy hypothesis holds
that a temporary increase in stock price is caused by false information due to CEO cor-
ruption. Thus, conspiracy theory predicts that stock prices will fall after investors discover
the truth. Third, information theory supports the contention that positive words in Tweets
are proxies about firms’ fundamentals that are not currently incorporated into stock prices.
Therefore, information theory predicts that an increase in returns will persist indefinitely.
To determine whether CEOs’ Tweets can predict stock returns, we use regression analysis.
Using 0.12 billion Tweets of CEOs, Table 1.2 explores the predictive power of the proportion
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of positive words for daily stock returns using the following regression equation:
Daily Stock Return = α + β1Pos. Prop. + β2Neg. Prop. + β3Tot. Words + Controls
The dependent variable is the stock return on Tweet days. Note that if a Tweet is posted
when the market is closed, the stock return on Tweet days is replaced with that of the next
day. We control for other features of Tweets, including the proportion of negative words
and the total number of words in a Tweet. We also include Fama-French three factors to
capture market conditions. As regards firm characteristics, we include firm size, cash-to-
assets, market-to-book ratio, return-on-assets, and market leverage. CEO features include
total compensation, age and tenure. We control for the industry or firm interacting with year
and quarter fixed effects in columns 1 or 3, and the industry or firm interacting with year and
month fixed effect in columns 2 or 4. Panel A excludes Tweets related to firm operations.
The coefficient of the proportion of positive words is 0.0013 on the daily stock return, and it
is significant at the 5% level. This means that with a 1% increase in the fraction of positive
words, the daily return will increase by 0.13 basis points. Given that the average proportion
of positive words is 10%, posting a Tweet with 10% positive words will increase the daily
stock return by 1.3 basis points. The magnitude does not change significantly when we
include firm and month fixed effects. In Panel B, we use all of the Tweets of CEOs, which
include Tweets related to firm operations and activities. The coefficients of the proportion
of positive words increase to 0.0014 and are significant at the 5% level of significance.
Next, we include stock returns on days without CEOs posting Tweets. On days without
Tweets, the proportion of positive or negative words is zero and the total number of words
is also zero. Table 1.3 reports the regression results adding the days without Tweets during
CEO tenure. We include the same controls and fixed effects as in Table 1.2. Panel A reports
the regression results which drop Tweets related to firm operations, while Panel B keeps
all of the Tweets. The coefficients of the proportion of positive words are around 0.0012 to
0.0018 with various fixed effects and they are significant at the 1% level of significance. The
interpretation is that posting a Tweet with an average proportion (10%) of positive words
will increase stock returns by between 1.3 and 1.9 basis points, as compared to the days that
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CEOs do not post Tweets, or the days that CEOs post Tweets that do not contain positive
words. These results show that the proportion of positive words in Tweets can predict stock
returns.
To further explore the predictability of Tweets on later stock returns, we regress the pro-
portion of positive words on daily stock returns subsequent to the Tweet days. Specifically,
the dependent variables in Table 1.4 include stock returns on the first, second, third and
sixth day after CEOs posting the Tweets. We include the same control variables as well as
fixed effects as in the last column of Table 1.2. Panel A excludes Tweets that are related
to firm operations and Panel B contains all the Tweets. The first three columns show that
there is predictive power of positive words on subsequent stock returns. To be specific, the
coefficients of the proportion of positive words are 0.11%, 0.09% and 0.10% on the first,
second and third day following the Tweets. However, the increasing trend of stock returns
reverses on the sixth day after the Tweets days, as the coefficient of the proportion of pos-
itive words is negative on the sixth day’s return. Therefore, we find that the proportion of
positive words can predict contemporary stock returns using Tweets posted on regular days.
1.4.2 Stock Returns Before Earnings Announcements
In this section, we explore the predictive power of positive words in CEO Tweets prior to
earnings announcements. If the proportion of positive words in the Tweets of CEOs is a
proxy for positive information about firm performance, we expect this predictive power for
stock returns should be stronger before earnings announcements. This is because CEOs
already know whether their firms’ earnings have beaten analysts’ forecasts, while investors
are not informed of such information. Compared to CEOs who have failed to meet the
analysts forecasts, CEOs who have achieved the performance target are more likely to be
happier and engage in enjoyable activities. Therefore, we can use CEO Tweets to infer the
mood of CEOs before earnings release.
To start with, we predict contemporary stock returns before earnings announcements.
Table 1.5 presents the regression results of CEOs’ Tweets on stock returns during two weeks
before earnings announcements. We include the same control variables and fixed effects as
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in Table 1.2. Panel A reports the regression results by excluding Tweets related to firm
operations, while Panel B includes all of the Tweets. The coefficients of the proportion
of positive words are around 0.0045 before earnings announcements, which are triple the
positive word coefficients in Table 1.3 that covers the whole sample period. The predictive
power is magnified before earnings release due to the reason that investors are waiting for
news about actual earnings, thus these stakeholders are more sensitive and pay a greater
amount of attention to communications and information released from CEOs.
Furthermore, using an event study framework, we explore the cumulative abnormal re-
turns (CAR) around Tweet days before earnings announcements. The abnormal return is
measured as the difference of daily stock return and the equal-weighted market return. The
cumulative abnormal return is the sum of abnormal returns starting 14 days before CEOs
post the Tweets to 14 days afterwards. Figure 1.2 plots the CAR separately for three groups.
The first group contains days with no Tweets posted and they appear as red squares. The
second group includes days with Tweets posted that have no positive words and they appear
as blue rhombuses. The third group is consisted of days with Tweets that contain positive
words and they appear as green triangles. The group of days with Tweets containing positive
words shows an increasing trend of stock returns around Tweet days compared to the other
two groups. Moreover, this increasing pattern persists without a reversal during a 28-day
window. Therefore, this event study provides some evidence that there is information con-
tent in the Tweets of CEOs posted before earnings announcements. Specifically, by tracking
CEOs’ Tweets, we can infer CEOs’ activities and consequently whether they have achieved
analysts forecasts. Executives who perform well tend to use more positive words in their
Tweets, which can predict higher contemporary returns on the Tweet days and subsequent
stock returns.
In addition to predicting stock returns on Tweet days, we predict stock returns on earnings
announcements using positive words in Tweets posted prior to earnings announcements.
Table 1.6 presents the predictive power of positive words in Tweets on subsequent stock
returns. Specifically, the dependent variable is the daily stock return on earnings release
days, while the independent variable is the proportion of positive words in Tweets posted
during 14 days prior to the announcement. Panel A includes Tweets that are unrelated to
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firm operations and Panel B contains all the Tweets. We control for the same variables and
fixed effect as in the first two columns of Table 1.2. The coefficients of the proportion of
positive words are 0.7% to 0.9% on stock returns on earnings release, and they are significant
at the 5% level. It indicates that posting a Tweet containing a 7% fraction of positive words
predicts 5 basis points higher in stock returns on earnings announcement days.
Alternatively, we can aggregate the proportion of positive words in Tweets posted prior
to earnings announcements to predict stock returns on those days. Table 1.7 shows the
regression results. The independent variable of interest is the cumulative proportion of
positive words, which is counted starting 14 days before, and ending 1 day prior to, earnings
announcements. We control for the cumulative proportion of negative words, cumulative
number of Tweets, Fama-French factors, firm and CEO features, as well as industry and
time fixed effects. Panel A excludes Tweets related to firm operations in the calculation
of cumulative measurements, while Panel B contains all of the Tweets. The coefficients
of the cumulative proportion of positive words are positive on stock returns on earnings
announcement days at the significance level of 10%.
In summary, the predictive power of CEO Tweets for contemporary and subsequent returns
is stronger before earnings announcements, compared to the predictive power of Tweets for
stock returns on regular days. When CEOs are confident and satisfied with firm operations,
they tend to engage in pleasant activities and use more positive words to tweet. Therefore,
we can use this information to predict stock returns on the Tweet days prior to earnings
release as well as returns on earnings announcement days.
1.4.3 Portfolio Returns
In the previous section, we show that there exists information in CEOs’ Tweets prior to
earnings announcements based on two findings. First, the increasing trend of stock returns
on Tweet days persists without a reversal in a window of 28 days. Second, we can use the
positive words in Tweets posted during the 14 days prior to earnings release to predict stock
returns on earnings announcement days. Thus, positive words have predictive power, not
only for contemporary stock returns, but also for subsequent returns on earnings release
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days. In this section, we further construct investment portfolios based on Tweets posted
prior to earnings announcements and examine the performance of these portfolios.
Because stock returns increase as the proportion of positive words increases, we long
portfolios of stocks that contain positive words in their CEO Tweets, and short stocks that
lack positive words. Specifically, we restrict the sample to be Tweets posted during the 14
days prior to earnings release, and sort the Tweets based on the proportion of positive words
on Tweet days. If there are multiple Tweets that have an equal fraction of positive words,
we further sort them based on the proportion of negative words. We further restrict to days
that contain at least two Tweets, including one Tweet with positive words.
Table 1.8 reports Fama-French factor alphas on daily calendar-time spread portfolios that
buy stocks that contain a high proportion of positive words in their CEOs’ Tweets and sell
stocks that contain a low fraction of positive words during the 14 days prior to earnings
announcements. The sample contains 988 days that have at least two Tweets posted, in-
cluding at least one Tweet with positive words. We sort the sample based on the proportion
of positive words on Tweet days and rebalance the portfolio on a daily basis. We track the
performance of these portfolios over the next day, as well as over the following week. We
apply two weighting schemes: equal weighting and value weighting.
First, we use an equal weighting scheme and buy stocks with the proportion of positive
words in the top 10th percentile and sell stocks in the bottom 10th percentile. Panel A
describes the summary statistics of these stocks. For stocks that fall in the top and bottom
10th percentile of the proportion of positive words, their portfolio returns over the next day
are 0.21% and 0.056%, respectively. Each portfolio contains 1.24 stocks on average. Panel
B reports alphas and factor loadings by regressing daily stock returns on risk factors using
an equal weighting scheme. A portfolio of stocks with the proportion of positive words in
the top 10th percentile has an alpha of 12.8 basis points per day. In contrast, the alpha for
the portfolio of stocks in the bottom 10th percentile is -4.4 basis points. Therefore, a spread
portfolio that buys stocks in the top 10th percentile of the proportion of positive words and
sells stocks in the bottom 10th percentile has an alpha of 17.2 basis points per day, which is
significantly positive at 1% level.
Furthermore, we apply a value-weighted scheme in calculating the portfolio returns. Panel
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C replicates the investment strategy in Panel B using a value-weighting scheme. The portfolio
of stocks with the proportion of positive words in the top or bottom 10th percentile has an
alpha of 13.3 and -6.3 basis points, respectively. A daily calendar-time spread portfolio based
on a value-weighted scheme that longs stocks in the top 10th percentile of positive words
and shorts stocks in the bottom 10th percentile has an alpha of 19.6 basis points.
We also track the performance of these portfolios over the following week. To be specific,
in Panel D, we report the alpha and factor loadings of the calendar-time portfolios in Panel
B with a holding period of a week. The portfolios are rebalanced daily by adding stocks with
positive words that enter in the top or bottom percentiles and dropping stocks that reach
the end of the holding period. Stocks in the top 10th percentile have an alpha of 12.5 basis
points, while stocks that fall in the bottom 10th percentile have an alpha of 1.6 basis points.
Therefore, a spread portfolio that longs stocks in the top 10th percentile of the proportion
of positive words and shorts stocks in the bottom 10th percentile with a holding period of a
week has an alpha of 10.8 basis points per day.
1.5 Using CEOs’ Tweets to Predict Earnings
1.5.1 Predicting Earnings Surprise
In this section, we investigate whether the Tweets of CEOs can predict firms’ earnings
surprise. On one hand, if the fraction of positive words in Tweets is a noise measurement
of positive information about firms, the coefficients of positive words in the regressions on
firms’ earnings surprise should be around zero. On the other hand, if CEOs tend to use more
positive words in their Tweets when they are confident and satisfied with firm performance,
the coefficients on earnings surprise should be significantly positive. Thus, positive words
such as “gorgeous, incredible, good, happy, nice, terrific, amazing, and wonderful” should
predict contemporaneous firm earnings.
We examine Tweets before earnings announcements to predict the difference between
actual earnings and analysts’ forecasts. We choose a window of 14 days before earnings
announcements, given that CEOs already know whether their firms will beat analysts’ fore-
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casts, even though this information has not been released to public at that time. With
regard to firms that meet analysts’ forecasts, CEOs may spend more time with their fami-
lies, watching sports, hanging out with friends, travelling on vacations or they may simply
be happier than CEOs of firms that miss their earnings target. In terms of Tweets, enjoyable
activities and a pleasant mood are reflected as positive words in their postings.
Table 1.9 presents the relationship between earnings surprise and cumulative measure-
ments of Tweets before earnings announcements. These cumulative measurements about
Tweets are counted starting 14 days before, and ending 1 day prior to, earnings announce-
ments. The independent variable of interest is the cumulative proportion of positive words.
We also control the cumulative proportion of negative words and the total number of Tweets
posted during this period. The dependent variable is the standardized unexpected earnings,
which is collected in the surprise history of the summary history of the Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (IBES). Standardized unexpected earnings are defined as the difference of
actual quarterly earnings and the mean of analysts’ forecasts, which is known as “earnings
surprise,” divided by the standard deviation of the earnings surprise. The summary statis-
tics of the cumulative measurements of Tweets, and earnings surprise can be found in Panel
C of Table 1.1. For example, the mean of the standardized unexpected earnings is 1.633.
The cumulative proportion of positive words for the 14 days before earnings announcements
is 0.02.
With these definitions, the regression equation can be expressed as:
Standardized Unexpected Earnings = α + β1Cum. Pos. Prop. + β2Cum. Neg. Prop.
+ β3Cum. Num. Tweets + Controls
Panel A in Table 1.9 excludes Tweets related to firm operations. We include industry
(firm) and year fixed effects in columns 1 (3), and industry (firm), year and quarter fixed
effects in Column 2 (4). The coefficients of the cumulative proportion of positive words are
around 0.78 to 0.94, and they are significant at the 10% level. If the cumulative proportion
of positive words increased by 1%, the standardized unexpected earnings would increase
by 0.01. Panel B of Table 1.9 includes all of the Tweets posted during the 14 days before
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earnings announcements. The coefficients of the cumulative proportion of positive words
are slightly larger than those in Panel A, and they remain significant at the 10% of level of
significance. Thus, these findings show that the cumulative proportion of positive words in
CEOs’ Tweets prior to earnings announcements can predict earnings surprise.
Next, we examine the cumulative number of positive words in CEOs’ Tweets posted in
the two weeks preceding the earnings release. Table 1.10 employs the following regression:
Standardized Unexpected Earnings = α + β1Cum. Pos. Num. + β2Cum. Neg. Num.
+ β3Cum. Num. Tweets + Controls
The independent variable of interest is the cumulative number of positive words. We
control the cumulative number of negative words and the cumulative number of Tweets. We
include the same controls on firm and CEO characteristics and fixed effects as in Table 1.9.
Panel A reports the regression results from dropping Tweets related to firm operations, while
Panel B keeps all of the Tweets. The coefficients of the cumulative number of positive words
are around 0.11 and they are significant at the 5% level of significance. This means that
adding one positive word will increase the standardized expected earnings by 0.11, which
is equivalent to 10% of the median of standardized unexpected earnings (1.154). Thus, the
cumulative number of positive words preceding earnings announcements can predict earnings
surprises.
The previous analysis examines CEOs’ Tweets during a window of 14 days preceding the
earnings announcements. Alternatively, Table 1.11 presents the results of predicting the
earnings surprise using Tweets within 28 days, or 7 days prior to the earnings release. In
Table 1.11, the independent variable of interest in Panel A is the cumulative proportion
of positive words. Column 1 and 2 include Tweets within one week prior to earnings an-
nouncements, and columns 3 and 4 contain Tweets during a window of 28 days preceding the
earnings release. The coefficients of the cumulative proportion of positive words are 1.04 and
0.64 for Tweets during a window of 7 and 28 days, respectively. Recall that the coefficient
of the cumulative proportion of positive words in a window of 14 days is 0.93 in Panel B of
Table 1.9. These findings show that the information content of CEOs’ Tweets is stronger
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when the Tweets posted on days close to earnings announcements. In Panel B of Table 1.11,
we use the cumulative number of positive words to predict the earnings surprise. In columns
1 and 2, the coefficients of the cumulative number of positive words are 0.11 during a 7-day
timeframe and 0.07 during a 28-day window. The coefficients of the cumulative number of
positive words on earnings surprise in a 14-day framework are also 0.11, according to Panel
B of Table 1.10. In summary, the above findings are consistent with information content
theory concerning CEOs’ Tweets, which can be used to predict earnings surprise.
1.5.2 Predicting Firms’ Fundamentals
In this section, we investigate whether the Tweets of CEOs can predict firms’ fundamentals
such as earnings per share, normalized earnings and cash flows.We first investigate the
relationship between quarterly earnings per share and CEOs’ Tweets preceding the end of
each quarter In Table 1.12. Earnings per share are measured as the diluted EPS dividend by
lagged stock price, basic EPS dividend by lagged stock price, income before extraordinary
items adjusted for common stock equivalents divided by lagged capitalization, or income
before extraordinary items available for common divided by lagged capitalization. The
independent variable of interest is the cumulative proportion of positive words in Tweets
during the 14 days prior to the end of each quarter. Panel D of Table 1.1 presents the
summary statistics of these outcome variables on quarterly earnings per share, together with
information about Tweets posted during the two weeks prior to the end of each quarter. For
example, the mean of the cumulative proportion of positive words is 0.025 and the average
number of Tweets posted is 3.77.
The regression equation specification in Table 1.12 is as the following:
Normalized EPS = α + β1Cum. Pos. Prop + β2Cum. Neg. Prop.
+ β3Cum. Num. Tweets + Controls
We include firm and year fixed effects in the odd columns and firm, year and quarter fixed
effects in the even columns. Panel A excludes Tweets about firm activities, while Panel
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B contains all of the Tweets. The coefficients of the cumulative proportion of Tweets are
around 0.034, and they are significant at the 5% level. This means that a 1% increase in the
cumulative proportion of positive Tweets will increase the normalized earnings per share by
0.0003, which is equal to 10% of the mean of normalized earnings per share (0.004). In other
words, having a higher proportion of positive words in the Tweets of CEOs prior to the end
of each quarter is associated with a higher level of earnings per share.
Last, we explore the predictability of CEOs’ Tweets with respect to normalized earnings.
Table 1.13 regresses cumulative measurements of CEOs’ Tweets within 14 days prior to the
end of each quarter on normalized earnings. Normalized earnings are defined as 4 times
net income divided by lagged assets, income before extraordinary items adjusted for com-
mon stock equivalents divided by lagged assets, income before extraordinary items available
for common divided by lagged assets, or cash flow divided by lagged assets. The control
variables and fixed effects are the same as in Table 1.12. Panel A excludes Tweets about
firm operations, and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. The coefficient of the cumulative
proportion of positive words is 0.09 for normalized earnings. Given that the mean of net
income divided by assets is 0.04, a 1% increase in the cumulative proportion of positive
words would enhance the normalized earnings by 0.001, or 3% of the mean. The coefficients
on cash flow are 0.022 in columns 9 and 10, meaning that a 1% increase in the cumulative
proportion of positive words would increase the normalized cash flow by 1% of its mean.
In summary, the above findings show that the Tweets of CEOs contain information about
the firms’ fundamentals. The cumulative measurements of positive words can predict earn-
ings surprise, earnings per share and normalized earnings. When CEOs are confident and
satisfied with firm performance, they are happier and spend more time on personal activities.
Their pleasant mood and enjoyable activities are reflected in Tweets using positive words,
such as “gorgeous, incredible, good, happy, nice, terrific, amazing, and wonderful.”
1.6 Motivation Behind The Tweets
So far, we have shown the information content of the Tweets of CEOs, which can predict a
higher level of stock returns and earnings. In this section, we explore whether CEOs Tweets
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may constitute unintentional release of information without an agenda, or it may be that
CEOs strategically choose the time to release the information.
Literature has found that managers manipulate the timing of corporate voluntary disclo-
sures as a mean of increasing the fair value of executive compensation. These studies focus
on lowering stock prices on option grant dates, given that option exercise prices are set to
be stock prices on award dates. In a manner consistent with this reasoning, Aboody and
Kasznik (2000) find that CEOs manage to rush forward bad news and delay announcements
of good news on earnings prior to option award dates. Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) also
show that stock prices prior to option grants tend to decrease due to the release of bad
discretionary news on earnings, dividends and forecasts. Yermack (1997) examines stock
price movements after award dates and finds that prices increase following option grants due
to favorable earnings announcements.
This paper examines another communication channel through which executives transmit
information to investors, which is the personal social media of CEOs. According to Chauvin
and Shenoy (2001), executives do not want to spoil their compensation packages before
the compensation committee meetings by formally releasing bad news. Thus, executives
manipulate stock prices using informal or private communication methods, given that the
resulting stock prices can be blamed on market misinformation. The personal social media
of CEOs is an informal communication tool, and we have shown that there is information
content in CEOs’ Tweets. In particular, having a higher proportion of positive words is
associated with higher stock returns. Therefore, if CEOs strategically time the disclosure of
information to increase their personal payoff, CEOs would post Tweets that contain a higher
fraction of positive words when they want to increase stock prices. Thus, we compare the
pattern of Tweets that are posted around CEO option exercises and stock sales.
Dates of CEO stock option exercises and stock sales are collected from Table 2 and Table
1 of the Thomson Reuters database. We use managers’ role titles to restrict managers to
CEOs only. We limit the Tweets posted during the 14 days before and the 14 days after the
dates of option exercises and stock sales. Panels E and F in Table 1.1 present the summary
statistics for the proportion of positive and negative words, and the number of words in each
Tweet posted before and after option exercises and stock sales, respectively. For example,
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the average proportion of positive words is 0.017 before option exercises and it is 0.013 after
option exercises, and the difference is significant at the 1% level. The mean of proportion of
negative words is also significantly higher before than after option exercises, but it becomes
insignificant once we control for the firm fixed effect in a regression framework.
Panel A of Table 1.14 explores the pattern of Tweets posted during the 14 days before
and the 14 days after CEO option exercises using the following regression equation:
Characteristics of Tweets = α + β1I(Before Option Exercise) + Controls
Column 1 and 2 examine the proportion of positive words, columns 3 and 4 explore the
proportion of negative words, and columns 5 and 6 investigate the total number of words
in each Tweet. The independent variable of interest is the before option exercise indicator,
which takes on a value of 1 if a Tweet is posted within 14 days prior to option exercises,
and it is equal to 0 if a Tweet occurs within 14 days after option exercises. The control
variables and fixed effects are the same as in Table 1.13. The coefficient of the before option
exercise indicator on the proportion of positive words is 0.0012, and it is significant at the
10% level. It means that CEOs posted a 1% higher fraction of positive words before option
exercises than afterwards. The coefficient of before exercise indicator is insignificant with
respect to the proportion of negative words. Thus, it provides some evidence that CEOs
do not increase the fraction of positive and negative words simultaneously before exercises.
The last two columns show that the number of words in Tweets is 0.33 more before than
after option exercises.
Similarly, Panel B of Table 1.14 presents the pattern of CEOs’ Tweets around the time
of stock sales. The independent variable of interest is the before stock sale indicator, which
takes on a value of 1 if a Tweet is posted during the 14 days prior to stock sales, and it is
equal to 0 if a Tweet occurs within 14 days after stock sales. The coefficient of before stock
sale indicator on the proportion of positive words is 0.0013 and it is significant at the 5%
level. The coefficient on the proportion of negative words is 0.002 and it is not significant at
the 10% level. These results show that CEOs post Tweets that contain a higher proportion
of positive words, but not a higher proportion of negative words, before they sell their stocks.
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The above findings provide some evidence that CEOs strategically post Tweets that con-
tain a higher proportion of positive words in order to manipulate stock price upward before
option exercises and stock sales. These results are consistent with the literature showing
that executives are incentivized to inflate stock prices leading up to option exercises. For
example, Balachandran et al. (2008) suggest that firms use buyback programs to increase
stock prices and maximize payoff from option exercises.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
Using one hundred thousand personal Tweets of CEOs posted during their tenure, we test
four competing hypotheses about the relationship of CEOs’ Tweets and market reaction.
First, CEOs’ personal Tweets are irrelevant with respect to firms’ fundamentals, or the
information about firms’ fundamentals is already incorporated into stock prices. If the
fraction of positive words in Tweets is a noise measurement of positive information about
firms, the coefficient of positive words in the regressions on firms’ fundamentals should
be zero. Similarly, if the proportion of positive words in Tweets is a proxy for positive
information about firms’ fundamentals that is already incorporated into prices, we should
find no predictive power for future market activities. Given that we document a significant
positive relationship between the proportion of positive words in Tweets and firms’ stock
returns and earnings, we reject this hypothesis.
Second, sentiment theory holds that irrational investors misinterpret the positive words in
Tweets and buy stocks, causing a stationary increase in returns. If the higher stock returns
are due to sentiment, we should see returns rebound during the next period when there
is a new information about firms. However, we do not observe the CAR around earnings
announcements reverses during a 28-day window. In addition, based on sentiment theory,
we should not find there to be predictability concerning CEOs’ Tweets regarding firms’
fundamentals, such as earnings surprises. Third, the conspiracy hypothesis contends that a
temporary increase in stock price is caused by false information due to CEO corruption. If
higher stock returns are the results of conspiracy, we should find that stock prices reverse
when investors discover the true information. Given that we find that CAR around earnings
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announcements increases persistently, and that Tweets can predict firms’ earnings, we reject
both the sentiment and conspiracy hypotheses.
Fourth, information theory believes that positive words in Tweets are proxies about firms’
fundamentals that are not currently incorporated into stock prices. My findings support the
information content hypothesis. We find that the proportion of positive words in CEOs’
Tweets can predict stock returns, especially before earnings announcements. Furthermore,
the cumulative measurements of positive words can predict earnings surprise, earnings per
share and normalized earnings. Intuitively, when CEOs are confident and satisfied with their
firms’ performance, they tend to tweet using positive tones about their daily lives. Messages
containing positive words derive from pleasant mood or enjoyable activities, such as dining
out, travelling, watching sports, spending time with family, hanging out with friends and
appreciating the scenery.
This paper is closed related to Yermack (2014). Tracking corporate jet flights, he finds
a connection between CEO vacations and the timing of corporate information release. He
shows that corporations withhold good news and release it immediately after CEOs return
from vacations. Compared to his measurement of CEOs’ private activities using jet flights,
my measurement using the Tweets of CEOs is simpler to measure and has a higher frequency.
To be specific, flights may happen infrequently, whereas Tweets of CEOs could occur daily.
Counting the proportion of positive words in Tweets can allow investors to infer CEOs’ job
achievements and attainability, such as whether CEOs have achieved the earnings target goal.
These findings can be used to develop trading strategies. For example, using Tweets posted
before earnings announcements, a daily calendar-time spread portfolio that buys stocks with
a high proportion of positive words and sells stocks with a low proportion delivers a return
of 10.8 to 19.6 basis points per day. However, the limitation of this paper is the sample
selection bias. Only 10% of CEOs have their own personal Twitter accounts.
In comparing the literature on information content, this study relies on the personal social
media of CEOs, while the literature focuses on media coverage, analysts’ forecasts and firms’
publicly disclosed accounting variables. We measure the tone of CEOs’ Tweets by tracking
positive words in order to infer CEO job performance and thus business prospects. This is







Figure 1.1 Daily stock returns and positive words in Tweets 
The following graphs plot the relationship between positive words in Tweets and stock returns. Panel A 
plots the daily stock returns after CEOs posting Tweets on bins of the proportion of positive words in 
Tweets. The proportion of positive words is defined as the number of positive words divided by the total 
number of words in each Tweet. Bin 0 includes Tweets with zero positive word, bin 1 contains Tweets 
with (0, 0.1] proportion of positive words, bin2 to bin 4 have (0.1, 0.2], (0.2, 0.3] and (0.3, 0.4] 
proportion, respectively, and bin 5 contains Tweets with more than 0.4 fraction. Panel B plots the daily 
stock returns on the number of positive words. If a Tweet contains more than 5 positive words, it is 
included in the last bar with 5 positive words.  
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Figure 1.2 Cumulative abnormal returns around Tweet days before earnings announcements  
The following graphs plot the cumulative abnormal return around the Tweet days before earnings 
announcements. The abnormal return is measured as the difference between the daily stock return and the 
equal-weighted market return. The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of abnormal returns 14 days 
before CEOs post the Tweets to 14 days afterwards. Cumulative abnormal returns are plotted separately 
for three groups: days with no Tweets posted (red squares), days with Tweets posted that contain no 
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Table 1.1 Summary statistics  
The following tables present summary statistics. Panel A describes stock return, Fama-French 3 factors, 
and Tweet information on days that CEOs post Tweets. Panel B reports firm and CEO characteristics, 
which are measured at the end of the previous year. Panel C reports summary statistics on earnings 
announcement days, which includes the cumulative measurements of Tweets. The cumulative 
measurements are counted starting 14 days to 1 day prior to earnings announcements. Panel D reports 
other outcome variables on firms’ fundamentals, such as earnings per share, normalized earnings and cash 
flow. These outcome variables are measured at the end of each quarter. The cumulative measurements of 
Tweets are counted 14 days to 1 day prior to the end of each quarter. Panel E compares information on 
Tweets that are posted during 14 days before CEO option exercises with those posted during 14 days after 
option exercises. Panel F reported the summary statistics of Tweets that are posted during 14 days prior to 
CEO stock sales and during 14 days after stock sales.  
 
A: On Tweet days (N=127,916) 
 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Mean Std 
Daily stock return (%)  -2.234 -0.914 0.023 1.063 2.356 0.075 0.021 
Small minus big  -0.600 -0.310 0.010 0.330 0.630 0.012 0.517 
High minus low   -0.570 -0.310 -0.040 0.260 0.540 -0.017 0.486 
Market premium    -1.030 -0.330 0.060 0.500 1.100 0.055 0.938 
Pos. prop  0.000 0.000 0.053 0.111 0.174 0.072 0.102 
Neg. prop 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.018 0.049 
Total words 5.000 9.000 14.000 19.000 23.000 14.191 7.414 
I(firm related)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.113 
 
B: Firm and CEO characteristics (N=819) 
 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Mean Std 
Cash to assets  0.020 0.061 0.137 0.291 0.468 0.200 0.188 
Total assets ($million) 233 592 2797 13020 65444 19950 42074 
Market to book  1.188 1.916 3.129 5.599 10.878 5.197 7.029 
Return on assets  -0.042 0.010 0.038 0.077 0.132 0.037 0.101 
Market leverage  0.082 0.156 0.287 0.487 0.694 0.342 0.229 
CEO total 
comp.($thousand) 
1137 2292 4880 10155 17569 6832 5737 
CEO age  44.000 48.000 52.000 57.000 61.000 52.631 7.132 
CEO tenure  0.000 1.000 5.000 11.000 17.000 7.196 7.728 
 
C: On earnings announcement days (N=4,544) 
 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Mean Std 
Stand. unexpected 
Earnings  
-1.761 -0.167 1.154 2.959 5.495 1.633 7.813 
Cum. pos. num. 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 5.000 1.309 2.917 
Cum. neg. num 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.431 1.533 
Cum. Tweets 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 7.000 1.858 4.004 
Cum. words 0.000 0.000 0.000 24.000 97.000 26.121 56.403 
Cum. pos. prop. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.074 0.020 0.042 








Cont. of Table 1.1 
D: Other fundamental outcome variables (N=5,306) 
 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Mean Std 
Diluted EPS / price 0.011 0.003 0.009 0.016 0.024 0.004 0.044 
Basic EPS / price -0.011 0.003 0.009 0.016 0.024 0.004 0.044 
Income before /cap.  -0.011 0.003 0.010 0.016 0.024 0.004 0.044 
Income before adj. / cap.  -0.011 0.003 0.009 0.016 0.024 0.004 0.044 
Income before for 
common / cap. 
-0.011 0.003 0.009 0.016 0.024 0.004 0.044 
net income/assets  -0.050 0.009 0.043 0.087 0.149 0.038 0.148 
Income before /assets  -0.046 0.009 0.043 0.085 0.148 0.039 0.142 
Income before adj. / 
assets 
-0.047 0.009 0.043 0.085 0.148 0.038 0.143 
Income before for 
common / assets 
-0.047 0.009 0.043 0.085 0.148 0.038 0.143 
Cash flow / assets -0.002 0.010 0.021 0.033 0.050 0.020 0.037 
Cum. pos. num. 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 10.000 3.532 11.971 
Cum. neg. num 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.947 5.325 
Cum. Tweets 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000 9.000 3.769 14.263 
Cum. words 0.000 0.000 0.000 27.000 142.000 54.186 198.810 
Cum. pos. prop. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.088 0.025 0.047 
Cum. neg. prop.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.005 0.016 
 
E: Tweets around option exercises  
 Before and after 
option exercises 
Before option exercise 
 
After option exercise Difference 
 
 P50 Mean P50 Mean P50 Mean  
Pos. prop  0.000 0.016 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.013 0.005*** 
Neg. prop 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.001*** 
Total words 0.000 3.195 0.000 3.521 0.000 2.677 0.843*** 
N 30,933 30,933 18,984 18,984 11,949 11,949  
 
F: Tweets around stock sales  
 Before and after stock 
sale 
Before stock sale 
 
After stock sale Difference 
 
 P50 Mean P50 Mean P50 Mean  
Pos. prop  0.000 0.019 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.015 0.006*** 
Neg. prop 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.001*** 
Total words 0.000 3.781 0.000 4.101 0.000 3.225 0.877*** 












Table 1.2 Predicting stock returns on days with Tweets  
The following tables report the relation between daily stock returns and the fraction of positive words in 
Tweets. The proportion of positive words is defined as the number of positive words divided by the total 
number of words in a Tweet. The controls include the proportion of negative words, the total number of 
words, Fama-French factors, firm characteristics, and CEO characteristics. Panel A excludes Tweets 
related to firm operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. We include industry or firm interacting 
with time fixed effects. Error is clustered at the firm and year level. T-statistics are reported in the 
parenthesis.  
A: Exclude firm operations related Tweets  
 Stock Return on Tweet day (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.131** 0.130** 0.106** 0.124**  
(2.58) (2.35) (2.40) (2.79) 
Neg. prop. -0.072 -0.082 -0.14 -0.193*   
(-0.57) (-0.67) (-1.45) (-2.12)    
Total words  -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(-0.23) (-0.37) (0.62) (0.74) 
Small minus 
big  
0.339*** 0.324*** 0.336*** 0.325*** 
(4.32) (4.28) (4.48) (4.44) 
High minus 
low 
-0.008 -0.002 -0.023 -0.015 
(-0.14) (-0.03) (-0.41) (-0.26)    
Market risk 
premium  
0.764*** 0.764*** 0.761*** 0.756*** 
(19.40) (20.69) (20.67) (21.04) 
     
R square  0.171 0.205 0.186 0.246 
N 117,332 117,233 124,827 124,251 
Control  Yes Yes No No 
Fixed effect Ind*Y*Q Ind*Y*M Firm*Y*Q Firm*Y*M 
  
B: Include all Tweets  
 Stock Return on Tweet day (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.137** 0.137** 0.113** 0.130**  
(2.61) (2.46) (2.58) (2.92) 
Neg. prop. -0.081 -0.089 -0.152 -0.201*   
(-0.65) (-0.74) (-1.52) (-2.20)    
Total words  -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(-0.24) (-0.37) (0.55) (0.61) 
Small minus big  0.340*** 0.324*** 0.338*** 0.326*** 
(4.37) (4.33) (4.53) (4.49) 
High minus low -0.008 -0.001 -0.023 -0.014 
(-0.14) (-0.02) (-0.40) (-0.24)    
Market risk 
premium  
0.766*** 0.766*** 0.764*** 0.758*** 
(19.29) (20.64) (20.72) (21.07) 
     
R square  0.171 0.206 0.186 0.247 
N 118,842 118,744 126,465 125,881 
Control  Yes Yes No No 





Table 1.3 Predicting stock returns including days without Tweets  
The following tables report the relation between daily stock returns and the fraction of positive words in 
Tweets, including days that CEOs do not post Tweets. The proportion of positive words is defined as the 
number of positive words divided by the total number of words in a Tweet, and it is equal to zero if there 
is no Tweet posted. The controls include the proportion of negative words, the total number of words, 
Fama-French factors, firm characteristics, and CEO characteristics. Panel A excludes Tweets related to 
firm operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. We include industry or firm interacting with time 
fixed effects. Error is clustered at the firm and year level.  
A: Exclude firm operations related Tweets  
 Stock Return on Tweet day (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.182*** 0.180** 0.120** 0.134*** 
(3.19) (2.82) (2.86) (3.33) 
Neg. prop. 0.006 0.01 -0.126 -0.162 
(0.05) (0.09) (-1.22) (-1.72)    
Total words  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001**  
(3.93) (4.13) (2.06) (2.39) 
Small minus 
big  
0.513*** 0.511*** 0.522*** 0.520*** 
(11.82) (11.78) (11.96) (12.04) 
High minus 
low 
0.032 0.035 0.028 0.031 
(0.83) (0.91) (0.70) (0.76) 
Market risk 
premium  
0.931*** 0.928*** 0.922*** 0.918*** 
(39.77) (39.02) (32.84) (31.90) 
     
R square  0.272 0.284 0.272 0.305 
N 509,530 509,525 551,682 551,633 
Controls  Yes Yes No No 
Fixed effect Ind*Y*Q Ind*Y*M Firm*Y*Q Firm*Y*M 
 
B: Include all Tweets  
 Stock Return on Tweet day (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.189*** 0.187** 0.127*** 0.142*** 
(3.28) (2.90) (3.14) (3.65) 
Neg. prop. -0.002 0.003 -0.136 -0.171 
(-0.02) (0.03) (-1.26) (-1.74)    
Total words  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001**  
(3.85) (4.02) (2.05) (2.35) 
Small minus 
big  
0.513*** 0.511*** 0.522*** 0.520*** 
(11.83) (11.80) (11.98) (12.06) 
High minus 
low 
0.032 0.035 0.028 0.031 
(0.83) (0.91) (0.69) (0.77) 
Market risk 
premium  
0.931*** 0.928*** 0.922*** 0.918*** 
(39.80) (39.06) (32.86) (31.93) 
     
R square  0.272 0.284 0.272 0.304 
N 511,041 511,036 553,322 553,273 
Controls  Yes Yes No No 




Table 1.4 Predicting subsequent stock returns  
The following tables report the relation between future daily stock returns and the fraction of positive 
words in Tweets, including days without Tweets posted. The proportion of positive words is defined as 
the number of positive words divided by the total number of words in a Tweet; it is equal to zero if there 
is no Tweets posted. Panel A excludes Tweets related to firm operations and Panel B contains all of the 
Tweets. We control for the Fama-French factors on the future days. We include firm interacting with time 
fixed effects. The error is clustered at the firm and year level. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis.  











































  Future Daily Stock Return (%) 
 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.111*** 0.093* 0.101** -0.096** 
(4.70) (1.87) (2.23) (-2.23) 
Neg. prop. -0.04 0.223 -0.058 -0.078 
(-0.43) (1.77) (-0.42) (-0.63) 
Total words  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.45) (0.86) (0.59) (0.36) 
Small minus big  0.575*** 0.574*** 0.573*** 0.565*** 
(13.25) (13.33) (13.61) (13.3) 
High minus low 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.014 
(0.40) (0.36) (0.28) (0.32) 
Market risk 
premium  
0.959*** 0.957*** 0.958*** 0.953*** 
(25.87) (26.27) (26.3) (26.18) 
     
R square  0.327 0.327 0.328 0.324 
N 551,412 551,182 550,971 550,356 
controls  No No No No 
Fixed effect Firm*Y*M Firm*Y*M Firm*Y*M Firm*Y*M 
  Future Daily Stock Return (%) 
 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.111*** 0.093* 0.090* -0.096** 
(3.74) (2.03) (1.96) (-2.16) 
Neg. prop. -0.034 0.204 -0.045 -0.092 
(-0.36) -1.56 (-0.33) (-0.80) 
Total words  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.45) 0.98 0.70 0.46 
Small minus big  0.576*** 0.574*** 0.573*** 0.565*** 
13.25 13.34 13.58 13.3 
High minus low 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.014 
0.40 0.37 0.28 0.31 
Market risk 
premium  
0.959*** 0.957*** 0.958*** 0.953*** 
25.83 26.27 26.24 26.16 
     
R square  0.327 0.327 0.328 0.324 
N 553,051 552,821 552,610 551,993 
controls  No No No No 




Table 1.5 Days prior to earnings announcements  
The following tables report the relation between daily stock returns and the fraction of positive words in 
Tweets during two weeks prior to earnings announcements, including days that CEOs do not post Tweets. 
The proportion of positive words is defined as the number of positive words divided by the total number 
of words in a Tweet and it is equal to zero if there is no Tweet posted. The controls include the proportion 
of negative words, the total number of words, Fama-French factors, firm characteristics, and CEO 
characteristics. Panel A excludes Tweets related to firm operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. 
We include industry or firm interacting with time fixed effects. The error is clustered at the firm level. 
A: Exclude firm operations related Tweets  
 Stock Return on Tweet day (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.452*** 0.440*** 0.411*** 0.408**  
(2.74) (2.60) (2.63) (2.35) 
Neg. prop. -0.355 -0.273 -0.568* -0.45 
(-1.19) (-0.93) (-1.81) (-1.42)    
Total words  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
(0.77) (0.72) (0.72) (0.78) 
Small minus big  0.559*** 0.563*** 0.574*** 0.574*** 
(11.58) (11.29) (11.99) (11.82) 
High minus low 0.073* 0.073 0.074* 0.07 
(1.69) (1.65) (1.70) (1.59) 
Market risk 
premium  
0.942*** 0.940*** 0.931*** 0.930*** 
(38.75) (38.91) (38.39) (38.64) 
     
R square  0.294 0.316 0.337 0.372 
N 74,892 74,826 79,716 79,488 
Controls  Yes Yes No No 
Fixed effect Ind*Y*Q Ind*Y*M Firm*Y*Q Firm*Y*M 
 
B: Include all Tweets 
 Stock Return on Tweet day (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.431*** 0.422** 0.386** 0.392**  
(2.67) (2.55) (2.49) (2.28) 
Neg. prop. -0.346 -0.257 -0.563* -0.444 
(-1.16) (-0.88) (-1.80) (-1.42)    
Total words  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.84) (0.81) (0.80) (0.81) 
Small minus big  0.558*** 0.562*** 0.573*** 0.574*** 
(11.54) (11.26) (11.97) (11.81) 
High minus low 0.072* 0.073 0.074* 0.07 
(1.66) (1.63) (1.69) (1.58) 
Market risk 
premium  
0.941*** 0.940*** 0.930*** 0.929*** 
(38.72) (38.85) (38.34) (38.55) 
     
R square  0.294 0.316 0.336 0.371 
N 75,121 75,055 79,971 79,744 
Controls  Yes Yes No No 





Table 1.6 Predicting stock return on earnings announcements  
The following tables report the relation between stock returns on earnings announcements and the fraction 
of positive words in Tweets during two weeks prior to earnings announcements, including days without 
Tweets posted. The proportion of positive words is defined as the number of positive words divided by 
the total number of words in a Tweet; it is equal to zero if there is no Tweets posted. The dependent 
variable is daily stock returns on earnings announcements. Panel A excludes Tweets related to firm 
operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. The controls include firm characteristics and CEO 
features. We include industry interacting with time fixed effects. The error is clustered at the firm level. 
T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis.  









































   Daily stock return on earnings announcements (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.861*** 0.776*** 0.780*** 0.714*** 
(2.95) (2.79) (2.76) (2.62) 
Neg. prop. -1.273 -1.277 -1.281 -1.176 
(-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.28) (-1.15)    
Total words  0.013** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.013**  
(2.41) (2.06) (2.78) (2.49) 
Small minus big    0.668*** 0.672*** 
  (5.64) (5.67) 
High minus low   -0.153 -0.081 
  (-1.57) (-0.74)    
Market risk 
premium  
  0.927*** 0.936*** 
  (17.98) (16.98) 
     
R square  0.379 0.467 0.453 0.53 
N 64,671 64,604 64,671 64,604 
controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Ind*Y*Q Ind*Y*M Ind*Y*Q Ind*Y*M 
   Daily stock return on earnings announcements (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pos. prop 0.850*** 0.757*** 0.768*** 0.696**  
(2.91) (2.73) (2.72) (2.56) 
Neg. prop. -1.415 -1.411 -1.407 -1.293 
(-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.43) (-1.29)    
Total words  0.013** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.013**  
(2.42) (2.07) (2.81) (2.52) 
Small minus big    0.669*** 0.673*** 
  (5.65) (5.68) 
High minus low   -0.153 -0.082 
  (-1.57) (-0.75)    
Market risk 
premium  
  0.928*** 0.937*** 
  (18.02) (17.02) 
     
R square  0.379 0.467 0.453 0.53 
N 64,775 64,708 64,775 64,708 
controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 1.7 Predicting stock return on earnings announcements using cumulative positive words  
The following tables report the relation between daily stock returns on earnings announcements and the 
cumulative proportion of positive words in Tweets prior to earnings announcements. The cumulative 
measurements of Tweets are counted starting 14 days and ending 1 day prior to earnings announcements. 
The independent variable of interest is the cumulative proportion of positive words, and the dependent 
variable is daily stock returns on earnings announcements. The controls include firm characteristics and 
CEO features. Panel A excludes Tweets related to firm operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. 
We include industry and time fixed effects. Error is clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in 
the parenthesis. 
 
A: Exclude firm operations related Tweets 
 Daily stock return on earnings announcements (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cum. pos. prop. 1.614* 1.749* 1.651* 1.762* 
(2.03) (2.16) (1.89) (2.04) 
Cum. neg. prop. -6.773 -6.548 -6.523 -6.428 
(-1.57) (-1.50) (-1.58) (-1.56) 
Cum. Tweets 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.027 
(1.04) (1.07) (0.99) (1.05) 
Small minus big    0.553*** 0.549*** 
   -4.37 (4.36) 
High minus low   -0.179 -0.167 
   (-1.51) (-1.38) 
Market risk 
premium  
  0.861*** 0.858*** 
  (13.62) (12.78) 
     
R square 0.021 0.023 0.118 0.119 
N 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Ind, Y Ind, Y ,Q Ind, Y Ind, Y ,Q 
 
B: Include all Tweets  
 Daily stock return on earnings announcements (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cum. pos. prop. 1.659* 1.798** 1.693* 1.806* 
(2.12) (2.25) (2.02) (2.16) 
Cum. neg. prop. -6.97 -6.757 -6.77 -6.688 
(-1.58) (-1.52) (-1.61) (-1.60) 
Cum. Tweets 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.026 
(1.08) (1.11) (1.01) (1.07) 
Small minus big    0.553*** 0.548*** 
   (4.37) (4.36) 
High minus low   -0.179 -0.167 
   (-1.51) (-1.38) 
Market risk 
premium  
  0.862*** 0.858*** 
  (13.6) (12.76) 
     
R square 0.021 0.023 0.118 0.119 
N 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 1.8 Portfolio returns: 14 days before earnings announcement  
The following tables report Fama-French factor alphas on daily portfolios that buy stocks with a high 
proportion of positive words in their CEOs’ Tweets and sell stocks with a low fraction of positive words 
during the 14 days prior to earnings announcements. The sample contains 988 days that have at least two 
Tweets posted, including at least one Tweet with positive words. We sort the Tweets based on the 
proportion of positive words on Tweet days (Day 0) and rebalance the portfolios daily. We long stocks 
that rank in the top 10th percentile of the proportion of positive words and short the stocks in the bottom 
10th percentile, using either equal- or value-weighting schemes across firms. The holding period is a day 
in Panel B-C and a week in Panel D. The following tables report alphas and factor loadings by regressing 
daily stock returns on risk factors.  
A: Summary statistics  
 Sort proportion of positive words on Day 0 
   Top 10 Bottom 10 
   (1) (2) 












Portfolio Day 1 
return (%) 




Num of Tweets in portfolio    1,220 1,200 
 
B: Long stocks that rank in the top 10 percentiles of the prop. pos. words (equal-weighted)  
 Stock return on Day 1 (%) 
 Positive words Lack positive words Positive – lack 
positive 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Alpha  0.128** -0.044 0.172*** 
 (2.60) (-0.86) (3.50) 
Small minus big  0.588*** 0.452*** 0.136 
 (3.80) (3.53) (0.72) 
High minus low -0.304 -0.153 -0.151 
 (-1.67) (-1.35) (-0.81)    
Market risk premium  0.938*** 1.113*** -0.175*   


















Cont. of Table 1.8 
C: Long stocks that rank in the top 10 percentiles of the prop. pos. words (value-weighted)  
 Stock return on Day 1 (%) 
 Positive words Lack positive words Positive – lack positive 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Alpha  0.133*** -0.063 0.196*** 
 (3.42) (-1.34) (3.57) 
Small minus big  0.518*** 0.410*** 0.108 
 (3.31) (3.58) (0.55) 
High minus low -0.313* -0.157 -0.155 
 (-1.96) (-1.50) (-0.92)    
Market risk premium  0.929*** 1.117*** -0.188**  
 (18.41) (17.41) (-2.79)    
 
D: Long stocks that rank in the top 10 percentiles and hold for a week (equal-weighted) 
 Stock return in week 1 (%) 
 Positive words Lack positive words Positive – lack positive 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Alpha  0.125*** 0.016 0.108**  
 (2.81) (0.38) (2.27) 
Small minus big  0.501*** 0.465*** 0.037 
 (5.45) (5.25) (0.37) 
High minus low -0.135 0.003 -0.138 
 (-1.45) (0.03) (-1.37)    
Market risk premium  0.990*** 1.068*** -0.078 






Table 1.9 Predicting earnings surprise using the proportion of positive words  
The following tables report the relationship between earnings surprise and the cumulative proportion of 
positive words in Tweets prior to earnings announcements. The cumulative measurements of Tweets are 
counted starting 14 days and ending 1 day prior to earnings announcements. The independent variable of 
interest is the cumulative proportion of positive words, and the dependent variable is standardized 
unexpected earnings. Standardized unexpected earnings are measured as the difference between actual 
quarterly earnings and the mean of analysts’ forecasts (earnings surprise), divided by the standard 
deviation of earnings surprise. The controls include the cumulative proportion of negative words, the 
cumulative number of Tweets, firm characteristics, and CEO characteristics. Panel A excludes Tweets 
related to firm operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. We include industry or firm and time 
fixed effects. Error is clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. 
A: Exclude firm operations related Tweets  
 Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cum. pos. prop.  0.797* 0.784* 0.938* 0.925* 
(1.83) (1.83) (1.94) (1.96) 
Cum. neg. prop. -0.996 -0.951 -1.182 -1.130 
(-0.80) (-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.81) 
Cum. Tweets -0.029 -0.030 -0.033 -0.035 
(-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.93) (-0.99) 
     
R square  0.047 0.048 0.111 0.111 
N 4,121 4,121 4,114 4,114 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Ind, Y Ind, Y ,Q Firm, Y Firm, Y, Q 
 
B: Include all Tweets  
 Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cum. pos. prop.  0.813* 0.802* 0.941* 0.930* 
(1.85) (1.84) (1.93) (1.94) 
Cum. neg. prop. -0.922 -0.877 -1.124 -1.070 
(-0.75) (-0.71) (-0.81) (-0.77) 
Cum. Tweets -0.030 -0.032 -0.035 -0.037 
(-0.78) (-0.81) (-0.96) (-1.02) 
     
R square  0.047 0.048 0.111 0.111 
N 4,121 4,121 4,114 4,114 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Table 1.10 Predicting earnings surprise using the number of positive words  
The following tables report the relationship between earnings surprise and the cumulative number of 
positive words in Tweets prior to earnings announcements. The cumulative measurements of Tweets are 
counted starting 14 days and ending 1 day prior to earnings announcements. The independent variable of 
interest is the cumulative number of positive words, and the dependent variable is standardized 
unexpected earnings. Standardized unexpected earnings are measured as the difference between actual 
quarterly earnings and the mean of analysts’ forecasts (earnings surprise), divided by the standard 
deviation of earnings surprise. The controls include the cumulative number of negative words, the 
cumulative number of Tweets, firm characteristics, and CEO characteristics. Panel A excludes Tweets 
related to firm operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets We include industry or firm and time 
fixed effects. Error is clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. 
A: Exclude firm operations related Tweets  
 Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cum. pos. num.  0.107** 0.103** 0.112** 0.109** 
(2.49) (2.41) (2.24) (2.19) 
Cum. neg. num. 0.031 0.034 0.007 0.012 
(0.44) (0.48) (0.10) (0.15) 
Cum. Tweets -0.079* -0.079* -0.076* -0.077* 
(-1.85) (-1.83) (-1.93) (-1.95) 
     
R square  0.047 0.048 0.111 0.111 
N 4,121 4,121 4,114 4,114 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Ind, Y Ind, Y ,Q Firm, Y Firm, Y, Q 
 
Panel B: Include all Tweets  
 Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cum. pos. num.  0.107** 0.104** 0.112** 0.108** 
(2.52) (2.44) (2.24) (2.19) 
Cum. neg. num. 0.034 0.037 0.009 0.014 
(0.48) (0.52) (0.13) (0.18) 
Cum. Tweets -0.079* -0.079* -0.077* -0.077* 
(-1.87) (-1.86) (-1.95) (-1.97) 
     
R square  0.047 0.048 0.111 0.111 
N 4,121 4,121 4,114 4,114 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Table 1.11 Predicting earnings surprise using alternative timeframes 
The following tables report the relationship between earnings surprise and the cumulative proportion or 
number of positive words in Tweets prior to earnings announcements, using alternative timeframes. In 
columns 1 and 2, the cumulative measurements of Tweets are counted starting 7 days and ending 1 day 
prior to earnings announcements. In columns 3 and 4, the cumulative measurements are counted starting 
28 days and ending 1 day prior to earnings announcements. The independent variable of interest is the 
cumulative proportion of positive words in Panel A, and the cumulative number of positive words in 
Panel B. The dependent variables are standardized unexpected earnings, which are measured as the 
difference between actual quarterly earnings and the mean of analysts’ forecasts (earnings surprise), 
divided by the standard deviation of earnings surprise. The controls include the cumulative proportion or 
number of negative words, the cumulative number of Tweets, firm characteristics, and CEO 
characteristics. We include firm and time fixed effects. Error is clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are 
reported in the parenthesis. 
A: Proportion of positive words 
 Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
 One week Four weeks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cum. pos. prop.  1.045* 1.039* 0.644* 0.631* 
(1.74) (1.76) (1.73) (1.72) 
Cum. neg. prop. -1.314 -1.281 -0.044 -0.029 
(-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.05) (-0.03) 
Cum. Tweets -0.047 -0.050 -0.019 -0.020 
(-1.05) (-1.10) (-0.75) (-0.79) 
     
R square  0.111 0.111 0.112 0.112 
N 4,106 4,106 4,128 4,128 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effect Firm, Y Firm, Y, Q Firm, Y Firm, Y, Q 
 
B: Number of positive words 
 Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
 One week Four weeks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cum. pos. num.  0.111* 0.107* 0.067* 0.065* 
(1.80) (1.76) (1.81) (1.77) 
Cum. neg. num. 0.070 0.073 0.049 0.050 
(0.68) (0.68) (-0.90) (0.91) 
Cum. Tweets -0.094* -0.094* -0.041 -0.041 
(-1.83) (-1.83) (-1.52) (-1.53) 
     
R square  0.111 0.111 0.112 0.112 
N 4,106 4,106 4,128 4,128 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes 








Table 1.12 Predicting earnings per share using positive words  
The following tables report the relationship between earnings per shares and the cumulative positive 
words in Tweets. The cumulative measurements of Tweets are counted starting 14 days and ending 1 day 
prior to the end of each quarter. The independent variable of interest is the cumulative proportion of 
positive words, and dependent variables are earnings per share at the end of each quarter. Earnings per 
share are measured as the diluted EPS dividend by lagged stock price in columns 1-2, basic EPS dividend 
by lagged stock price in columns 3-4, income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock 
equivalents divided by lagged capitalization in columns 5-6, and income before extraordinary items 
available for common divided by lagged capitalization in columns 7-8. The controls include the 
cumulative proportion of negative words, the cumulative number of Tweets, and firm and CEO 
characteristics. Panel A excludes Tweets related to firm operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. 
We include firm and time fixed effects. Error is clustered at the firm level. 
A: Exclude firm operations related Tweets  








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Cum. pos. 
prop.  
0.034** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 
(2.21) (2.19) (2.17) (2.15) (2.21) (2.20) (2.20) (2.18) 
Cum. neg. 
prop. 
-0.023 -0.022 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 
(-0.90) (-0.84) (-0.93) (-0.87) (-0.90) (-0.84) (-0.90) (-0.84) 
Cum. 
Tweets 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.57) (-0.54) (-0.49) (-0.45) (-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.50) 
         
R square  0.227 0.229 0.225 0.228 0.228 0.231 0.228 0.23 
N 4,833 4,833 4,833 4,833 4,831 4,831 4,831 4,831 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed 
effect 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
 
B: Include all Tweets  








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Cum. pos. 
prop.  
0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.034** 0.034** 0.033** 0.033** 
(2.18) (2.17) (2.14) (2.13) (2.19) (2.17) (2.17) (2.16) 
Cum. neg. 
prop. 
-0.02 -0.019 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.019 -0.02 -0.019 
(-0.76) (-0.71) (-0.79) (-0.73) (-0.76) (-0.71) (-0.76) (-0.71) 
Cum. 
Tweets 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.55) (-0.52) (-0.47) (-0.44) (-0.50) (-0.47) (-0.51) (-0.48) 
         
R square  0.227 0.229 0.225 0.228 0.228 0.231 0.228 0.23 
N 4,833 4,833 4,833 4,833 4,831 4,831 4,831 4,831 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed 
effect 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 









Table 1.13 Predicting earnings using positive words  
The following tables report the relationship between normalized earnings and the cumulative positive 
words in Tweets. The cumulative measurements of Tweets are counted starting 14 days and ending 1 day 
prior to the end of each quarter. The independent variable of interest is the cumulative proportion of 
positive words, and dependent variables are earnings at the end of each quarter. Earnings are measured as 
4 times the net income divided by lagged assets in columns 1-2, income before extraordinary items 
adjusted for common stock equivalents divided by lagged assets in columns 3-4, income before 
extraordinary items available for common divided by lagged assets in columns 5-6, and cash flow (sum of 
net income and depreciation expenses) divided by lagged assets in columns 7-8. The controls include the 
cumulative proportion of negative words, the cumulative number of Tweets, and firm and CEO 
characteristics. Panel A excludes Tweets related to firm operations and Panel B contains all of the Tweets. 
We include firm and time fixed effects. Error is clustered at the firm level. 
A: Exclude firm operations related Tweets  
 Net income 
/assets 
Income before adj. 
/assets 
Income before 
common / assets 
Cash flow 
/assets 
 (1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Cum. pos. 
prop.  
0.091** 0.090** 0.082** 0.082** 0.082** 0.082** 0.023** 0.023** 
(2.28) (2.26) (2.15) (2.12) (2.15) (2.13) (2.33) (2.31) 
Cum. neg. 
prop. 
0.022 0.023 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.34) (0.35) (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (-0.32) (-0.30) 
Cum. 
Tweets 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.07) (-0.06) 
         
R square  0.321 0.322 0.349 0.351 0.349 0.351 0.355 0.356 
N 4,859 4,859 4,859 4,859 4,859 4,859 4,714 4,714 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed 
effect 
Firm, Y Firm, 
Y, Q 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
Firm, Y Firm, 
Y, Q 
Firm, Y Firm, 
Y, Q 
 
B: Include all Tweets  
 Net income 
/assets 
Income before adj. 
/assets 
Income before 
common / assets 
Cash flow 
/assets 
 (1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Cum. pos. 
prop.  
0.085** 0.085** 0.076** 0.076** 0.076** 0.076** 0.022** 0.022** 
(2.16) (2.15) (2.01) (2.00) (2.02) (2.00) (2.23) (2.21) 
Cum. neg. 
prop. 
0.037 0.038 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.54) (0.54) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44) (-0.091) (-0.082) 
Cum. 
Tweets 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.20) (-0.18) (-0.200) (-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.08) 
         
R square  0.321 0.322 0.349 0.351 0.349 0.351 0.355 0.356 
N 4,859 4,859 4,859 4,859 4,859 4,859 4,714 4,714 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed 
effect 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 
Firm, Y Firm, Y, 
Q 









Table 1.14 Comparing Tweets around option exercises and stock sales   
The following tables report characteristics of Tweets posted during 14 days before and 14 days after CEO 
option exercises in Panel A and stock sales in Panel B. The characteristics of Tweets include the 
proportion of positive and negative words, and the number of words. In panel A, the independent variable 
of interest is the before CEO option exercise indicator, which takes on a value of 1 if it is posted within 14 
days prior to option exercises, and it is equal to 0 if a Tweet is posted within 14 days after option 
exercises. In panel B, the independent variable of interest is the before CEO stock sale date indicator, 
which takes on a value of 1 if a Tweet is posted within 14 days prior to stock sales, and it is equal to 0 if a 
Tweet is posted within 14 days after stock sales. The dependent variable is the proportion of positive 
words in a Tweet in columns 1-2, the proportion of negative words in a Tweet in columns 3-4, and the 
number of word in a Tweet in columns 5-6. We include firm and time fixed effects. Error is clustered at 
the firm level. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. 
A: Days around option exercises 
 Proportion of Positive 
Words (%) 
Proportion of Negative 
Words (%) 
Total number of Words  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I (before CEO 
option exercises)  
0.124* 0.123* 0.024 0.024 0.332*** 0.332*** 
(1.73) (1.72) (0.90) (0.86) (2.69) (2.64) 
       
R square  0.19 0.19 0.082 0.083 0.448 0.45 
N 30,933 30,933 30,933 30,933 30,965 30,965 
Control  No No No No No No 
Fixed effect Firm, Y Firm, Y, Q Firm, Y Firm, Y, Q Firm, Y Firm, Y, Q 
 
B: Days around stock sales 
 Proportion of Positive 
Words (%) 
Proportion of Negative 
Words (%) 
Total number of Words  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I (before CEO  
stock sales)  
0.132** 0.130* 0.020 0.019 0.207* 0.206* 
(2.01) (1.95) (0.77) (0.74) (1.71) (1.69) 
       
R square  0.154 0.154 0.073 0.074 0.384 0.392 
N 55,330 55,330 55,330 55,330 55,391 55,392 
Control  No No No No No No 






In this Chapter, a joint article with Mathias Kronlund, we explore the results of equity-based
compensation on earnings dilution, and study the methods to manage this dilutive effect.
Equity-based compensation like restricted stock and option exercises increase a firm’s shares
outstanding and dilute earnings per share (EPS), giving the firm an incentive to manage EPS,
either by increasing earnings or through buybacks. We examine what firms do in response to
plausibly exogenous dilution using a fuzzy regression discontinuity framework, by focusing
on close-to-the-money options near their expiration. If the firm’s share price is just above
an option’s strike price on the expiration date, the option is significantly more likely to be
exercised compared to if the share price ends up just below the strike. We show that these
“just-in-the-money” exercises put pressure on EPS, and firms respond by engaging in both
real- and accruals-based earnings management. These effects are stronger when an exercise
is larger and thus more dilutive, and hold only when earnings are positive. However, firms
do not engage in more repurchases, suggesting that dilution from equity-based compensation
is not a significant driver of buybacks.
2.1 Introduction
Equity-based compensation for corporate executives, in the form of restricted stock and stock
options, has increased substantially over the last couple of decades. For example, in 2015,
CEOs among S&P 1500 firms on average were awarded around $1 million in option awards
(Black-Scholes value), and exercised previously granted options for a value of $3 million. The
intended purpose of equity-based pay is to align the interests of managers and shareholders
more closely. Researchers and practitioners have nevertheless recognized that equity-based
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pay can have unintended consequences, for example, by encouraging manipulation of stock
prices or by distorting corporate decisions.
This paper investigates one such distortion, namely whether the increase in the firm’s
outstanding shares that results from options compensation can cause firms to manage their
EPS. The basic argument is the following: When executives exercise options, those options
turn into new shares, which causes the number of shares outstanding to expand. The in-
creased share count mechanically causes per-share performance metrics (such as EPS) to
contract because of the growth in the denominator.1 Analysts and stock market investors
pay careful attention to these per-share metrics, and missing an EPS target, even if only by
a very narrow margin, can disappoint investors and result in negative stock market returns
(Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Furthermore, executives themselves are often explicitly compen-
sated in the form of bonuses that are tied to meeting or beating EPS targets, which gives
these executives an added incentive to avoid any negative impacts to EPS. Firms may thus
seek to counter the negative effect on EPS that results from option exercises.
Firms have two main ways of strategically managing EPS: 1) doing a buyback, which
reduces the denominator, or 2) by increasing the earnings (the numerator) through earnings
management. Several academic papers have argued that the former mechanism, anti-dilutive
buybacks in response to options compensation, is an important driver of buybacks (Bens,
Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 2003; Kahle, 2002), and this view is also prevalent in the press
(see, e.g., Coggan, 2015). If firms buy back the same number of shares as the number of
options that were exercised, they can perfectly undo the dilution caused by the exercise and
limit the adverse effect on EPS (Coggan, 2015).2 Executives themselves have also claimed
that this channel is important: In a survey of executives, two-thirds of CFOs cited options
anti-dilution as a “very important” or “important” driver of repurchases (Brav, Graham,
1The effect from exercises on EPS is bigger for “basic EPS” and relatively smaller for “diluted EPS”,
especially for options that are far in the money, because diluted EPS already accounts for the possibility of
future exercises. We will focus on a set of options that are close-to-the-money and thus represent significant
shocks to both “basic” and “diluted EPS”.
2While most buybacks do increase EPS, they do not always do so. Specifically, a repurchase will increase
EPS when the firm’s earnings-to-price ratio is higher than the opportunity cost of funds (e.g., the after-tax
interest earnings on cash holdings or the marginal cost of debt used to pay for the buyback). As an obvious
example, a firm with negative earnings would only cause its EPS to become even more negative if doing a
buyback to reduce the number of shares.
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Harvey, and Michaely, 2005).
Even though earnings management around option exercises has not received as much at-
tention, there are nevertheless good reasons to believe that real- and accruals-based earnings
management could be at least as important as repurchases when it comes to managing EPS
around option exercises. For example, in a survey of 400 executives, Graham, Harvey, and
Rajgopal (2005) asked what executives would do if it looked like their company might come
in below the desired EPS target. 80% of executives reported that they would “decrease
discretionary spending (e.g., R&D, advertising, maintenance, etc.)”, making it the most
popular option, and 40% reported they would “book revenues now rather than next quar-
ter” (i.e., accruals management, making it the third-most popular option). By contrast,
only 12% of executive reported they would repurchase shares if faced with this situation.
However, despite this, as far as we know, no papers that study dilution incentives around
options or restricted stock have considered real or accruals-based earnings management, but
these papers tend to instead focus exclusively on share repurchases. One of the contribu-
tions of this paper is thus to bring the focus back to earnings management as a way that
firms deal with dilution. In this study, we study how firms respond to the dilutive effect of
option exercises on EPS. Because both stock options and restricted stocks result in earnings
dilution, we expect the earnings management results can be extended to the methods that
firms use to counter the dilution from restricted stocks.
The primary goal of this paper is to employ a novel identification strategy to examine
to what extent firms do share buybacks or engage in other forms of earnings management
strategies to counter the EPS dilution from option exercises. What firms do about dilution
from options is important. Excessive share buybacks can have real consequences when the
money spent on repurchases instead could have been used to invest in plants, R&D, or to
hire more employees (Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund, 2016). Direct cuts to R&D and other
discretionary spending could, in turn, result in worsened firm performance going forward
(e.g. Bens, Nagar, and Wong, 2002).
While previous research has shown that dilution from options and repurchases indeed
are strongly correlated (e.g., Bens et al., 2003; Kahle, 2002), it is naturally challenging to
establish whether options have a causal impact on repurchases as implied by the “anti-
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dilution” hypothesis. The reason is that both the extent to which executives receive options,
when and whether those options are dilutive or end up being exercised, as well as the extent
of share buybacks are endogenous outcomes that depend on multiple industry-, firm-, and
executive-level factors that are difficult to control for in a regression framework. Options can
also put pressure on diluted EPS even before they are exercised, raising the question whether
firms should manage “basic” or “diluted” EPS.3 Outstanding options have a significant
impact on diluted EPS only if the firm in the past has awarded many options and if the firm’s
stock price also has performed well since any grants were made, so that these options are now
(far) in-the-money. A wide range of firm characteristics, including recent firm performance,
growth opportunities, life cycle, and liquidity position can affect both a firm’s use of options
compensation and its payout policy. These kinds of factors could plausibly introduce a
spurious correlation between exercises and repurchases, in which case their relationship may
not be causal.4
Consider a firm that has experienced strong returns—that firm is more likely to experience
exercises because its options are more likely to be in-the-money, but strong stock performance
often goes hand-in-hand with high cash flows that the firm can use for buybacks. Similarly,
younger firms are more likely to use stock options as part of their compensation packages
because they are “cash-poor”; but these firms may also not want to commit to regular divi-
dend payments but instead use repurchases to distribute any excess cash. Causal inference
in this setting is challenging precisely because factors like a firm’s life cycle and financial
constraints can be hard to measure well and perfectly control for in a regression framework
(see, for example Erickson and Whited, 2000). The direction of causality could even go the
other way, from repurchases to options: for example, Babenko (2009) show that buybacks
increase employees’ pay-performance sensitivity and cause employees to carry more risk,
which in turn encourages employees to exercise their options.
3The effect of outstanding but yet-unexercised options on diluted EPS—based on the “treasury stock
method”—is calculated by assuming that any cash the firm receives as the strike price in the exercise would
be used to buy back shares. The resulting formula for the “impact” of each option is max{0, 1-X/P},
where X is the strike price and P is the firm’s share price. The treasury stock method thus implies that,
for example, if a firm has 1000 outstanding options with a strike price of $25 and a share price of $50, the
number of shares that are added to current shares when calculating diluted EPS is 500 (1000*(1-25/50)).
Conversely, outstanding options that are out-of-the-money or at-the-money do not affect diluted EPS.
4Larcker (2003) makes this argument in a concurrent comment on Bens et al. (2003).
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To examine the causal effect of exercises on EPS management (share repurchases and
earnings management), this paper employs a “fuzzy regression discontinuity” (fuzzy RD)
framework. The idea behind the experiment we have in mind is the following: Imagine two
firms, A and B, that both awarded their executives 100,000 options in 2006 that are set
to expire in 2016; both firms’ stock prices on the grant date were $25, and as is typical
for executive options, the strike price for these options was the same as the stock price
when they were granted (i.e., “at-the-money”). Fast-forward to 2016 when these options
are about to expire; now, suppose the stock prices of these firms have been fairly stagnant,
and so their stock prices remain around $25. Firm A has nevertheless performed slightly
better than firm B: Firm A has a stock price of $25.50, while firm B has a stock price of
$24.50 on the day when the options are about to expire. Despite similar characteristics
and almost-identical performance, the executives in firm A are more likely to exercise their
options which would increase the number of shares outstanding, compared to firm B. This
framework thus provides a quasi-exogenous shock to exercises, and according to the anti-
dilution hypothesis, we might then expect firm A to buy back shares or engage in other
forms of earnings management in response to these exercises to maintain its EPS, compared
to firm B that experiences no dilution. One prominent example of this kind of situation
involves Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein and Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan,
both of whom received around 200,000 options in late 2006 and early 2007. Goldman’s
stock price was almost perfectly flat over the 10-year period after Blankfein’s options were
granted, but narrowly rose above the strike price (by around 2%) by the time the options
were about to expire, causing Blankfein to exercise his options, whereas Moynihan’s options
expired worthless.5
In our empirical framework, we first define the variable price gap as the difference on the
option expiration date between the firm’s share price and the option’s strike price (adjusted
for splits and stock dividends since the grant), normalized by the adjusted strike price. In the
example above, this was $0.5/25=+2% for firm A and $-0.50/25=-2% for firm B, respectively.
At a price gap of zero, there is a discrete jump in the level of exercises, where executives
5See the Wall Street Journal (Feb 16, 2017) at https://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-of-america-misses-a-
big-options-payday-goldman-cashes-in-1487154601
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with options to the right of the gap are more likely to exercise their options because they end
up slightly in-the-money. In case that firms have option-auto exercise rules, stock options
that are in-the-money at the time of expiration will be automatically exercised, resulting in
a sharp discontinuity near the zero-price-gap threshold. We then limit the observations to
only instances of price gaps that fall within a narrow price gap window of 20% around the
strike price and examine how the discontinuity around the zero-price-gap relates to changes
in firm outcomes (while controlling for any linear relation with the price gap).6 The RD is
“fuzzy” (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Van der Klaauw, 2002), because a stock price above the
strike price on the expiration date does not guarantee that the option is exercised and that
no options are exercised below, but it nevertheless increases the likelihood that an option is
exercised.
There are several reasons why the price gap does not produce a “sharp” discontinuity.
First, options can be forfeited or re-structured throughout an option’s life (usually 10 years),
for example, if an executive leaves the firm or if there is a reorganization such as an acquisition
or a merger. Second, even though most options have vesting requirements that require
executives to continue holding an option for several years, an option can be exercised early
anytime after the vesting period, and many executives do exercise early (Klein and Maug,
2011). Theoretically, a risk-neutral executive should never exercise a call option early except
possibly before a dividend payment (Merton, 1973), and even risk-averse executives should
not exercise early unless the option is far in-the-money (Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace,
2010). In our setting, early exercises are less common, precisely because the options that
we focus on are by construction out of the money or only barely in the money for most
of their lives. Third, executives sometimes exercise options even if they are slightly out-
of-the-money, i.e. when the price gap is negative (Fos and Jiang, 2015). The fact that
we do not have a sharp discontinuity for many of these reasons is not a threat to the
validity of the identification strategy, but it nevertheless affects how we should interpret
the resulting regression coefficients. Specifically, the results from the fuzzy RD are a local
average treatment effect (LATE) which captures the effect among firms where the executive’s
decision to exercise or not depends on whether the price is above or below the strike price
6Our results are robust to alternative definitions of the bandwidth around the threshold.
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on expiration (“compliers”). We nevertheless do require that at least some executives hold
their options until close to the expiration for there to be a statistically strong “first stage”,
so that the likelihood that an option is exercised indeed increases discontinuously around
the zero-price-gap threshold. Firms experiencing stagnant share prices can be examples
of “compliers” , because their managers are more likely to exercise the stock options near
maturity to maximize the time value of options. For example, Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd
Blandfein and Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan both did not exercise their stock
options early during 10-year period after the options were granted in 2006-2007 due to their
stagnant stock prices.
Our data starts with all executive options in the Execucomp database that have been
granted after 1992 and that also expired by the end of 2016. Every firm has several executives,
all of whom in turn can hold several options, but our primary outcome variables are defined
at the firm-quarter level, which implies that we need to carefully aggregate our data across
options to get a firm-quarter level measure of the price gap. To do so, if a firm has multiple
options that have the same expiration day and strike price, we treat them as one but sum
across the number of shares that underlie the options. We further drop options that have
been fully exercised before the quarter when the option expires, or if the still-unexercised
size is smaller than 0.1% of shares outstanding. If a firm has multiple options that expire
in the same quarter, but with different strike prices or expiration dates, we further select
only the largest option. This process results in a total of 5,183 options that are unique to
a firm-quarter. When we limit the sample to only those options that fall within the 20%
price gap range, we end up with 899 options, which make up the core of our sample. These
options on average represent around 0.4% of shares outstanding. This magnitude is similar
to the level of quarterly repurchases—which means that if these options were to be offset by
repurchases that would in turn represent a sizeable shock to buyback activity.
In our empirical analysis, we start by showing that the first stage—i.e., the relation
between the zero-price-gap threshold and exercises—is strong. When we plot exercises on
the price gap on the expiration date (Figure 1), we see that there is a discontinuity in the
level of exercises right around the zero-threshold. There are very few exercises to the left of
50
the threshold and many exercises to the right of the threshold.7 Importantly, the strength
of the first stage is stronger when the underlying option is large. We further show that the
higher level of exercises results in an increase in the number of shares outstanding and a
mechanical decrease in EPS due to the increase in the denominator.
If firms seek to counter the dilutive effect of these plausibly exogenous option exercises, we
should then observe more repurchases and/or more earnings management just to the right of
the zero-price-gap threshold compared to the left. On the other hand, it is also possible that
firms do not respond to these exercises—for example, if managers count on investors and
analysts realizing that any negative effect on EPS was purely “mechanical”—in which case we
would not observe any jump in repurchases or earnings management around the threshold.
Crucially, the positive price gap indicator is plausibly uncorrelated with the many other
reasons firms may have to engage in earnings management or share buybacks—which is one
of the main advantages of this empirical strategy.8
Contrary to a positive relation between option exercises and repurchases, we show that
firms do not engage in increased share buybacks in response to these quasi-exogenous exer-
cises. Firms on either side of the zero-price-gap threshold have remarkably similar repurchase
patterns, both repurchasing around 0.6% of total assets. This is true even for the largest
options, which represent the greatest shock to shares outstanding, and also among firms that
explicitly compensate their managers based on EPS and may have the strongest incentive
to respond. We also see no delayed response over the following quarter or year, suggesting
that the firms that experience exercises do not buy back the newly issued shares even with
7We also observe that there are some exercises also in the price gap region between -2% and 0. This is
consistent with the “out-of-the-money” exercises studied by Fos and Jiang (2015) and Jensen and Pedersen
(2016). Another reason for observing exercises with a negative price gap is that these exercises could have
been done a few days or hours before the close on the expiration date when the price gap might have still
been positive, but that the stock price subsequently drifted down to end up with a negative price gap. Such
mismeasurement around the threshold has the potential to shrink our regression coefficients but is small
enough that it does not affect the first stage significantly. However, as an added robustness test, we also
estimate our results using a “Donut RD” strategy which throws out the observations in a region of 1%
around the threshold; see, e.g., Almond and Doyle (2011); Cahuc, Carcillo, and Le Barbanchon (2014); Rau,
Sarzosa, and Urzúa (2015) for other examples of Donut RD.
8For example, common reasons for buybacks include tax-efficiency (Desai and Jin, 2011), optimal leverage
(Bagwell and Shoven, 1989), undervaluation (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995), agency problems
(Jensen, 1986), liquidity (Cook, Krigman, and Leach, 2003; Hillert, Maug, and Obernberger, 2016), or fending
off takeovers (Bagwell, 1991; Billett and Xue, 2007).
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a delay. In sum, these results suggest that share dilution from exercises is not a significant
causal driver of share repurchases. Firms thus appear willing to tolerate the resulting share
expansion and not significantly alter buyback plans in response. Our experiment is immune
to a concern of buybacks as a from of tax withholding, because the payoff of exercising op-
tions that are slightly in-the-money options is little. Thus, there is little mechanical relation
from tax withholding.
Instead, we show that firms strongly engage in earnings management around these exer-
cises. This happens both in the form of reduced R&D spending and higher accruals. These
effects are stronger and only significant for firms that have positive earnings—firms with
negative earnings naturally have no incentive to manage earnings around option exercises,
since an expansion in shares makes their EPS better. We also show that especially accruals
management is much stronger for firms where managers are explicitly compensated based
on EPS. As a result of this earnings management, even though we observe a “mechanical”
decrease in EPS that’s driven by the denominator, the firms to the right of the threshold
actually report higher increases in EPS because of higher growth in earnings (the numer-
ator) compared to the firms on the left of the threshold. In sum, our results show that
firms manage earnings when faced with a need to counter adverse shocks to EPS, but that
repurchases are not affected.
We conduct several robustness tests to support the assumptions behind the quasi-experimental
RD design. One possible threat to the identification could arise if firms manipulate the
share price around exercises. Previous studies have shown that managers manage share
prices around option grants (e.g., Baker et al., 2003; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001; Yermack,
1997), although there is less evidence of manipulation around option exercises (Carpenter
and Remmers, 2001). Intuitively, executives do not have a particularly strong incentive to
manage the share price precisely around the price gap threshold, because if the firm ends up
just narrowly to the right of the price gap, then executives profit only based on the small
difference between the strike price and the share price. In other words, the payoff from
options as a function of the share price is continuous and exhibits no discrete jumps. Fur-
thermore, to pose a threat to the identification strategy, it would have to be that managers
to the right of the threshold manipulate differently from managers on the left, which is even
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harder to believe. Nevertheless, if managers do manipulate share prices so that they end up
just-in-the-money, we would expect to see a mass of observations to the right of the thresh-
old. We formally investigate this possibility but observe no “bunching” on either side of the
threshold, but firms are smoothly distributed around the zero price gap threshold, which is
thus consistent with “non-manipulation” of the assignment variable. Further, there are no
systematic differences in other observable characteristics of the firms that end up on either
side of the threshold. We also examine possible pre-trends and show that the firms that end
up on the left and the right were also on similar trends before the expiration quarter. These
tests thus support the notion that it is truly random which firms ended up on the right side
of the threshold and which firms ended up on the left.
Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the related literature. Section
2.3 describes our data and measurement. Section 2.4 presents summary statistics. Section
2.5 describes the results from OLS correlations, and Section 2.6 describes the fuzzy RD
empirical strategy and the first-stage results on exercises. Section 2.7 presents results for
firm responses to exercises. Section 2.8 discusses robustness tests, and Section 2.9 concludes
the paper.
2.2 Literature
This paper relates to the literature that links executive compensation—and specifically
exercises—to payout decisions. Weisbenner (2000), Kahle (2002), Bens et al. (2003) were
among the first to study the relation between options compensation and payout policy.
A more recent paper is by Ferri and Li (2016) who consider the relation between options
compensation and payout policy using a diff-in-diff design. Ferri and Li (2016) specifically
exploit a change to accounting standards (FAS123R) that mandated option grants to be
expensed, which has been followed by firms awarding fewer options. They find that firms
that were most “exposed” to FAS123R (the firms that had previously awarded the most
options) did not change their dividends or buybacks after the law compared to other firms.
Their question is slightly different from ours, as they focus on the effect of option grants on
payout policy, and thus do not directly consider whether the channel between repurchases
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and options goes through dilution. Option grants can importantly affect payout policy even
independent of dilution because dividend payments decrease the value of options, which can
encourage firms to substitute repurchases for dividends—a “dividend-substitution hypoth-
esis” (Fenn and Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002; Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker, 1989; Liljeblom
and Pasternack, 2006). Our empirical strategy instead explicitly tests the “anti-dilution hy-
pothesis” under which repurchases are driven by dilution and exercises but not directly by
grants; if options were granted but did not end up in-the-money, there would be no dilution.
In contrast, under the “dividend-substitution” hypothesis, the grants themselves cause firms
to substitute away from dividends, and that incentive is not related to whether the options
end up being exercised or not.
This paper also relates to the literature that studies the link between repurchases and earn-
ings management. Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) and Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund
(2016) document an abnormally high number of EPS-increasing repurchases among firms
that otherwise would have small negative earnings surprises. Almeida et al. (2016) further
show that this effect is particularly strong for firms that use EPS as an incentive measure
for executives. Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015) also find that firms are more likely to
do repurchases if executives’ incentive plans are tied to earnings per share. In contrast to
this literature, we find that in the setting of EPS dilution due to exercises, firms do not
use repurchases as a tool to manage EPS. We find that firms instead are more likely to use
earnings management when faced with adverse shocks to EPS from exercises. Bergstresser
and Philippon (2006) also show a correlation between option exercises and high accruals, al-
though their story behind this association is one of opportunistic (i.e., endogenous) exercises
in times when accruals are high, and not of earnings management as a response to dilution.
In contrast to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), we thus show that there is a causal link
that also goes from (exogenous) exercises to earnings management.
Other papers have studied the relation between options and other corporate policies such
as investment. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find that executives with risk-increasing
incentives adopt riskier corporate policies, such as higher leverage, lower cash holdings, and
shorter debt maturities. Babenko, Lemmon, and Tserlukevich (2011) show that an increase
in cash flows to the firm from exercises can increase real investment, especially for firms with
54
high external financing costs. The empirical setting that Babenko et al. (2011) employ is
most similar to ours as they proxy for the level of exercises using the ratio of the end-of-year
stock price divided by average strike price for outstanding options (across all employees in a
firm). They show that as employee options “on average” are more in the money, we observe
more exercises. The main difference in the empirical setup between Babenko et al. (2011)
and this paper is that because Babenko et al. average across a lot of different options for
all executive and non-executive employees (who may have received their options at different
times with different strike prices, and which may not be exercisable), they do not observe
any jumps in the likelihood of exercises as a function of the “price ratio” they use. Their
identification instead principally relies on changes in the slope of exercise intensity over a
wide domain of the ratio.
2.3 Data and Measurement
2.3.1 Measuring Options
We collect data on options that were awarded starting from 1992 and that expired before
the end of 2016. Our data source for option grant data is Compustat’s Execucomp database.
Because the SEC changed the disclosure requirements and reporting format of option grants
in 2006, we employ two different tables from Execucomp before and after the disclosure
reform.9 For options that expire from 2007 onwards, we use the “Plan-Based Awards” table,
which lists both new options granted in a fiscal year as well as the previously-granted-and-
still-outstanding options as of the fiscal year-end. Because options are listed in this table
every year between the grant year until the option disappears, we limit the observations to
options that are scheduled to expire during the upcoming fiscal year. Filtering the sample
of options in this manner eliminates any duplicate observations from the same option being
listed across multiple years, and also by construction eliminates any options that have been
forfeited, restructured, or exercised early before the start of the last fiscal year of the option’s
9See the SEC’s final rule on “executive compensation and related person disclosure” at:
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf
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life. For options that expire before 2007 and thus are not covered by the “Plan-Based
Awards” table, we instead use the “Stock Option Grants Awards” table. Because most
options have a 10-year life, this mostly includes options that were granted between 1992 and
1996. The “Stock Option Grants Awards” table lists all options as of the year when they
are granted. Because we cannot directly filter the options from this table based on whether
these options are still “alive” as of the last fiscal year before the option expires, we expect
the first stage for this subset of options to be slightly weaker compared to the observations
from the “Plan-Based Awards” table.
For each option, we get data on the number of underlying shares, the grant date, expiration
date, and strike price. Our identification strategy compares firms with options that end up
narrowly in-the-money and thus are more likely to be exercised versus firms with options
that expire out-of-the-money. To measure whether an option is in-the-money or out-of-the-
money on the expiration date, we define the price gap as the stock price on the expiration day
minus the strike price, where we adjust the strike price for stock splits and stock dividends,
with the difference normalized by the adjusted strike price:
Price gap,i =
Stock price on expiration date,i - Adjusted Strike Price,i
Adjusted Strike Price,i
We further create a price gap indicator, which takes on a value of 1 if the price gap is
positive, and 0, otherwise. If the price gap is positive, then the option is in-the-money on
the expiration date and vice versa.
Our main outcome variables are defined at the firm-quarter level, which requires aggrega-
tion of the options data to summarize the effect of these options at the firm-quarter level.
To do so, we combine all options (sum across the number of underlying shares) that belong
to the same firm and have the same expiration date and strike price, and thus treat them
as one. We exclude observations that belong to firm-quarters with expiring options that
include both positive and negative price gaps, as these cannot be cleanly assigned to either
side. This situation is possible if a firm has several options with different expiration dates or
different strike prices where some end up in-the-money and others out-of-the-money. Lastly,
56
if a firm has multiple options that expire in the same quarter (with different prices/dates but
where all are on the same side of moneyness), we choose the largest option for determining
the price gap measure at the firm-quarter level.
We collect data on option exercises from “Table 2” of the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing
database. To ensure that these exercises relate to executive incentive options, we first limit
this data to filings that are reported on Form 4 (“change in an insider’s ownership position”)
with the transaction code “M” (exercises of derivative securities). We further restrict the
reported derivative “type” to be either options, employee stock option, non-qualified stock
option, call option, or incentive stock option, and we drop observations with a cleanse code
that indicates invalid or missing data elements.10
To attain a more accurate representation of the expected size of the potential dilutive
impact of an option as it gets close to expiration, we subtract from each option’s reported
size (from Execucomp) the number of options that have already been exercised up until
the start of the last quarter of the option’s life. To do so, we use the Thomson database
and calculate the cumulative split-adjusted number of exercised options for each option
award (where we match awards between the databases based on cusip, strike price, and the
expiration date) up until the start of the quarter of expiration. We then define the option
size as the reported size from Execucomp minus the cumulative number of options that have
been already exercised. We use these exercises to drop any options that we know have been
fully exercised, or if the still-unexercised size is less than 0.1% of share outstanding.
Because we require detailed option-level data on the strike price and expiration date of
each option, we focus by necessity on only the options of the “named executive officers”,
for whom option grants are detailed in SEC filings. Some of the previous research also
has considered options belonging to non-executive employees, including Kahle (2002), Bens
et al. (2003), and Babenko et al. (2011). The problem for our purposes of using all employee
option data is that the only information available from firm filings are average strike prices
and the total number of options, but not individual option-level data. If detailed option-level
10We may inadvertently undercount actual exercises, both due to imperfect merging between Thomson
and Execucomp and in applying the previously mentioned filters—this in turn can make the first stage
appear relatively smaller in magnitude than the true level of exercises.
57
data on employee-level options were available, we would clearly like to include them as well.
However this is not a significant threat to our study for at least two reasons: First, both
executive options and employee options should have the same effect, since they equally cause
dilution, so we have no reason to believe that a firm’s reaction to employee exercises would
result in a different effect from how firms react to executive options. Second, even though
non-executive options can make up a significant part of the total option pool, each option
is often individually smaller, which means that these options may commonly not clear the
0.1% (as a fraction of shares outstanding) size hurdle we require for inclusion in our sample.
Finally, the previous literature has debated whether firms should be more worried about
managing basic vs. diluted EPS, and thus whether they should manage EPS the moment
an option becomes dilutive for diluted EPS (which can happen gradually as an outstanding
option gets farther into the money) or when an option is exercised and causes dilution to
basic EPS (see, e.g. Bens et al., 2003). Our setting of examining close-to-the-money options
is ideal for tackling the timing question of whether to manage dilution before the actual
exercise or not, because the options that we study have almost no dilution before they are
exercised, and become 100% (or 0%) dilutive after they are exercised if the option ends up
in the money (or expires our of the money). For example, an option that is 10% in the
money would be 9% dilutive (1-X/P, according to the treasury stock method,) right before
it is exercised, but jumps to being 100% dilutive the moment it is exercised. So even if a
firm has bought back some shares before exercise, there is a big shock to the incentive to
manage both basic and diluted EPS right at the time of exercise.
2.3.2 Measuring Repurchases, Earnings Management, and Other Outcome
Variables
We merge the firm-quarter level options data on the price gap with stock-level data from
CRSP and firm-level data from the Compustat Quarterly file. We drop observations for
firms with a stock price of less than one dollar or assets less than $1 million. The full
merged sample consists of 5,183 observations that are unique to a firm-quarter. Of these,
899 represent firm-quarters where the absolute price gap is within 20%.
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We measure repurchases using Compustat’s variable “purchases of common and preferred
stocks” minus any decrease in the par value of preferred stock, normalized by lagged total
assets. This is different from the common way of measuring repurchases as a change in
treasury shares, or as the difference between purchases and sales of stock (Fama and French,
2001). The reason for why we measure repurchases this way is that we do not want to measure
repurchases based on changes in treasury shares, because this measure can be mechanically
confounded by exercises. For example, suppose an executive exercised an option and was
awarded stock from the company’s treasury shares, thus decreasing the treasury shares, and
the firm subsequently repurchased the same number of shares, adding to the treasury stock.
In this case, the firm has repurchased shares to undo the dilution from options perfectly, but
we would not be able to detect that buyback based on the change in treasury shares which
was zero. We do not subtract sales of shares from purchases because we want to isolate gross
buyback activity. Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2005) compare reported repurchases from annual
filings with measures available in Compustat, and conclude that the measure of repurchases
that we use is the most accurate measure of actual repurchases, especially for firms using
stock options, because it is not mechanically affected by equity issuance and the exercise of
options.
To measure earnings management, we focus on two different kinds of earnings manage-
ment: real and accruals-based. For real earnings management, we consider reductions in
spending on R&D. R&D is a form of discretionary spending that is one of the most com-
monly used measures of real earnings management (Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard, 1991;
Bushee, 1998; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Roychowdhury, 2006); for example, Baber et al.
(1991) show that firms spend less on R&D when they are worried about meeting earnings
targets. For accruals-based earnings management, we use three different measures that are
based on total accruals as well as two different measures of discretionary accruals, following
the Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) and Modified Jones model, respec-
tively. As is common in the earnings management literature, we focus on absolute accruals
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Cornett, Marcus, and Tehra-
nian, 2008). For our first measure of discretionary accruals, we calculate residuals from
regressing total accruals on the inverse of lagged assets, sales growth, and PP&E, all scaled
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by lagged assets (for a detailed example, see, e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). For the
second measure of discretionary accruals, we subtract sales by receivables to adjust the sales
growth term used in Jones model. Finally, we use data from IncentiveLab on whether an
executive’s compensation is explicitly tied to EPS. Definitions of these variables are found
in the data appendix. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
2.4 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for options (panel A), exercises and payout variables
(panel B), other outcome variables (panel C), and control variables (panel D). In Column
1, we present summary statistics for all observations, and in Columns 2 and 3, we present
statistics for observations that have a positive versus negative price gap. In Columns 4–6,
we further limit this to observations with a price gap between -20% and 20%; in other words,
where the stock price on the expiration date falls within 20% of the strike price. Column 7
presents t-tests for the difference between Columns 5 and 6.
Panel A in Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for option-level statistics such as the stock
price on the expiration day, strike price, price gap, and option size. The average price gap is
0.969 on average (Column 1), which implies that a typical option ends up far in-the-money
on expiration, although this distribution is right-skewed (the median price gap is 0.16).
Out of the 5,183 options in our sample, 2,917 end up with a positive price gap while 2,266
options end up with a negative price gap. The average option size represents 0.48% of shares
outstanding. When we limit the sample to the 899 options within the 20% range around the
zero-price-gap, we observe that the average price gaps in the “positive” (Column 5) versus
“negative” (Column 6) groups are 0.094 and -0.107 respectively, as we would expect if these
options are distributed relatively evenly in the 20% range around the strike price. Overall,
the options that end up with a negative or positive price gap look similar based on their
strike price and size, though of course the options with positive price gaps on average have
a slightly higher stock price on expiration.
Panel B reports statistics on exercises and payout policy in the quarter when an option
expires (we refer to this quarter as “q0”). Comparing exercises for firm-quarters that have
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positive (Column 2) versus negative (Column 3) price gaps, we find that there are signif-
icantly more exercises for firms that experience a positive price gap. The probability of
having an option exercise is 43% for observations with a positive price gap, and 5% for neg-
ative price gaps. On average, firms tend to repurchase 0.62% of total assets in a quarter.11
Comparing Columns 2 and 3, we observe that options that are in-the-money at expiration
tend to belong to firms that have higher payouts than those with options with negative price
gaps, which is quite natural because the firms with positive price gaps have also performed
better; this difference illustrates why looking at the regression discontinuity is important.
In columns (5)–(6), where we limit the sample to only observations within the narrow price
gaps, payouts appear more balanced across the groups with positive versus negative price
gaps: Both groups of firms repurchase around 0.6–0.61% of total assets in the quarter of
expiration. These simple statistics offer a first hint at our finding in Section 2.7 that firms
do not respond to exercises by repurchasing shares: If these firms did perfect anti-dilution
of the options, we would expect to see the positive-price-gap firms display significantly more
buybacks. That said, while these simple averages compare all firms within the relatively nar-
row band, the regression discontinuity design enables us to more precisely determine whether
there is a discrete jump specifically around the zero-price-gap threshold while controlling for
any possible linear relation between the price gap and our outcome variables.
Panel C reports changes in other variables from q−1 (the quarter before expiration) to
q0, including changes in shares outstanding, measures of EPS, earnings management, shares
issued, cash balance and cash flow. Comparing Columns 5 and 6 in Panel C, we observe
that outstanding shares increase more (by around double) for firms with positive compared
to negative price gaps, thus mechanically putting pressure on EPS, although the difference
in this simple comparison of means is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Of
particular note is our measure of the “mechanical” denominator-driven EPS change, which
11For comparison to other research on buybacks, note that these figures are not the unconditional average
in Compustat for the sample period, but rather the average conditional on having an expiring option in that
quarter, as that is required for the price gap variable to be defined. In Table A.1 in the Appendix, we also
report similar statistics for all firms in Compustat, over the same period, regardless of whether they have
outstanding options or not. Comparing these statistics to those of Panel B of Table 2.1, we observe that
firms that use options on average tend to engage in more share repurchases compared to the typical firm in
Compustat, with the caveat that such comparisons are likely to be confounded by omitted variables.
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is defined as lagged earnings divided by current shares outstanding minus lagged earnings
divided by lagged shares outstanding; i.e., this measure captures the change in EPS that
would be expected if the numerator does not change, and we show that the firms on the
positive side exhibit more downward denominator-driven pressure on EPS compared to their
peers with slightly negative price gaps. However, Panel C also shows that the changes to
reported diluted and basic EPS, despite the increase in the number of shares, are higher for
the firms with a positive price gap, indicating that these firms also grow their earnings even
more. While these are only suggestive summary statistics, we formally test these outcome
variables within the fuzzy RD framework in Section 2.7.
We observe that firms with slightly positive price gaps have a larger increase in cash and
shares issued than firms with slightly negative price gaps, consistent with cash inflows from
exercises and new issues of shares in exchange, although these differences are not statistically
significant in the simple comparison of means. It is important to note that employees who
exercise options often have access to “cash-less exercises”, where the employee does not have
to put up money for the exercise price, but merely receives the difference between the strike
price and share price, either in the form of cash or shares. However, even in these cases, the
effect on the firm is the same—the firm receives money for the strike price and issues shares,
but a broker or bank is acting as an intermediary by making a loan to the employee for the
exercise price and immediately selling some of the shares received in exchange to pay back
the loan (Heath, Huddart, and Lang, 1999).
Finally, Panel D of Table 2.1 presents statistics for several firm-level control variables,
including market-to-book, cash flow, cash holdings, ROA, debt-to-assets, firm size, and an
EPS incentive indicator. These variables are measured as of the end of the previous quar-
ter (most variables), or as of the end of last fiscal year (in the case of the EPS indicator)
before the expiration quarter. Importantly, when we narrow the window to a range of 20%
around the zero-price-gap, the characteristics across the positive and negative groups appear
balanced, and any differences are statistically insignificant. These findings support the iden-
tification assumption that the firms that narrowly end up on either side of the threshold are
observationally equivalent when it comes to possible confounders to our empirical strategy.
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2.5 Motivating Correlational Evidence
Before moving on to our regression discontinuity results, we also confirm the evidence in
the current literature that there is a strong correlation between repurchases and options
compensation, regardless of whether we measure options compensation using the amount of
option grants, the amount of exercises, or the amount of unexercised exercisable options.
Table 2.2 tests this hypothesis using OLS regressions over the period 1992–2017. We regress
the log value of quarterly repurchases as the dependent variable on the log value of option
grants, the log value of unexercised exercisable options, and the log value of exercises using
firm-year level data from Compustat and Execucomp.
The results in Panel of Table 2.2 show that repurchases are indeed strongly correlated
with the value of option grants, option exercises, and exercisable options, both separately
and when including all of these independent variables simultaneously. We further control
for possible measurable confounders such as firm age and size, as well as industry × year
fixed effects, with broadly similar results, albeit smaller coefficients. These correlations also
continue to hold after controlling for firm fixed effects which means that the same firm
tends to do more repurchases during times when many options are granted, exercisable, or
exercised, even though the economic coefficients here become yet smaller.
On the one hand, this evidence is consistent with a hypothesis of anti-dilution motivated
repurchases. On the other hand, both repurchases and exercises could be driven by some
unmeasured omitted factors such as financial constraints or performance, which makes a
causal relationship challenging to ascertain. In addition to the measurable characteristics
we control for, there are likely also many unobservable characteristics that differ across firms
that affect both buybacks and options. The simple control variables that we employ in Table
2.2 reduce the estimated coefficients on exercised/exercisable options to almost a quarter of
the original magnitude (from around 0.18 to 0.05). The omitted variable concern then is
that it is plausible that a few still-omitted or hard-to-measure control variables, such as
firm lifecycle or investment opportunities, could plausibly explain any remaining association
between repurchases and options.
One way to test whether the regression result of a relation between repurchases and
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option exercises is evidence of anti-dilutive buybacks is to test whether this relation holds in
a sample where the anti-dilution mechanism is not at work. Panel B of Table 2.2 therefore
restricts the sample to firm-quarter observations with negative income. If anti-dilution from
option exercises is a reason behind repurchases, firms should not be more likely to conduct
repurchases in response to option exercises when their income is negative. However, if
the positive correlation between repurchases and option awards is driven by other omitted
variables, we may still observe a positive relationship between repurchases and option awards
even during times with negative income. We find that in the sample of only years with
negative income, the coefficients of option exercises and unexercised exercisable options are
still significantly positive; a result that holds even after controlling for multiple possible
confounders, industry, and firm fixed effects. This finding thus provides suggestive evidence
that the relationship between repurchases and options may not be a causal one, or at least not
one that is driven by earnings management concerns, thus further motivating the empirical
strategy that we describe in the next section.
2.6 Empirical Strategy and First Stage Results
To examine whether a causal relationship exists between option exercises and the various
methods of managing EPS, we need an identification strategy that allows for plausibly
exogenous variation in exercises that can isolate the effect of these exercises. We employ a
fuzzy RD strategy (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Van der Klaauw, 2002), by focusing on options
that expire with a stock price close to the strike price. While firms that fall narrowly on either
side of the zero-price-gap are ex-ante similar (as was shown in Panel D of Table 2.1), when a
firm ends up on the positive side the option expires in-the-money and is therefore more likely
be exercised, while on the negative side the options will more likely expire out-of-the-money.
To illustrate the discontinuous effect on exercises that is caused by the price gap, Figure
2.1 plots firm-quarter-level exercises of expiring options on bins of price gaps on expiration
(i.e., the “first stage”). The x-axis represents normalized price gaps falling in the range of
-0.2 to 0.2, which are grouped into ten bins with a bin size of 0.04. We see there is a discrete
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jump around the price gap of zero in the graph.12 In Panel A, the exercises are close to zero
for slightly negative price gaps and around 0.15% of shares outstanding for positive price
gaps. We nevertheless note that there are some “out-of-the-money” exercises, particularly
in the price gap region between -4% and 0. This could be due to out-of-the-money exercises
(Fos and Jiang, 2015), minor mismeasurement of the adjusted strike price, or because of
exercises that take place some days or hours before expiration with a subsequent price drift
below the strike price. Such mismeasurement around the threshold has the potential to
shrink our regression coefficients, but is small enough that it does not affect the first stage
significantly. However, as an added robustness test, we have also replicated our results using
a “Donut RD” strategy which throws out the observations in a region of 1% around the
threshold, with similar results.13
As described in Section 2.3.1, we make an effort to remove any options that have been
exercised early (before the last quarter of its life) or that have disappeared (because of
forfeiture, mergers, etc.). This method nevertheless does not ensure a perfect measure of
the dilutive impact of any individual option as it nears expiration, because options can
disappear for reasons that we are not able to capture, or because of exercises where we are
not able to merge options perfectly between Thomson’s “Table 2” and Execucomp. One way
of summarizing how many options are still around is to compare actual exercises in a bin
to the sum of options that we predict belong to that bin. Panel B shows that the fraction
of exercised options to “predicted exercises” is around 30-40% for firms with positive price
gaps, while this fraction is close to zero for negative gaps. If we could eliminate every option
that is no longer around, we might expect the regression discontinuity to be “sharp”, in
the sense that every “predicted exercise” (instances where the price gap is positive) would
correspond to an actual exercise.14 Because we cannot eliminate every option that’s no
12Figure A.1 plots the size of option exercises on price gaps falling in the range of -0.5 to 2. We observe
that manages exercise a larger amount of options with positive price gaps than options with negative price
gaps. However, among options expiring in the money, we do not observe that the size of option exercises
increases as the price gap of options increases. This is because if options are deep-in-the-money before
maturity, they are likely to be already exercised before maturity. Thus, options expiring in the money on
the expiration date are equally likely to be exercised.
13See, e.g., Almond and Doyle (2011); Cahuc et al. (2014); Rau et al. (2015) for other examples of Donut
RD.
14This method is nevertheless more precise for options that expire after 2007, as we know the exact number
of options that are still around as of the start of the fiscal year when the option expires. Panel A in Figure
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longer around, the RD is “fuzzy”, implying that the price gap does not predict exercises
perfectly but rather an increase in the likelihood of exercises. Having a non-strict RD does
not invalidate the identification strategy, but rather means that the coefficients of the first
stage and the “reduced-form” second stage results of the fuzzy RD are slightly smaller than
they would be if we had perfectly measured data.
To formally test the first stage, we estimate the following regression for firm-quarters with
options in the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]:
Exerciseq0,i = α + β1I[Pricegapi>0] + β2Pricegapi + β3Pricegapi × I[Pricegapi>0] + εi,
The dependent variable is firm-quarter-level exercises of expiring options. Price gap is
the size of the price gap on the expiration date, that is, the stock price on that date minus
the strike price adjusted for stock split and stock dividends, normalized by the adjusted
strike price. The main coefficient of interest, β1, measures the extent to which there is a
discontinuous jump in the level of exercises around the threshold while controlling for any
linear relation with the price gap itself.
Table 2.3 reports results. In Columns 1–2, we use an indicator for whether there is an
exercise, and in Columns 3–5, we use exercise size, which is the number of options exercised,
normalized by shares outstanding. Column 1 shows that firms with slightly positive price
gap options are 37.6% more likely to exercise compared to firms with slightly negative gaps.
The coefficient of interest in Column 3 shows that firms with slightly positive price gaps
experience additional exercises around 0.1% of shares outstanding—this is also consistent
with the graphical results from Figure 2.1. We control for the level of the price gap itself
and allow for different linear slopes on either side of the threshold in Columns 2 and 4. In
Column 5, we further include an interaction of the positive price gap indicator with the
option size, which shows that the predicted impact of having a positive price gap on the
level of exercises is greater when the underlying option is large.
A.2 shows the fraction of actual exercises to total options per bin which tends to be in the 50-70% range to
the right of the threshold.
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In Table 2.4, we study the relation between our price-gap-based instrument and exercises
across terciles based on the option size. Columns 1 and 2 include options in the smallest size
tercile, Columns 3 and 4 include options belonging to the middle tercile, and Columns 5 and
6 include the largest options. We predict that the discontinuity around the zero-price-gap
should predict more exercises when the underlying option is large. Indeed, the coefficients
on the positive price gap indicator increase from 0.05% (Column 1) to 0.21% (Column 5) of
shares outstanding as we increase the option size (or 0.02% to 0.22% when controlling for
any linear relation). These results establish that there is a discrete jump in exercises right
at the price gap threshold, and especially so for large options.
To support the identification assumptions behind the regression discontinuity framework,
we perform several supporting diagnostic tests. For the RD design to provide reliable esti-
mates of a causal effect, the “assignment” of firms immediately around the threshold should
ideally be “as good as random”. This identification assumption could be violated, for ex-
ample, if firms successfully manipulate their stock prices to make sure they fall narrowly
on either side of the threshold. One way to test this empirically is to examine if there is
bunching with an abnormally large mass of firms to one side of the threshold. We test this
in Figure 2.2 by plotting a histogram of observations around the zero-price-gap threshold.
We observe no bunching of observations on either side of the threshold, and the distribution
looks quite smooth. Panel A of Figure 2.2 plots the histogram of price gaps in the range
of [-0.5,2], while Panel B zooms in closer to include only the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2].
Alternatively, we formally test whether there is bunching using the McCrary test (McCrary,
2008). The t-statistics is 0.163 and the p-value is 0.870. Thus, we conclude that there is no
bunching near the zero-price-gap threshold. The fact that the number of options is smooth
around the price gap of zero is consistent with the assumption that firms are not actively
manipulating their share prices precisely around the threshold. There are also conceptual
reasons to believe that such manipulation is unlikely, or at least that such manipulation
would be different between firms that end up narrowly on either side. Share prices are
difficult to manipulate to the level of this precision right around the threshold as prices
move around by market forces outside the control of executives. Moreover, even if managers
could push the share price to be only slightly above the strike price, there would be little
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incentive to do so because there is virtually no money to be made, as the executives receive
only the difference between the stock price and strike price. In other words, while managers
generally always seek to increase stock prices, their incentives to do so are unlikely to be any
stronger-than-usual precisely around the zero-price-gap threshold.
Second, the identification strategy based on the regression discontinuity assumes that
other firm characteristics do not exhibit jumps around the same threshold. As shown in
Panel D of Table 2.1, the characteristics of firms that fall on either side of the threshold
appear similar, as there are no significant differences in ex-ante characteristics (Columns
5–7).
Only considering options that have a stock price close to the strike price also has ad-
vantages beyond the identification benefits of allowing a fuzzy RD identification strategy.
First, because these options are close to moneyness (and, in any case, they not far in-the-
money), they are unlikely to be exercised early (see, e.g., Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005)
, Malmendier and Tate (2005), and Aboody, Hughes, Liu, and Su (2008) for discussions of
incentives for early exercise). The basic reason why early exercise is unlikely in this setting
is that the time value for an option is the greatest—and early exercise is the most costly—
when the stock price is close to the strike price. Early exercises could nevertheless introduce
some noise in the first stage and thereby drive down the estimated coefficients in the first
stage and reduced-form second stage. Another conceptual benefit of examining only options
with a small price gap is that we do not need to make a distinction between firms’ incentives
to manage basic versus diluted EPS: Options that only have a small price gap are only so
slightly in-the-money that the adjustment to the number of shares when calculating diluted
EPS is minimal.15
2.7 Main Results
This section describes “second stage” results based on the fuzzy RD framework. We first
study the consequences of having a positive price gap on firms’ shares outstanding and how
changes to the denominator affect EPS. Next, we present results on repurchases. We then
15See, for example, Bens et al. (2003) for details on the how to calculate diluted EPS.
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examine the effect of option exercises on other strategies that firms can use to mitigate
the dilutive effects on EPS, including cutting real investment and accruals management.
Throughout, we devote special attention to settings where we may expect a greater response
to counter dilution: large options, when firms explicitly use EPS targets in determining
compensation, and for firms with positive income.
2.7.1 Consequences for Shares Outstanding and Mechanical EPS
Reduction
The results in the previous section showed a discontinuity in the level of exercises around the
zero-price-gap threshold. In this section, we present evidence on how these exercises affect
shares outstanding and how that, in turn, puts negative pressure on EPS.
Table 2.5 presents results on how firms on either side of the zero-price-gap threshold are
affected in terms of changes to shares outstanding. We estimate regressions for firm-quarters
with options within a 20% window around the zero-price-gap threshold that are of the form:
∆Sharesq−1 to q0,i = α + β1I[Pricegapi>0] + β2Pricegapi + β3Pricegapi × I[Pricegapi>0] + εi,
In Panel A, we use the percent change in shares outstanding, which is measured as the
difference is shares between the end of the quarter of option expiration (q0) and the previous
quarter (q−1), normalized by shares outstanding in q−1. In Columns 1 and 2, we show results
for the full sample, while Columns 3–4 focus on the top size tercile of options. Across the
full sample of options, the number of shares does expand slightly but this difference is not
statistically significant, but when we focus on only the options in the top size tercile where
the effect should be larger, the coefficients on the positive price gap indicator become larger
and more significant. For these options, the number of shares expands by around 1.02%
more for the firms that fall on the positive side of the threshold compared to the firms on
the negative side, and this effect increases to 1.58% after controlling for any linear relation
with the price gap. In Panel B, we measure the dependent variable as changes in log shares
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outstanding between q0 and q−1. The results are similar to those in Panel A and now also
weakly significant even in the full sample of option awards.
These results on shares outstanding are notably “net” of any buybacks. That is, the
resulting expansion in shares shows that firms at least do not fully compensate for the
expansion in shares from option exercises by repurchasing more shares. In the next section,
we will study if there is any measurable effect on buybacks at all to partly mitigate the share
expansion.
We next study the extent of the dilutive effect that this expansion in shares has on earnings
per share (EPS). To do so, we hold the EPS numerator (using the Compustat varibale
“income before extraordinary items, available for common”) constant at the lagged (q−1)
value, and calculate the resulting change in EPS that is “mechanically” driven by changes
to the denominator:






Table 2.6 reports results. In Panel A, we measure mechanical changes in EPS as income
in q−1 divided by shares at the end of (q0), minus income in q−1 divided by shares at the
end of (q−1). Given that shares increase more for the firms to the right of the threshold, we
would expect that firms with positive income would see a denominator-driven reduction in
EPS, while firms with negative income do not see any reduction. Thus, we split firms into
positive and negative income earners (based on the income from the quarter before option
expiration). Columns 1-4 include all awards, with positive income earners in Column 1 and
2, and negative income earners in Columns 3 and 4, whereas Columns 5 and 6 include only
options in the top size tercile that belong to firms with positive income. In the full sample
of positive income earners, EPS decreases “mechanically” by around 0.68 cents for the firms
that fall on the positive side of the price-gap-threshold compared to the firms on the negative
side. When income is negative, we do not see a statistically significant effect on EPS. As
expected, the dilutive effect among the positive-income earners is larger when we focus on the
top size tercile of options (columns 5–6), where EPS mechanically decreases by 1.56 cents for
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the positive-price-gap firms, thus providing firms with an even greater incentive to manage
earnings. In Panel B, we further normalize these relative changes to EPS by the lagged stock
price, with similar results. This pressure on EPS is notably significant compared to what a
repurchase can achieve for a firm’s EPS; for example, Hribar et al. (2006) show that fewer
than 20% of all repurchases increase EPS by one cent or more.
2.7.2 Do Firms Engage in Anti-Dilutive Repurchases?
If firms do share buybacks to counter the dilutive effect of exercises, we should observe a
similar discrete jump in repurchases around the zero price gap threshold. On the other hand,
if the observed correlation between option exercises and repurchases is driven by potentially
omitted variables or reverse causality, we should not observe a jump in repurchases at the
zero-price-gap threshold.
Table 2.7 reports results on the effect of exercises on repurchases using the regression
discontinuity framework. Similar to the previous section, we estimate the following regression
for firm-quarters with options within a 20% window around the zero-price-gap threshold:
Repj,q0 = α + β1I[Pricegapi>0] + β2Pricegapi + β3Pricegapi × I[Pricegapi>0] + εi,
The dependent variable is the level of repurchases for a firm j in the quarter q0 when its
option i expires. The main coefficient of interest, β1, captures the extent to which there is
a discrete change in the level of repurchases around the threshold. If firms do buybacks to
counter the dilutive effect of exercises, we expect β1 to be positive.
We report results using two different measures of the dependent variable: repurchases
normalized by total assets (Panel A), and changes in normalized repurchases (Panel B).
Columns 1 and 2 include all options in the 20% range, and Columns 3 and 4 includes only
the largest options.
The results in Table 2.7 show that there is no jump in the intensity of repurchases around
the zero price gap threshold. In Panel A, the coefficient of positive price gap indicator on
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normalized repurchases, β1 is -0.05%, and not significant either economically or statisti-
cally. We obtain similar results in Panel B where we measure repurchases using quarterly
changes. These results show that firms on average do not engage in anti-dilutive repurchases
in response to share dilution caused by these plausibly exogenous option exercises.
Figure 2.3 illustrates these results graphically. We plot average normalized repurchases
on bins of price gaps in the [-0.2,0.2] range. The x-axis represents normalized price gaps
falling in the range of -0.2 to 0.2, which are grouped into ten bins with a bin size of 0.04.
If firms engage in anti-dilutive repurchases, we would expect a discrete jump to a higher
level around the zero threshold. We do not see this. Instead, the distribution of repurchases
appears quite flat overall, although with some idiosyncratic variation from bin to bin.
While we show that firms on average don’t conduct repurchases to counter dilution due
to exercises, it is nevertheless possible that many options may be too small to encourage
firms to change their repurchase policy to counter them. To investigate whether the effect
is different when firms are faced with exercises of the large options, we therefore redo our
tests in a sample that is limited to options in the top size tercile (Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 2.7). The coefficients on the positive price gap indicator are still insignificant (and
the point estimate is even negative)—indicating that firms do not respond. For example,
the coefficient is -0.044% on the level of repurchases (Panel A), and -0.256% on changes in
repurchases (Panel B).
Figure 2.4 plots these results for the subset of large options graphically. We plot the firm-
quarter level of exercises of expiring options (Panel A) and the level of repurchases (Panel B)
on bins of price gaps for these large options. Exercises see a sharp increase when price gaps
move from slightly negative to slightly positive. In contrast, the distribution of repurchases
is flat over the range of price gaps without any discontinuous jump in repurchases around
the zero price gap.
Further, only firms with positive income theoretically have any incentive to counter EPS
dilution. By contrast, if a firm’s income is negative, having more shares from option exer-
cises raises EPS, as losses are shared across a larger number of shares. We therefore study
whether these results are sensitive to whether we only include firms that have positive in-
come. The underlying concern is that perhaps the firms with positive income do engage
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in anti-dilutive repurchases, but firms with negative income do not, and the “full sample”
coefficients are moderated by the latter firms. In Table A.2, we repeat the regressions in
Table 2.7 where we limit the sample to firms that have positive earnings (measured as in-
come before extraordinary items). We find that the coefficients of positive price gaps on
repurchases remain small and insignificant (and often negative). These results show that the
lack of anti-dilutive buybacks is not confounded by firms that have negative income.
We further investigate whether firms engage in anti-dilutive share repurchases with a delay.
Such delayed buybacks are plausible if it takes some time for firms to respond to the exercise,
or if firms seek to avoid market impact from buying back a lot of shares in short order. To
examine this question, we consider the impact on repurchases in the following quarter as well
as over the next full year (the average over four quarters, starting with the quarter when the
option expired). Results for the next-quarter repurchases are reported in Panel A of Table
A.3, and for full-year repurchases in Panel B. If firms engage in anti-dilutive buybacks in
response to exercises, we should again observe a significant and positive coefficient for the
price gap indicator. However, we only observe statistically and economically insignificant
coefficients of repurchases over both of these alternative horizons.
In summary, by examining options that expire near the zero price gap threshold using
a fuzzy RD framework, we do not find evidence of a causal relationship between exercises
and repurchases. This holds even when we consider only the largest options and when we
consider longer time windows over which firms may conduct such repurchases.
2.7.3 Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management
Option exercises exert a decreasing force on EPS due to the expansion of shares, especially
as we show that these exercises are not countered by share repurchases. Firms nevertheless
also have other tools at their disposal that can compensate for this effect by managing the
numerator, i.e. earnings. We now examine the extent to which firms instead respond to
EPS dilution from option exercises by managing earnings.
We analyze the effects on the two main tools firms have at their disposal to manage earn-
ings: by cutting discretionary spending (which we proxy using changes to R&D spending,
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as in (Baber et al., 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Roychowdhury, 2006)), or by manag-
ing accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). Because firms with positive or negative income before
extraordinary items have very different incentives to engage in earnings management when
faced with option exercises (the firms with negative income experience better EPS when faced
with dilution), we further partition the sample by the sign of income. Table 2.8 presents
results of the effects of price gaps on real (Panel A) and accruals-based (Panel B) earnings
management.
In Panel A, we show that firms with positive price gaps decrease R&D investment more
than the ones with negative price gaps. This effect is significant only among firms that have
positive income. The firms with negative income here thus also serve as a kind of placebo:
If there were some still-omitted spurious factors that were causing a discontinuous effect
around the threshold, we would expect those factors to also be at work for the firms with
negative income. However, we should interpret the results in the negative sample with a
caveat, as the number of observations is smaller in the sample of negative income earners
than that of positive income earners.
One might argue that compared to managers for whom options expire worthless, managers
with options slightly in the money will exercise options and become less sensitive to firm-
performance after exercising, which results in a reduction in R&D. However, this is not the
case for the following reasons. First, options will disappear for both the executives who
exercise and those for whom options expire worthless. Second, if executives with positive
price gaps hold on to stocks, they will become more sensitive to firm performance, compared
to managers whose options expired out-of-the-money. Third, if managers with positive price
gaps sell the stock immediately after exercising, such as “cash-less option exercises”, they
will not experience an equity incentives reduction. In summary, it is not the case that a
decrease in R&D is a result of a reduction in equity incentives.
In Panel B, we examine whether the firms that end up on either side of the zero-price-gap
threshold differentially alter their accruals. We employ three measures of accruals: changes
to absolute total accruals, and changes in absolute discretionary accruals (estimated using
the Jones model or modified Jones model). The coefficients of positive price gaps on accruals
are around 1.2% - 1.6% (relative to lagged assets) within the sub-sample of positive income
74
earners, which implies a higher intensity of earnings management among the firms that
experience plausibly exogenous option exercises. The effects are also only significant among
firms with positive earnings. The economic magnitude of accruals management due to option
exercises is significant, comparing to the results of Cohen et al. (2008). For example, they
find that the coefficient of passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act on discretionary accruals using
Modified Jones model is 1.8%.
Figure 2.5 illustrates these results graphically. If firms engage in earnings management,
we would expect a discrete fall to a lower level of R&D investment, and a discrete jump to
a higher level of accruals around the zero price gap threshold. Panel A plots the change in
R&D investment on bins of the price gap. The graph shows that firms with slightly positive
price gaps experience a decrease in R&D spending compared to firms with slightly negative
price gaps. Panel B plots the change in discretionary accruals on bins of the price gap.
Firms on the right-hand side of the zero price gap threshold experience a sharp increase in
discretionary accruals compared to firms on the left-hand side of the threshold.
In summary, we find that firms respond to share dilution from option exercises through real
and accruals-based earnings management. This result also speaks to why we do not observe
an increased intensity in share repurchases in response to exercises: firms instead employ
other, and perhaps easier, ways of managing earnings to meet/beat their EPS targets. That
is, instead of using repurchases to bring back the denominator, firms increase the numerator
by boosting earnings.
These findings also importantly shed new light on previous research. Other papers have
found associations between exercises, R&D spending, and accruals, but have interpreted
their findings differently. Bens et al. (2002) shows that option exercises are correlated with
lower R&D, but attribute this to firms shifting money away from R&D so that they can di-
rect money towards anti-dilutive share repurchases instead. We show that firms do not seem
to increase repurchases around exercises, but we instead provide evidence that the reduced
R&D spending is likely to be a form of earnings management. Bergstresser and Philippon
(2006) show that firms engage in more accruals management around option exercises, but
attribute this to opportunistic exercises by managers during times of higher earnings man-
agement. In their argument, exercises are thus an endogenous response to high accruals,
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whereas our identification strategy shows that at least part of the observed correlation be-
tween exercises and accruals is a causal link from (exogenous) exercises to accruals as the
endogenous response in order to manage EPS around these exercises.
2.7.4 Actual EPS Changes
The results in the previous sections have shown that option exercises we study have a
denominator-driven negative effect on EPS, that firms do not buy back more shares in
response to these exercises, but instead bring up the numerator. What’s the net effect on
actual EPS from the depressed denominator but higher numerator? In this section, we use
the same empirical framework to examine what happens to actual changes in EPS that take
both changes in the numerator and denominator into account. Table 2.9 presents results.
The dependent variables are changes in diluted EPS in Columns 1-2 and basic EPS in
Columns 3-4. In contrast to the “mechanical” decrease in EPS that’s driven by the denom-
inator, we find that the actual EPS changes for firms with slightly positive price gaps are
significantly larger than the ones for firms with negative price gaps. The coefficient on the
positive price gap indicator is 1.9 cents for changes to both diluted and basic EPS. Because
earnings management is lumpy, earnings offsetting is large, which results in an increase in
the actual EPS. These results thus show that the firms that experience a share expansion
due to option exercises exhibit even larger offsetting increases in earnings, driven at least
in part by an increased intensity of earnings management as we discussed in the previous
section.
2.7.5 Subsample Analysis: When Anti-Dilution Incentives are the
Strongest
The previous sections have already described results where we focus on only the largest
options and firms that have positive earnings—settings where we might expect anti-dilution
incentives to be the stronger. It is nevertheless possible that only some firms and executives
care about share dilution, and the average results are moderated by firms that do not care
about dilution. To test this hypothesis, we examine the extent to which firms that use EPS
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as an explicit incentive measure in their executive compensation behave differently. We also
explore whether the equity ownership of managers makes a difference in option exercises,
repurchases and earnings management.
To that end, we first identify firms with EPS-tied compensation, by using data from the
IncentiveLab database and identifying firms that have any component of compensation for
any executive that is based on EPS as a performance metric in the year when the option is
expiring.
Panel A of Table 2.10 confirms that the first stage holds—i.e., a positive price gap on
the expiration predicts more exercises—even among the limited set of firms that use EPS
as an explicit incentive. In Panel B and C, we next look at our main outcomes, the effects
on share repurchases and earnings management. We limit the sample here to firms with
positive earnings since these are the only firms that should respond. Panel B shows that
even among the firms that use EPS as an explicit incentive, we do not observe more share
repurchases in response to option exercises.
Panel C shows that the response on accruals-based earnings management is much stronger
for firms that use EPS as an explicit incentive. This is consistent with these firms being more
concerned about the dilution from option exercises. By contrast, we see no response among
the firms that do not use EPS as an incentive. This is consistent with managers being more
concerned about maintaining the EPS around dilution only when they are compensated for
doing so. The sample of firms with no EPS incentive also serves as yet another “placebo”
test, as we would expect a smaller response among these firms.16 Table A.4 tests whether
there is a significant difference in the level of earnings management between firms use and
not use EPS in the design of executive compensation. We find that firms with slightly
positive price gap options and explicitly use EPS in compensation-based incentives engage
in a higher level of accruals-based earnings management.
Next, we split the sample based on top managers’ equity ownership, as we expect anti-
dilution incentives to be stronger in firms with a higher level of managers’ equity ownership.
16We nevertheless do not see a significant differential effect on R&D in this limited sample. Part of the
reason is that the sample of firms that report R&D is significantly smaller, so when we further limit this
sample to firms that we can link to IncentiveLab that use EPS and have positive income, we end up with a
very small sample and thus insufficient statistical power to tell any differences apart.
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We define firms with a higher level of equity ownership if the percentage of stock ownership
owned by top 5 managers is above the median in the sample. The data about managers’
stock ownership is collected from the Annual Compensation database of Execucomp. Table
A.5 presents the results. Even though the coefficients of having a positive price gap is large
in sample with a higher level of stock ownership by insiders. We do not observe a significant
difference in option exercises, repurchases and earnings management between firms with high
or low levels of stock ownership by top 5 managers, as the interaction of having a positive
price gap and being above the median of stock ownership is not significant.
2.7.6 Consequences on Firm Performance
We document that firms engage in earnings management to counter the dilution effect on
EPS caused by option exercises. Bens et al. (2002) find that firms with a higher level of em-
ployee stock option exercises are associated with more share repurchases and declining firm
performance. Almeida et al. (2016) find that firms engage EPS-motivated repurchases expe-
rience a reduction employment and investment, and a decrease in cash holdings. We explore
the real consequences of earnings management on firm performance in this subsection.
The firm performance measurement is defined as the average difference in cash flow dur-
ing four quarters that follow the option expiration and four quarters prior to the expiration.
Quarterly cash flow is measured as the net income and depreciation and amortization, nor-
malized by the lagged total assets. We define firms engaging in real-based earnings manage-
ment if the firms experience a negative change in R&D investment in the quarter of option
expiration. Similarly, we define firms engaging in accruals-based earnings management if
the firms experience a positive change in discretionary accruals in the quarter of option
expiration.
Table 2.11 reports results on the relation between earnings management and firm per-
formance. For firms that experienced option exercises and conducted real-based earnings
management, we observe a reduction in the cash flow during the four quarters that follow
the option expiration. Similarly, the coefficients of having a positive price gap and engaging
in accruals-based earnings management are significantly negative on cash flows. These results
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indicate a real effect of earnings management due to option exercises on firm performance.
2.8 Robustness Tests
This section discusses further tests that we employ to assess the robustness of our results.
In our baseline results, we do not include observations with missing data for the “purchase
of common and preferred stocks” variable in Compustat. We, therefore, redo our tests where
we set any missing data to zero. The results remain similar. We also examine whether our
results are sensitive to different ways of measuring repurchases. We adjust our repurchase
measures for lagged repurchases, by subtracting the average repurchases during the last four
quarters from the current quarter, again with similar results. We also adjust the repurchases
by the average repurchases in the same industry and quarter (industry classifications based
on the Fama-French 49 industries). Another repurchase measurement uses a repurchase
indicator, which takes on a value of one if there is a repurchase in the quarter; and zero,
otherwise.
We also collect data from the SDC database on repurchase announcements to examine
whether such announcements are more likely in quarters when options are exercised using the
same regression discontinuity framework as above, but we find no evidence of an increased
likelihood of new repurchase programs. These results on announcements are thus consistent
with our baseline results that focus on actual repurchases.
We further test whether our results are sensitive to variations to our regression disconti-
nuity specification. We examine whether our results are sensitive to the window size around
the threshold of a zero price gap, by changing the window to [-0.15, 0.15], [-0.25, 0.25], [-0.3,
0.3], [-0.35, 0.35], [-0.4, 0.4], [-0.45, 0.45] and [-0.5, 0.5]. We also include the square and cube
of the price gap in the regression to account for a non-linear effect of the assignment variable.
Table 2.12 reports the regression coefficients of the positive price gap indicator across a range
of different bandwidths. The dependent variables include option exercises and repurchases
in Panel A, and earnings management variables in Panel B. The bandwidths range from 0.15
to 0.5 with an interval of 0.05. We also include the “optimal” bandwidth based on Calonico,
Cattaneo, Titiunik et al. (2014), which is 0.33. For bandwidths smaller than or equal to 0.2,
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we control for the linear relation with price gap, and for bandwidths larger than 0.2 and less
than 0.4, we control for the linear and quadratic relation with price gap. For bandwidths
greater than or equal to 0.4, we control for the linear, quadratic and cubical relation with
price gap. In Panel A, the coefficients of the positive price gap indicator are significantly
positive on option exercises and not significant on repurchases across all alternative band-
widths. In Panel B, the coefficients of the positive price gap are significantly negative on
the change in investment for a majority of the bandwidths, and are significantly positive on
the change in discretionary accruals in all alternative windows. These findings show that
the previous results are robust to alternative estimation windows.
As a robust test, we also include year fixed effect, cluster the standard errors by firm. Table
A.6 reports the regression results on option exercises, repurchases, real- and accruals-based
earnings management variables. Furthermore, we examine the results using bias-corrected
estimates and robust standard errors. Table A.7 summarizes conventional RD estimators
with conventional standard errors, bias-corrected RD estimators with conventional standard
errors and bias-corrected RD estimators with robust standard errors. In all the frameworks,
we find that managers exercise more options when they are slightly in the money, and firms
engage in earnings management activities, in stead of share repurchases, to counter the
dilution on EPS as a result of option exercises.
We also check the effect of the price gap on pre-trends of outcome variables. We examine
pre-trends in shares outstanding and earnings management in quarters before option expi-
ration in Table A.8 in the Appendix. The pre-trend outcome variables are measured as the
average change in the previous four quarters. We find that there are no such pre-trends in
the quarters before the option expiration.
2.9 Concluding Remarks
Many previous studies have shown a positive correlation between option exercises and share
repurchases and argue that firms may seek to engage in shares buybacks to counter EPS
dilution from options compensation. This correlation may nevertheless not necessarily be
causal. Both exercises and share repurchases are endogenous decisions that depend on several
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third factors such as firm performance and life cycle and which may not all be easy to control
for, and firms have at their disposal alternative tools they can use to manage EPS.
This paper examines this question using a regression discontinuity framework to identify
the causal impact of quasi-exogenous option exercises on the two main ways of managing
EPS: share repurchases and earnings management. We exploit a fuzzy regression disconti-
nuity framework that focuses on options with stock prices that are close to moneyness and
examine responses by firms that experience quasi-exogenous exercises because of their op-
tions ending up slightly in-the-money. Contrary to an “anti-dilution hypothesis”, our results
show that these quasi-exogenous exercises do not cause additional buybacks. In other words,
even though firms with many options and options that are in-the-money tend to do more
buybacks on average, this difference disappears once we zoom in on a smaller window where
other confounding factors are held constant and where we should observe a discrete jump if
firms engage in anti-dilutive repurchases. Instead, we show that firms engage in real- and
accrual-based earnings management to avoid depressing EPS around option exercises.
If firms do not engage in share repurchases to manage earnings around option exercises,
why do so many managers give answers to survey questions suggestion that anti-dilution
is one of the main reasons for buying back shares? We can of course only speculate why
managers answer the way they do. One possibility is that managers who have repurchased
shares clearly notice that one of the “uses” for the resulting treasury stock is to provide shares
in connection with option exercises; but the real reason for having originally repurchased
shares could still have been something else, such as flexibility or tax efficiency. In other
words, using the treasury stock for option exercises does not mean that the reason for doing
those repurchases was because the firm anticipated those exercises, or that a firm would have
done more or less buybacks if it faced a different magnitude of option exercises.
Finally, we want to emphasize that it is still possible that other aspects of options compen-
sation could have a causal effect on payout policy, including the fact that options typically
are not dividend-protected. While our empirical framework is well-suited to directly test-
ing the causal effect of a dilution channel, we cannot take a stand on these other possible






Figure 2.1 First stage: Option exercises and price gaps 
These figures show the amount of option exercises that take place during the last quarter of an option’s 
life (y-axis) on bins of price gaps on the option expiration date (x-axis), the “first stage” in our regression 
discontinuity design. Awards with the same expiration date and same strike price are aggregated. If a 
firm-quarter has multiple expiring options with different strike prices or different expiration dates, the 
price gap is based on the largest option award that expires in that quarter. In Panel A, we normalize option 
exercises by the lagged number of shares outstanding. In Panel B, we normalize by the sum of all awards 
that expire in that quarter. The graph is limited to awards with a normalized price gap in the range of [-
0.2, 0.2] with a bin size of 0.04.  
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Figure 2.2 Non-manipulation of the assignment variable 
These figures show histograms of the normalized price gaps on each option’s expiration day. Normalized 
price gap is measured as the stock price on the expiration date minus the option strike price (adjusted for 
stock splits and stock dividends between the grant date and expiration date), with this difference 
normalized by the strike price. Panel A shows a histogram for option awards with price gaps falling 
within the range of [-0.5, 2], and Panel B shows the histogram within the finer range of [-0.2, 0.2]. The 
observations are at the option level. 
 
A: Price gap histogram in the range [-0.5, 2]  
 
 





Figure 2.3 Share repurchases during the quarter of option expiration 
This graph shows the quarterly level of share repurchases, normalized by lagged total assets (y-axis) on 
bins of price gaps on the option expiration date (x-axis), a principal “second stage” variable in our 
analysis. If a firm-quarter has multiple expiring options with different strike prices or different dates, the 
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Figure 2.4 Exercises and share repurchases: The case of large option awards 
These figures show option exercises (first stage) and repurchases (second stage) within a subsample of 
large option awards. We define an award as “large” if the award size ranks in the top tercile when 
measured as a fraction of lagged shares outstanding. Panel A shows the first stage (analogous to Figure 
1): option exercises that take place during the last quarter of an option’s life (y-axis) on bins of the price 
gap on the option’s expiration date (x-axis). Awards with the same expiration date and same strike price 
are aggregated. Panel B shows the second stage (analogous to Figure 3): quarterly share repurchases, 
normalized by lagged total assets. If a firm-quarter has multiple “large” expiring options with different 
strike prices or different dates, the price gap is based on the largest option award that expires in that 
quarter. We limit the graphs to awards with a normalized price gap in the range of [-0.2, 0.2] with a bin 
size of 0.04.   
 
A: First stage. Option exercises by shares outstanding, for subsample of large option awards  
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Figure 2.5 Earnings management during the quarter of option expiration 
These graphs show the changes in R&D investment in Panel A, and discretionary accruals in Panel B (y-
axis) on bins of price gaps on the option expiration date (x-axis). 
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
These tables report summary statistics on option award characteristics (panel A), option exercises and payout 
variables (panel B), other outcome variables (Panel C), and firm characteristics (panel D). The firm characteristics in 
panel D are measured at the end of the quarter before option expiration. We report statistics separately for all option 
awards (Column 1), all awards with positive price gaps on expiration (Column 2), and all awards with negative price 
gaps on expiration (Column 3). In Columns 4–6, we further restrict the sample to awards with a price gap in the 
range of [-0.2, 0.2]. The observations are at the firm-quarter level; if a firm-quarter has multiple expiring options 
with different strike prices or different dates, the price gap is based on the largest option award that expires in that 
quarter. In Columns 1–6, we report mean values, and median values in parentheses. In Column 7, we report the 
mean difference between Columns 5 and 6, and p-values of a t-test of the difference in parentheses. The variable 
definitions are described in detail in the Appendix. The sample period is January 1992–June 2017. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 







Price gap  
[-0.2,0.2] 
Price gap  
[0,0.2] 
Price gap  
[-0.2,0] 
t-test  
[0,0.2] vs.  
[-0.2,0] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Norm. price gap 0.9691 2.0661 -0.4431 -0.0180 0.0943 -0.1073 0.2016*** 
(0.1581) (1.1294) (-0.4289) (-0.0229) (0.0900) (-0.1113) (0.0000) 
Positive price gap 
(indicator)  
0.5628 1.0000 0.0000 0.4431 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000*** 
(1.0000) (1.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (1.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Adj. strike price ($) 22.5787 15.9044 31.1705 22.5622 23.1636 22.0837 1.0799 
(14.3800) (10.6250) (20.5000) (17.5600) (16.5000) (17.8400) (0.6222) 
Adj. stock price on 
exp. date ($) 
24.8116 32.3584 15.0966 22.1654 25.4917 19.5189 5.9728** 
(17.7900) (24.3700) (10.8000) (16.7317) (18.5000) (16.1400) (0.0163) 
Option award size 
(%) 
0.4808 0.4855 0.4746 0.4218 0.4292 0.4160 0.0132 
(0.2699) (0.2674) (0.2735) (0.2502) (0.2527) (0.2477) (0.6956) 
        
N 5,183 2,917 2,266 899 399 500  
 







Price gap  
[-0.2,0.2] 
Price gap  
[0,0.2] 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Option exercises/Shares 
outstanding (%) 
0.0578 0.1006 0.0027 0.0595 0.1219 0.0099 0.1120*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) 
Option exercises 
(indicator) 
0.2211 0.3774 0.0199 0.2165 0.4257 0.0501 0.3756*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0000) 
Repurchases ($ million) 20.0586 27.4968 10.6339 23.9201 22.7220 24.8833 -2.1614 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.7716) 
Repurchases/Assets (%) 0.6224 0.8111 0.3831 0.6038 0.5953 0.6105 -0.0152 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.9110) 
Dividends/Assets (%) 0.1858 0.2162 0.1470 0.2331 0.2382 0.2291 0.0091 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0222) (0.0103) (0.0238) (0.7202) 
        





Table 2.1, cont. 







Price gap  
[-0.2,0.2] 
Price gap  
[0,0.2] 
Price gap  
[-0.2,0] 
t-test  [0,0.2] 
vs. [-0.2,0] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in shares 
outstanding (%) 
0.5803 0.5805 0.5801 0.4340 0.5962 0.3055 0.2906 
(0.2067) (0.2985) (0.1153) (0.2015) (0.2996) (0.1405) (0.13) 
Change in mechanical  
EPS (cents) 
0.3571 0.1127 0.6724 0.2356 0.0212 0.4048 -0.3836* 
(-0.0082) (-0.0442) (0.0000) (-0.0130) (-0.0239) (-0.0057) (0.09) 
Change in mechanical 
EPS/Share price  
0.0194 0.0021 0.0421 0.0098 0.0012 0.0166 -0.0154* 
(-0.0006) (-0.0021) (0.0000) (-0.0008) (-0.0015) (-0.0004) (0.09) 
Change in diluted 
EPS (cents) 
0.3410 0.2305 0.4885 0.0698 0.7038 -0.4326 1.1364*** 
(0.0456) (0.0440) (0.0554) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0027) 
Change in basic EPS 
(cents) 
0.3525 0.2350 0.5094 0.0744 0.7078 -0.4287 1.1365*** 
(0.0496) (0.0476) (0.0592) (0.0000) (0.0117) (0.0000) (0.0033) 
Change in R&D (% 
of assets) 
0.0116 0.0604 -0.0430 -0.0052 0.02562 -0.0274 0.0530 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.43) 
Change in total 
accruals (*100) 
-0.0732 -0.0366 -0.1208 -0.2098 -0.1311 -0.2738 0.1427 
(-0.0326) (0.0057) (-0.1114) (-0.0476) (-0.0271) (-0.0575) (0.59) 
Change in discr. 
Accruals_J (*100) 
0.0068 0.0238 -0.0152 -0.1186 -0.0225 -0.1968 0.1743 
(0.0267) (0.0455) (0.0134) (-0.0012) (0.1387) (-0.0737) (0.49) 
Change in discr. 
accruals_MJ (*100) 
0.0049 0.0264 -0.0230 -0.0879 -0.0739 -0.0992 0.0253 
(0.0230) (0.0302) (0.0025) (0.0292) (0.1870) (-0.0847) (0.92) 
















Change in issued 















LR change in cash 
flow/ assets (%)  
0.3512 0.3301 0.3788 0.4891 0.3750 0.5813 -0.2063 
(0.2205) (0.2623) (0.1445) (0.2318) (0.2269) (0.2321) (0.35) 
        
N 5,063 2,803 2,260 877 380 497  
 







Price gap  
[-0.2,0.2] 
Price gap  
[0,0.2] 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Market-to-book 2.8076 3.1737 2.3133 2.2590 2.4601 2.0964 0.3638 
(1.8760) (2.2482) (1.3635) (1.5895) (1.6906) (1.5131) (0.1071) 
Cash flow/Assets 
(%) 
0.9613 2.1363 -0.5735 1.2483 1.3794 1.1425 0.2369 
(1.8252) (2.2613) (1.2149) (1.8093) (1.7872) (1.8183) (0.5364) 
Cash/Assets 0.1630 0.1499 0.1799 0.1509 0.1472 0.1539 -0.0067 
(0.0877) (0.0747) (0.1055) (0.0819) (0.0727) (0.0881) (0.5744) 
ROA 0.0061 4.5317 -5.8333 1.0319 1.1821 0.9127 0.2695 
(3.3401) (5.0761) (1.0457) (2.9648) (3.0263) (2.9441) (0.8368) 
Total debt/Assets 0.2295 0.2206 0.2409 0.2222 0.2242 0.2206 0.3631 
(0.2002) (0.2041) (0.1963) (0.1960) (0.2112) (0.1850) (0.7993) 
Assets (Log) 7.0273 7.3429 6.6210 7.1185 7.0966 7.1360 -0.0393 
(6.9215) (7.2709) (6.4941) (6.9996) (7.0109) (6.9551) (0.7120) 
EPS incentive 
indicator 
0.3192 0.3253 0.3084 0.3750 0.3452 0.4000 -0.0548 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2810) 
        





Table 2.2 OLS regressions of repurchases on options compensation 
These tables report OLS regression of repurchases on options compensation during 1992 to 2017. The variables are 
at the firm-year level. Repurchases are measured as log (dollar value of share repurchase +1). Options compensation 
are measured as the log(dollar value of option grants+1), log(dollar value of option exercises+1), and log(dollar 
value of unexercised but exercisable options+1), where the options variables are summed over all named executive 
officers within a firm-year. Firm control variables include firm age, cash to assets, earnings volatility, past 1-year, 5-
year and 10-year stock returns, market-to-book, ROA, and firm size (log of assets). These control variables are 
measured as of the end of the previous fiscal year. Panel A drops observations with assets less than 1 million dollars 
or with non-positive book value of equity. Panel B further restricts to firm-year observations with negative income. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics based on standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm are reported in brackets.  *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
A: All firm-year observations  
Dependent variable: Log ($ Share Repurchases)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Log ($Options awarded) 0.119*** 
(17.52) 













































































        
Firm FE No No No No No No Yes 
Ind.*Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
        
R2 0.033 0.093 0.082 0.111 0.318 0.412 0.564 





Table 2.2, cont.table 
B: Firm-year observations with negative income  
Dependent variable: Log ($ Share Repurchases)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 


















































































        
Firm FE No No No No No No Yes 
Ind.*Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes 
        
R2 0.006 0.037 0.017 0.039 0.164 0.325 0.587 
N 6,993 6,993 6,995 6,989 6,160 5,944 6,089 






Table 2.3 First stage: Price gap and option exercises 
This table reports results for the relation between option price gaps on the expiration date and option 
exercises. The observations are at the firm-quarter level. The dependent variable is an indicator for any 
exercise of options that expire during the quarter (columns 1-2); or, the sum of exercises of expiring 
options, normalized by shares outstanding (columns 3-5). We limit the sample to awards that fall in the 
price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. If a firm-quarter has multiple expiring options with different strike prices or 
different expiration dates, the price gap is based on the largest option award that expires in that quarter. 
As independent variables, Columns 1 and 3 include only an indicator for whether the price gap is positive; 
Columns 2 and 4 control linearly for the size of the price gap; and Column 5 interacts the positive price 
gap indicator with the option award size. Option award size is measured as the number of options 
normalized by lagged shares outstanding. The variable definitions are described in detail in the Appendix. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variables: Option Exercise Indicator Option Exercises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
























Option Award Size      0.009 
(0.65)     
I(Price Gap>0) 
* Option award size  
    0.074*** 
(3.25) 
      
R2 0.206 0.21 0.1 0.102 0.124 
N 899 899 899 899 899 















Table 2.4 First stage: Option award size terciles 
This table reports sample splits based on Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, with subsamples based on the 
option award size. The observations are at the firm-quarter level, and the variables and the sample are the 
same as in Table 3. The sample splits are based on the number of options underlying the award (summed 
across all awards with the same expiration date and exercise price), normalized by lagged shares 
outstanding. Columns 1-2 report results for the bottom tercile (smallest awards), Columns 3-4 for the 
middle tercile, and Columns 5-6 for the top tercile (largest awards). *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variables: Option Exercises  
 Bottom Tercile Middle Tercile Top Tercile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       


























       
R2 0.124 0.139 0.134 0.16 0.134 0.138 
N 300 300 300 300 299 299 


















Table 2.5 Consequences for shares outstanding 
These tables report results on the relation between option price gaps on expiration and changes in shares 
outstanding. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the difference in shares outstanding between the end of 
the quarter of option expiration (“q0”) and the end of the previous quarter (“q-1”), normalized by the 
shares outstanding in q-1. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the difference in log shares outstanding 
from q-1 to q0. We limit the sample to awards that fall in the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. Columns 1-2 
include all such awards, and Columns 3-4 further limit the sample to only large option awards (in the top 
tercile). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
A: Percent change in shares outstanding  
Dependent variable: (shares in q0 – shares in q-1)/shares in q-1 (%) 
 All awards Large awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     








     
Linear controls No Yes No Yes 
     
R2 0.003 0.004 0.021 0.024 
N 896 896 299 299 
     
 
B: Change in log shares outstanding  
Dependent variable: log shares in q0 – log shares in q-1 
 All awards Large awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     








     
Linear controls No Yes No Yes 
     
R2 0.003 0.004 0.021 0.024 
N 898 898 299 299 






Table 2.6 Denominator-driven consequences for EPS 
These tables report results on the relation between option price gaps on expiration and “denominator-
driven” changes in earnings per share (EPS). The dependent variable in Panel A is “Income before 
extraordinary items available for common” in the quarter before option expiration (“q-1”) dividend by 
shares outstanding at the end of the quarter of option expiration (“q0”), minus the same income measure 
divided by shares outstanding in q-1. In Panel B, we further normalize these denominator-driven changes 
in EPS by the lagged stock price. We limit the sample to awards that fall in the price gap range of [-0.2, 
0.2]. Columns 1-2 include awards belong to firms with positive income, Columns 3-4 contain awards in 
firms with negative income, and Columns 5-6 further limit the sample to only large option awards (in the 
top tercile) and have positive income. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
A: Denominator-driven EPS changes  
Dependent variable: (Income in q-1/Shares in q0) – (Income in q-1/Shares in q-1) (cents) 
 Positive income Negative income Large awards & positive 
income  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       












       
Linear controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
R2 0.008 0.014 0.002 0.008 0.027 0.048 
N 693 693 200 200 214 214 
       
 
B: Normalized denominator-driven EPS changes 
Dependent variable: [(Income in q-1/Shares in q0) – (Income in q-1/Shares in q-1)] / Price q-1 
 Positive income Negative income Large awards & 
positive income  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       












       
Linear controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
R2 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.014 0.022 
N 693 693 200 200 214 214 







Table 2.7 Share repurchases in the quarter of option expiration 
The following tables report results on the relation between option price gaps on expiration and share 
repurchases.  We measure share repurchases as the “purchase of common and preferred stocks”, minus 
the maximum of zero and any negative change in the value of preferred stock on the balance sheet. In 
Panel A, the dependent variable is the dollar amount of share repurchases in the same quarter as the 
option expiration (“q0”), normalized by lagged assets. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the difference 
in share repurchases normalized by assets between q0 and q-1. We limit the sample to awards that fall in 
the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. Columns 1-2 include all such awards, and Columns 3-4 further limit the 
sample to only large option awards (in the top tercile). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
A: Share repurchases (q0) 
Dependent variable: Share Repurchases / Lagged Assets 
 All awards Large awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
















     
R2 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 
N 831 831 272 272 
     
 
B: Change in share repurchases 
Dependent variable: ∆Share Repurchases/ Lagged Assets, from q-1  to q0 
 All awards Large awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
















     
R2 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.013 
N 776 776 261 261 








Table 2.8 Consequences for real- and accruals-based earnings management 
The following tables report the relation between the option price gap and earnings management. In Panel 
A, the dependent variable is the change in R&D, which is the change in research and development 
expenses normalized by lagged assets from q-1 to q0. In Panel B, the dependent variables are changes in 
different measures of accruals from q-1 to q0. The different accruals measures are: total absolute accruals 
(columns 1-2), absolute discretionary accruals based on the Jones model (columns 3-4), and absolute 
discretionary accruals based on the Modified Jones model (columns 5-6). We split the sample throughout 
based on whether income before extraordinary items is positive or negative, and report subsample results 
in alternate columns. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
A: Real earnings management: R&D  
Dependent variable: ∆ R&D 
 Sample: Positive income Sample: Negative income 
 (1) (2) 











   
R2 0.030 0.030 
N 270 108 
   
 
B: Accruals-based earnings management  
Dependent 
variable: 
∆ Total Accruals ∆ Discretionary Accruals, 
Jones Model 
∆ Discretionary Accruals, 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       












       
Linear controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 0.015 0.021 0.023 0.024 0.013 0.010 
N 514 170 541 170 536 169 







Table 2.9 Actual EPS changes 
The following table reports the relation between option price gaps on expiration and actual changes in 
earnings per share (EPS). In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is the change in diluted earnings per 
share from q-1 to q0, normalized by the lagged stock price. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the 
change in basic earnings per share from q-1 to q0, normalized by the lagged stock price. We limit the 
sample to awards that fall in the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Changes in actual EPS (cents) 
 Diluted EPS Basic EPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
















     
R2 0.011 0.014 0.01 0.013 
N 892 892 893 893 





Table 2.10 Subsample analysis: Firms that explicitly use EPS in compensation 
The following tables report results for the effect of the option price gap on exercises, share repurchases 
and earnings management splitting the sample based on whether the firm explicitly uses EPS in the 
design of compensation-based incentives or not. Panel A reports the results on exercises. Columns 1-4 
include a subsample of firms that explicitly use EPS in the design of compensation-based incentives, and 
columns 5-8 contain firms that do not explicitly use EPS-based incentives. Panel B reports the regression 
results on repurchases for firms that have positive net income. Panel C reports the results on earnings 
management for positive income earners.  
A: Option exercises  
 Use EPS-based Compensation  Not Use EPS-based Compensation 
   
Dependent 
variables: 
Exercise Indicator Exercise size Exercise Indicator Exercise size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 



















         
Linear 
controls 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
        
R2 0.204 0.207 0.084 0.117 0.226 0.234 0.082 0.104 
N 138 138 138 138 230 230 230 230 
 
B: Repurchases for firms that use EPS (positive income earners) 
Dependent variable: Repurchases 
 Use EPS Not use EPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     








     
Linear controls No Yes No Yes 
     
R2 0.005 0.027 0.000 0.006 
N 119 119 160 160 
 
C: Accruals-based earnings management (positive income earners) 
Dependent 
variable: 
∆ Total Accruals ∆ Discretionary Accruals, 
Jones Model 
∆ Discretionary Accruals, 
Modified Jones Model 
Sample: Use EPS Not use 
EPS 
Use EPS Not use 
EPS 
Use EPS Not use 
EPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       












       
Linear controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 0.062 0.090 0.122 0.052 0.142 0.031 
N 91 129 91 129 91 127 
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Table 2.11 Consequences on firm performance  
These table reports results on the relation between earnings management and firm performance. We 
define firms engaging in real-based earnings management if the firms experience a negative change in 
R&D investment in the quarter of option expiration. Similarly, we define firms engaging in accruals-
based earnings management if the firms experience a positive change in discretionary accruals in the 
quarter of option expiration. The firm performance measurement is defined as the average difference in 
cash flow during four quarters that follow the option expiration and four quarters prior to the expiration. 
We limit the sample to awards that fall in the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. Columns 1-2 include all such 
awards, and Columns 3-4 further limit the sample to only large option awards (in the top tercile). *, **, 
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable (%):  
average cash flow/assets in q0, q1, q2, q3 – average cash flow/assets in q-4, q-3, q-2, q-1  
   
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
I(Price Gap>0)*Real 
earnings management  
-1.729**  -1.883** 
(-2.28)  (-2.38) 
I(Price Gap>0)*Accruals 
earnings management 
 -0.911* -1.830** 
 (-1.81) (-2.35) 
I(Price Gap>0) 1.325 1.357** 2.468*** 
 (1.58) (2.42) (2.60) 
Price Gap -4.735 -4.821 -4.309 
 (-1.14) (-1.64) (-0.98) 
I(Price Gap>0)* Price Gap -1.935 -1.421 -4.177 
 (-0.30) (-0.32) (-0.61) 
Real earnings management 0.903*  0.954* 
 (1.84)  (1.85) 
Accruals earnings 
management 
 0.865** 1.041** 
 (2.55) (2.07) 
    
R2 0.029 0.020 0.053 
N 356 711 335 





Table 2.12 Robustness check using alternative RD bandwidths  
These tables report the regression coefficients of the positive price gap indicator on option exercises, 
repurchases, and earnings management across a range of different bandwidths. In Panel A, the dependent 
variables are option exercises and repurchases. In Panel B, the dependent variables are changes in 
investment and accruals management. We include linear controls of the price gap. We further include 
quadratic controls if bandwidths are more than 0.20, and cubical controls if bandwidths are more than 
0.40.  
 
Panel A: Option exercises and repurchases  
Independent variable of interest: I(Price Gap>0) 
Bandwidth  Exercise indicator  Exercise size Repurchase size  









































0.4 0.211*** 0.137*** -0.381 
 (2.62) (3.56) (-1.28) 
0.45 0.243*** 0.111** -0.191 
 (3.24) (2.23) (-0.69) 
0.5 0.248*** 0.157*** -0.212 























Table 2.12, cont. 
Panel B: changes in investment and accruals  
Independent variable of interest: I(Price Gap>0)  
Bandwidth   ∆ investment ∆ Total accruals ∆ discretionary 
accruals Jones 
∆ dis. accruals 
Modified Jones 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.15 -0.451*** 1.454** 1.825*** 1.215* 
(-2.89) (2.10) (2.77) (1.87) 
0.2 -0.266* 1.319** 1.630*** 1.165** 
(-1.96) (2.27) (2.93) (2.16) 
0.25 -0.495*** 1.688** 2.216*** 1.545** 
(-2.74) (2.02) (2.77) (1.99) 
0.3 -0.530*** 1.805** 2.352*** 1.498** 
(-2.61) (2.38) (3.21) (2.13) 
0.33 
 
-0.346* 1.567** 2.027*** 1.321* 
(-1.84) (2.16) (2.89) (1.95) 
0.35 -0.299* 1.631** 2.040*** 1.293** 
(-1.68) (2.36) (3.06) (2.01) 
0.4 -0.603*** 2.127** 2.761*** 1.659** 
(-2.74) (2.40) (3.20) (1.97) 
0.45 -0.531** 1.998** 2.562*** 1.642** 
(-2.17) (2.42) (3.19) (2.08) 
0.5 -0.480** 2.026*** 2.524*** 1.696** 


















THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
ON EARNINGS PER SHARE BONUSES AND
METHODS OF SHARE REPURCHASES
In this chapter, we examine the choice between Accelerated Share Purchase (ASR) and
Open Market Share Repurchase (OMR) from 2012 to 2015 for firms with different levels of
institutional investors. We uncover that firms with a high level of institutional ownership
are more likely to conduct an OMR than ASR program, which is due to both the influence
and the selection effects of institutional investors. We also find that, using a fuzzy regression
discontinuity framework, having a high level of institutional ownership causes a lower proba-
bility of having an annual bonus tied to EPS figures. In addition, ASR firms are more likely
to compensate their managers explicitly based on reported EPS figures, which is indicated
in the literature and replicated using our data. Thus, we conclude that firms with a high
level of institutional investors are less likely to conduct ASR programs because of concerns
about earnings management. Finally, we find that firms with higher institutional ownership
exhibit greater positive market reaction to ASR announcements than is the case for firms
with lower institutional ownership. Therefore, having a high level of institutional ownership,
which is a sign of better corporate governance, mitigates the problem of conducting ASR
programs to manipulate EPS for compensation purposes.
3.1 Introduction
This paper empirically examines the preference for Open Market Share Repurchase (OMR)
over Accelerated Share Repurchase (ASR) for institutional investors. ASR is an innovative
form of payout that has acquired increasing popularity. For instance, Dickinson, Kimmel,
and Warfield (2012) document that ASR announcements represented 0.5% of the total num-
ber of repurchase program announcements during 2002, and have increased to 14% of the
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aggregate repurchases in 2007. Instead of repurchasing shares on the open market, a firm
borrows its own shares from an investment bank in ASR at a pre-specified price on a specific
day. The investment bank borrows the shares from its clients to deliver the shares to the
firm in a short position, and then the investment bank will purchase the shares through
open market repurchases for some length of time. In the end, the firm pays (receives) the
investment bank for (from) extra cash or shares if the average price paid by the investment
bank in the open market repurchase is more (less) than the pre-specified price in the con-
tract (Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang, 2010). In other words, the pre-specified price is a
volume-weighted average price of the shares during this period of time.
ASR differs from OMR in two important ways. First, the firm retires the target number
of shares immediately, and this has a full effect on reported earnings per share during the
current accounting period. Second, once the firm enters the forward contract with the
investment bank, the firm is obligated to repurchase a certain number of shares at an average
market price during the course of the contract, even if the share price rises (Marquardt, Tan,
and Young, 2007). The expected cost of an ASR is higher than an OMR, because firms are
committed to repurchase and retire a specific number of shares immediately. This is the
case even if the price increase significantly, because the firm does not have the flexibility
to repurchase at another time or for a different number, or discontinue it. In contrast,
OMR offers the flexibility for repurchase at times when the price is low or to discontinue
buybacks when the price is high. For example, more than 25% of the OMR firms discontinue
repurchases after their announcements followed increases in the stock prices (Lie, 2005;
Stephens and Weisbach, 1998).
Programs that immediately increase earnings per share can be used as earning manage-
ment tools, particularly for managers whose bonuses are based on EPS. Marquardt et al.
(2007) find that ASR firms are more likely to compensate their managers using EPS-related
bonuses. Therefore, managers can obtain a short-term EPS increase and receive the annual
incentives by conducting an ASR program, but this can damage shareholder value since
using an ASR is more expensive. Marquardt and Wiedman (2005) similarly claim that firms
are more likely to use convertible bonds transactions to increase their EPS when managers
are compensated based on EPS measurements.
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Institutional investors play an important role in corporate governance because they mon-
itor the decisions of the Board of Directors and contribute to effective corporate governance
practices. For instance, Srivardhan (2009) finds that institutional investors can address
agency problems since they have incentives to monitor firm management due to the magni-
tude of their holdings and have the ability to put changes into effect through the use of voting
blocks. Thus, the level of Institutional investors is a proxy for corporate governance. Insti-
tutional ownership is measured in five ways: Total Institutional Ownership, Top 5 largest
Institutional Ownership, Long-term Institutional Ownership, Institutional Ownership Con-
centration and Motivated Institutional Ownership (Nagel, Qayyum, and Roskelley, 2015).
Diverse measures are used in order to capture institutions’ ability and incentives to monitor.
We examine the choice of institutional investors on repurchase methods. We find that
institutional investors favor OMR over ASR conditional on doing a repurchase. We also
show that the probability and size of a repurchase increase with the level of institutional
ownership, which is consistent with the literature (Crane, Michenaud, and Weston, 2016).
Thus, the relative reduction of ASR is a shift towards more stock repurchases with the
increase being disproportionally larger for OMR. Furthermore, we find that institutional
ownership decreases the probability of conducting an ASR without conditional on doing a
stock repurchase. We study whether institutional investors select firms that are less likely
to conduct ASR programs or active institutional investors that affect firms’ payout policy
towards less ASR programs. We separate the total institutional investors into dedicated
(active) investors who influence firms’ payout policy and quasi-indexers (non-active) investors
who do not influence firms’ policy (Chen, Huang, Li, and Shevlin, 2015; D’Souza, Ramesh,
and Shen, 2007). We find that the reason firms with a high level of institutional ownership
are more likely to conduct an OMR than ASR program is due to both the influence and
selection effects of institutional investors.
In order to answer why institutional investors do not favor ASR, we examine the reasons
why firms conduct ASR and the role of institutional investors. We test the hypothesis
that compensation incentive plays an important role in the decision to adopt ASR versus
OMR, as in Marquardt et al. (2007). We find that ASR firms exhibit a significantly greater
number of EPS related bonuses. Furthermore, we find that high institutional ownership is
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less associated with annual EPS-based incentives in both the ASR sub-sample and the OMR
sub-sample. This explains why institutional investors do not favor ASR firms, which have a
significantly greater number of EPS-related incentives.
This paper finds that having a high level of institutional ownership causes a significantly
lower percentage of annual bonuses tied to EPS figures using regression discontinuity strat-
egy. Chang, Hong, and Liskovich (2014) show that there is a discontinuity in institutional
ownership around the Russell 1000 index cutoff. To be specific, firms are ranked based on
their market capitalization on May 31,and the largest 1,000 firms form the Russell 1000 in-
dex, while the Russell 2000 index is comprised of the next largest 2,000 firms. Even though
there is a small difference between the smallest firms of the Russell 1000 and the largest firms
of the Russell 2000, the latter firms receive more weight in terms of institutional ownership.
The identification assumption is that the variation in institutional ownership is driven by
the inclusion in the Russell 2000 index, not by any other differences in corporate policy.
This identification strategy makes it possible to establish a causal relationship between in-
stitutional ownership and firms’ performance. For example, Crane et al. (2016) find that
higher institutional ownership causes better monitoring in terms of lower cash holdings,
higher investment in R&D and lower CEO compensation using the regression discontinuity
method.
The finding of market reaction to ASR announcement varies in the literature because
authors have collected their own data using different news sources and time periods. Some
papers find positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the time of ASR announce-
ment days (Akyol, Kim, and Shekhar, 2014; Kulchania, 2013). Bargeron, Kulchania, and
Thomas (2011) find that the positive return is weaker for firms involved in multiple ASR
programs. Dickinson et al. (2012) find that ASR market adjusted return is significantly
negative compared with OMR. They explain that positive market reaction to ASR is due to
market inefficiency with respect to two misreporting issues. When stock price increases, the
firm will owe the investment bank, but the balance sheet does not reflect the potential extra
liability. In addition to the misrepresentation of the balance sheets for firms conducting
ASR, earnings are also misrepresented, since unrealized gains and losses will not be recorded
as income but rather as adjustments to equity. Some investors are not fully adjusted for
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misrepresentations, so ASR programs result in positive market abnormal reaction.
We examine the market reaction to ASR announcements in terms of 5-day cumulative ab-
normal returns. We find that the market reacts to an ASR announcement positively for firms
with high institutional investors, and negatively for firms having low, or no, institutional in-
vestors. Therefore, having a high level of institutional ownership, a signal of better corporate
governance, mitigates the problem of conducting ASRs for the purpose of manipulating EPS
for compensation. We also find that ASR firms that do not have EPS-based compensation
have much higher abnormal returns than firms that have EPS-based compensation. For the
purpose of comparing, we plot the market reaction to OMR announcements and find that
the market reacts to firms with and without EPS bonuses differently depending whether
they are ASR or OMR firms. OMR firms with EPS bonuses even have higher returns than
those without EPS bonuses, which is the opposite for ASR firms. Thus, manipulating EPS
for earning management through share repurchases is a concern for ASR firms and it is not
a worry for OMR firms, at least from the perspective of the market.
There are other plausible explanations in the literature for firms choosing to use ASR
instead of OMR. Chemmanur et al. (2010) claim that ASR firms are undervalued because
they exhibit better post-announcement operating performance and stock returns. However,
Michel, Oded, and Shaked (2010) find that the post-announcement performance of ASR
stock is poor and believe that ASR firms do not signal undervaluation. Kulchania (2013)
finds that trading costs decrease and market quality improves after an ASR announcement.
The author thus concludes that firms choose ASR to improve liquidity. However, stock
liquidity improves following both ASR and OMR programs (Chemmanur et al., 2010).
We compare the future operating performance of ASR and OMR firms to test whether
firms conduct ASR to signal undervaluation instead of manipulating EPS for compensation
purpose. We match the ASR sample to the OMR sample based on firms’ past operating
performance before conducting ASR or OMR programs. We then compare changes in firms’
operating performance after the repurchases. We find that there is no significant difference
between firms that conduct ASR and OMR programs. Therefore, we conclude that firms
conducting ASR programs do not aim to signal undervaluation.
Our paper is the first to document institutional investors’ preference for OMR over ASR.
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Cook and Kim (2006) claim that institutional investors do not appear to differentiate be-
tween Open Market Repurchase from Derivative Repurchase as a whole (this includes Put
Options, Forward Purchase Contracts, Accelerated Share Repurchase and Structured Share
Repurchase). Moreover, Akyol et al. (2014) examine the mean difference of Total Insti-
tutional Ownership between ASR and OMR firms and they do not find any difference.
However, we find that the higher the level of institutional ownership, the less likely that
the firm conducts an ASR program conditional on doing a stock repurchase. Furthermore,
institutional ownership increases the probability of conducting an OMR and decreases the
probability of conducting an ASR without conditional on doing a stock repurchase. We find
that these results are due to the influence of active investors and the selection or sorting
effect of non-active institutional investors.
Moreover, this paper is the first to find that having a high level of institutional ownership
causes a significantly lower percentage of annual bonuses tied to EPS figures, which con-
tributes to the literature of corporate governance on institutional investors. Besides having
a high level of institutional ownership causes better monitoring in terms of lower cash hold-
ings, higher investment in R&D and lower CEO compensation, and pays more dividends and
repurchases more shares (Crane et al., 2016). In the final part of the paper, we document
a positive market reaction to ASR announcements among firms that have a high level of
institutional investors, and negative cumulative abnormal returns for firms with no, or low,
institutional ownership. We also find that firms that do not have EPS-based compensation
have much higher abnormal returns than firms that have EPS-based compensation.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the construction of the sample
and the institutional investment variables as proxies for corporate governance. Section 3.3
presents our methodology and quantitative results and Section 3.4 consists of an analysis of
these findings. Section 3.5 provides robustness check and Section 3.6 summarizes our paper.
3.2 Data
We manually searched ASR firms during 2012 to 2015 using the Lexis-Nexis Academic Uni-
verse Database and ABI/INFORM using the search term “Accelerated Share Repurchase
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Announce”. These databases offer comprehensive information on U.S. and world publica-
tions, news, court documents, web publications and company profiles. If multiple dates for
a single ASR announcement were listed, we examine firms’ 10-Ks or 10-Qs from the Edgar
Database of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. We restricted our sample to
companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. We employed a similar searching procedure
for OMR firms using the Lexis-Nexis Database and the search term “Share Repurchase An-
nounce.” We eliminated OMR firms involved in ASR programs. This resulted in 51 ASR
programs and 494 OMR programs.
We used the Compustat database for companies’ annual financial characteristics, and used
the CRSP database for daily stock information and market returns. We followed Dickinson
et al. (2012)’ s criteria to eliminate firms that had total assets, common equity, or revenues
that were less than $1 million, shares outstanding that were below $1 million dollars, or
closing prices that were less than $1. We went to construct the following variables using
these datasets.
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR):we estimate the expected return using a market
model with 255 trading days, and which ends 30 days prior to the announcement using
the CRSP data. We then calculate the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns using a
window of -2 to +2 trading days relative to the time of the repurchase announcement.
Leverage: this is the sum of debt in current liabilities (item 34) and long-term debt (item
9), divided by total assets (item 6)
Book-to-market value: this is the ratio of market value of the assets and the book value
of the total assets (item 6). The market value of the assets is calculated as the sum
of the market equity, the debt in current liabilities (item 34), long-term debts (item
9) and the preferred liquidation value (item 10), minus the preferred liquidation value
(item 10) and the deferred tax and investment tax credits (item 35), where the market
value of the equity is the product of share price (item 199) and the number of shares
outstanding (item 54)
Log (sales): log of sales/turnover (item 12)
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Log (assets): log of total assets (item 6)
EPS Bonus : we examine companies’ Form DEF 14A from the SEC and allow the dummy
variable EPS Bonus takes on the value of one, if managers’ annual bonuses are tied to
EPS in their proxy statement. It takes on the value zero otherwise.
Cash: this is measured as cash and short-term investments (item 1), scaled by total assets
(item 6)
Cash flow : this is measured in terms of net operating cash flow (item 13) minus capital
expenditures (item 128), scaled by total assets (item 6)
Dividends : this is calculated as the division of cash dividends (item 127) by the closing
stock price (item 199)
Purchase size: this is the repurchase amount as announced by the firm, scaled by firm’ s
market capitalization. Equivalently, it is the number of shares to be bought divided
by the total number of outstanding shares for the firm on the announcement day
Stock return volatility : this is calculated as the standard deviation of daily percentage
change of stock closing prices for the previous year.
Return on assets : this is calculated as the operating income before depreciation (item 13),
divided by total assets (item 6)
Return on sales : this is equal to the operating income before depreciation (item 13) scaled
by sales (item 12)
Operating cash-flow return on assets : this is equal to the operating income before deprecia-
tion (item 13) plus the decrease in receivables (item 2), the decrease in inventory (item
3), the increase in accounts payable (item 70), the increase in other current liabilities
(item 72), and the decrease in other current assets (item 68)
Capital expenditure: this is the value of property, plant and equipment (item 8), scaled by
total assets (item 6)
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Our Institutional holding data is derived from the Thomson Financial Database, which
includes information about institutional 13F SEC filings. We construct five measures of
institutional ownership based on the literature in order to capture their corporate governance
inventive and capabilities.
Total Institutional ownership: this measures the total ownership of all institutions as a
percentage of firm’s total shares outstanding.
Top 5 institutional Ownership: this is calculated as the sum of the five largest institutional
holdings as a percentage of firm’s total shares outstanding.
Long-term Institutional Ownership: this is defined as the percentage of a firm’s shares
outstanding held by institutional investors for at least four quarters.
Institutional Ownership Concentration: we first calculate the percentage of the firms’
shares held by each institutional investor. We then square the percentages and sum
the squared percentages across all institutional investors.
Motivated Institutional Ownership: this is measured using the sum of the percentages of
motivated institutional investors, where motivated institutional investors are defined
as those whose holding values in the firm are in the top 10% of their portfolios.
Akyol et al. (2014) examine the mean difference in the Total Institutional Ownership
between ASR and OMR firms and do not find any difference in the Total Institutional
Ownership. This sheds light on using other alternative measures of institutional ownership,
because the Total Institutional Ownership may not be the best measurement to test the
effect of institutions on the choice of repurchase methods. Grinstein and Michaely (2005)
believe that Top 5 Institutional Ownership explains institutions’ ability to monitor and exert
an effect on the board’s decisions, which suffer less from the coordination problems since the
shares are concentrated in their hands, compared to small institutional investors. Moreover,
Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) find that the benefit of monitoring increases with the length
of investment, and institutions with long-term holdings are likely to engage in monitoring
efforts. We thus use Long-term Institutional Ownership to capture the motivation which
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underlies corporate governance. Moreover, Hartzell and Starks (2003) construct the Herfind-
ahl index, which proxies for the concentration of the shares among institutional investors.
They argue that the higher the index, the more incentives that investors have to invest in
public goods, like monitoring. We use the term Institutional Concentration to measure the
motivation behind institutional investors’ governance efforts. Finally, Fich, Harford, and
Tran (2015) argue that institutions allocate their monitoring effort to firms based on the
relative importance of the firm’s stock in their portfolio. For instance, the institution will
choose to focus their exercise of corporate governance on firms with holding value weights
at the top of the institution’s portfolio. We thus construct the weight of the firm in the
institution’s portfolio as the percentage of holding value in the firm in order to find the
value of Motivated Institutional Ownership.
3.3 Results
Let us begin by presenting summary statistics concerning share repurchases (Panel A of
Table 3.1), institutional ownership (Panel B of Table 3.1) and firm characteristics (Table
3.2). Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of repurchases. The mean for
the number of OMR shares is 3463.49 thousand, which is larger than that of ASR (2777.59
thousand). In contrast, the median for the number of ASR shares is 791 thousand that is
larger than 500 thousand, the median for OMR. The median for the dollar value of ASR
is $800 million, a figure that is higher than the median of OMR ($500 million). Panel B
of Table 3.1 summarizes the level of institutional ownership for the first, third, fifth, seven
and ninth decile in five measurements. The median level of Total Institutional Ownership is
0.585, which is greater than that of Top 5 Institutional Ownership (0.214) and Long-term
Institutional Ownership (0.504). Among all five measurements, Institutional Ownership
Concentration has the smallest value, followed by Motivated Institutional Ownership. For
instance, their medians are 0.01 and 0.058 respectively.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of firms’ characteristics by groups of high and low
institutional ownership, and these are measured in five ways. A firm falls into a low (high)
institutional ownership group if its percentage of institutional investors is lower (greater)
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than the median. Panel A shows that firms with high Total Institutional Ownership have
bigger market-to-book values, greater cash flows and larger firm sizes. For instance, firms
with high Total Institutional Ownership have a mean of 2.95 for growth rate, while firms
with low Total Institutional Ownership have a mean of 1.76 for growth rate. Panel B
indicates that firms with high Top 5 Institutional Ownership are larger in size and have
greater growth rates when compare with firms with low Top 5 Institutional Ownership.
However, institutional investors do not have statistically significant higher holdings in firms
with higher levels of cash flow. Panel C groups firms based on their percentages of Long-
term Institutional Ownership and finds long-term institutional investors are more likely
to invest in firms with larger market-to-book values, higher cash flows, larger assets and
larger sales. Panel D shows that firms with high Institutional Ownership Concentration
have characteristics which are similar to firms with high Long-term Institutional Ownership,
where cash flow does not differ between groups. Panel E points out that firms with high
Motivated Institutional Ownership not only have greater growth rates, higher level of cash
flows, and larger firm sizes, but also issue more cash dividends. For instance, firms with high
Motivated Institutional Ownership have a mean of 7.81 for cash dividends, while firms with
low Motivated Institutional Investors have a mean of 2.36, which is statistically significant
at the 10% level. Our statistic summary is similar to the findings of Gompers and Metrick
(2001), who claim that institutional investors have a preference for large firms.
3.3.1 Institutional Investors Do Not Favor Accelerated Share Repurchase
Conditional on Stock Repurchases
We begin our analyses by determining which factors affect the choice between Accelerated
Share Repurchase and Open Market Share Repurchase in a multivariate framework. We
estimate the probability of conducting an ASR program conditional on doing a stock re-
purchase using a dummy dependent variable that takes on a value of one for ASR firms
and zero for OMR firms. The independent variable of interest is Institutional Ownership,
which is measured in five ways. In a manner consistent with Grinstein and Michaely (2005),
we define institutional ownership at year t in terms of the holdings on December 31 in the
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year t-1. It requires time for institutions to influence a board’s decisions, so the relationship
between institutional holdings during year t-1 and share repurchase at year t would be more
than a year. The choice of control variables is consistent with the literature, and they are
measured at the end of the year t-1. Chemmanur et al. (2010) show that ASR firms are
larger in size, have higher levels of cash dividends, have higher leverage ratios, have smaller
cash holdings and have lower levels of cash flow than firms which take the OMR path. Akyol
et al. (2014) find that there is a statistically significant and negative relationship between
market-to-book value and the choice of repurchase method. This suggests that firms choose
ASR to signal undervaluation. We include all of these variables as controls, namely firm
size, dividends, cash holdings, cash flow, leverage, and market-to-book ratio.
Table 3.3 presents the results of the probit regressions, which explain ASR election in
terms of five definitions of institutional ownership. The coefficients on the independent
variables are reported, along with their p-values. All the regressions include industry fixed
effect as the first two digits of SIC code and year fixed effect. Column (1) reports the
probability of conducting an ASR using Total Institutional Ownership. The coefficient
of Total Institutional Ownership is negative and significant at the 1% level where p-value
equals to 0.0057. This indicates that institutions do not prefer firms which chose to use ASR.
Market-to-book value has a negative coefficient, which shows that ASR firms are likely to be
undervalued. We also find that larger firms measured in log (assets), and firms with lower
levels of cash flow are more likely to conduct ASR, which is consistent with the literature.
However, the level of dividend payment, the level of cash holdings and the ratio of leverage
do not show a significant effect on the decision of which repurchase methods to use. Column
(2) uses Top 5 Institutional Ownership. This is significantly negative at the 1% level, and has
a p-value of 0.0091. In contrasted with Column (1), Column (2) has a positive coefficient of
the market-to-book value, and this weakens the undervaluation explanation for conducting
ASR programs. Michel et al. (2010) find that the post-announcement performance of ASR
stock is poor, and they suggest that ASR programs do not signal undervaluation. Column
(3) represents the probit analysis using Long-term Institutional Ownership. Higher levels of
Longer-term Institutional Ownership decrease the likelihood of conducting ASR programs
at a significant level of 1%. Similar to column (2), which has a positive coefficient of growth
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rate, we find that the coefficient of the growth rate is positive and significant at the 10% level
in Column (3), which further weakens the belief that ASR firms are undervalued. Column (4)
measures the level of institutional investors by using Institutional Ownership Concentration,
which has a significantly negative coefficient at the 5% level. Unlike in the previous columns,
we measure the firm size using log (sales), and find the result does not change. In Column
(5), we regress the Motivated Institutional Ownership based on the probability of conducting
an ASR program, and we find that the coefficient of institutional ownership is negative and
significant at the 1% level with a p-value of 0.0089. Unlike in columns (1) to (4), we find that
the size of the firm does not affect the probability of electing an ASR program. However, it
is the case that a lower leverage ratio affects the choice of ASR at the 5% significance level.
It supports the target leverage ratio theory (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001) to the
effect that firms use stock repurchases to increase their leverage ratio and move it towards
the target ratio. ASR programs allow firms to move themselves closer to their target leverage
ratios in a faster manner, so firms with leverage ratios below the target level are more likely
to conduct ASR programs. However, Chemmanur et al. (2010) find that leverage does not
exert a significant influence on the choice of an ASR over an OMR program, and they do
not find any support for this target leverage ratio theory.
In summary, in all five probit analyses, we find that the higher the level of institutional
ownership, the less likely that the firm conducts an ASR program conditional on doing a
stock repurchase. In other words, institutional investors do not favor ASR over OMR in a
statistically significant manner. In order to do a robust check, we also include the size of the
repurchase and stock price volatility. We do this because Bargeron et al. (2011) point out
that firms with larger purchase sizes and smaller levels of stock price volatility have lower
costs of losing flexibility in ASR program, and these firms are more likely to conduct an
ASR program instead of an OMR program. The conclusion does not change if we include
these variables.
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3.3.2 Institutional Investors Do Not Favor Accelerated Share Repurchase
Without Conditional on Stock Repurchases
We find that institutional investors prefer OMR over ASR conditional on doing a stock re-
purchase in Table 3.3. However, we do not know whether the relative reduction of ASR is
a shift to OMR, a shift towards less stock repurchases with the reduction being dispropor-
tionally larger for ASR, or a shift towards more stock repurchases with the increase being
disproportionally larger for OMR. We will answer this question by examining the effect of
institutional ownership on stock repurchases, and the probability of conducting an ASR
without conditional on stock repurchases.
Crane et al. (2016) find that firms pay more dividends and repurchase more shares when
they have higher levels of institutional investors using regression discontinuity near the Rus-
sell 1000 and 2000 index threshold. In Table 3.4, we examine the probability and size of a
repurchase that is affected by institutional ownership. All the regressions include firm fixed
effect and year fixed effect, and cluster the errors by firm. In Column (1), we find that there
is a significantly positive relationship between institutional ownership and the probability
of conducting a stock repurchase at a significance level of 1%. In Column (2), consistent
with the previous papers, we find that the size of stock repurchase increases with the level
of institutional ownership at a 1% significance level.
We find that institutional ownership reduces the probability of conducting an ASR relative
to OMR in Table 3.3, and it increases the probability and size of stock repurchase as a
whole in Table 3.4. Therefore, we can conclude that institutional ownership increases the
probability of OMR without conditional on stock repurchases. However, the probability of
conducting an ASR without conditional on doing a stock repurchase may be either increased
or decreased.
Table 3.5 represents the results of the probit regression of ASR without conditional on
doing a stock repurchase. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on a value
of one for an ASR year-firm observation, and zero for an year-firm observation without stock
repurchase. Since the sample of ASR is relatively small comparing with firm-year samples
of no repurchase, we perform a matching procedure based on industry, year, cash flow and
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assets. We choose to match using the level of assets and cash flow since they are significant
in determining the probability of conducting an ASR in Table 3.3. Column (1) in Table 3.5
has matched ASR samples (treatment) to no repurchase samples (control) based on being in
the same industry and year, having log (assets) within in 1 unit and size of cash flow within
0.5 unit. We find that the coefficient of institutional investors is negative and significant
at the 1% level. Column (2) has matched the treatment group to the control group using
a tighter matching criterion. The effect of cash flow is no longer significant at the 10%
level when adjust the size of cash flow to be within 0.05 unit for matching. We find that
institutional ownership reduces the probability of conducting an ASR without conditional
on stock repurchases at a significance level of 5%.
In summary, we find that the relative reduction of ASR is a shift towards more stock
repurchases with the increase being disproportionally larger for OMR. Besides, institutional
ownership increases the probability of conducting an OMR and decreased the probability of
conducting an ASR without conditional on doing a stock repurchase.
3.4 Analyses
3.4.1 Do Institutional Investors Select or Influence Firms’ Repurchase
Methods?
In part III, we find that firms with a high level of institutional ownership are more likely to
conduct an OMR than ASR program. However, it is unclear whether institutional investors
select firms that are less likely to conduct ASR programs or if the result is driven by active
institutional investors who affect firms’ payout policy. In this part, we regress the choice of
ASR and OMR on both active and non-active institutional investors. This way we can see
whether there is selection of non-active investors choosing firms that are by themselves less
likely to use ASR, and whether active investors influence firms to choose OMR over ASR.
Dedicated investors are characterized by “relation investing” with limited diversification,
lower turnover rates and longer investing horizons (D’Souza et al., 2007). Besides, they have
private channels of communication with investee firms. We measure the level of institutional
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ownership by dedicated institutions and examine their influence on firms’ payout policy.
Column (1) in Table 3.6 represents the probit regression of the repurchase methods on
active institutional investors. The independent variable is a dummy variable that takes on
the value of one for ASR firms and zero for OMR firms. We include control variables, as
well as year and industry fixed effects. The coefficient of Active Institutional Ownership is
significantly negative at the 1% level. This indicates that the choice of OMR over ASR can
be attributed to the influence of active investors.
Quasi-indexers are purely indexing institutions or funds that use their portfolios to mimic
an index. Quasi-indexers have no incentive or mechanisms to affect firms’ operations, since
they hold diversified portfolios with a low turnover rate for a long time horizon (Chen et al.,
2015). Consequently, quasi-indexers are non-active investors. We measure the level of insti-
tutional ownership by quasi-indexers and examine their effect on the repurchase methods.
Column (2) in Table 3.6 represents the probit regressions of the repurchase methods on
institutional investors categorized as quasi-indexers. The coefficient of Quasi-Indexers Insti-
tutional Ownership is negative and significant at the 1% level. It indicates that non-active
institutional investors select firms that are less likely to repurchase through ASR, since quasi-
indexers are unlikely to influence firms’ policies. Thus, we find that firms with a high level
of institutional ownership are more likely to conduct an OMR than ASR program is due to
both the influence and the selection effect of institutional investors.
3.4.2 Why Do Institutional Investors Not Favor ASR?
The level of institutional ownership is an endogenous variable, so we interpret the signifi-
cantly negative relationship between institutional investors and the probability of conducting
ASR programs as meaning that institutions prefer OMR to ASR programs (not the causa-
tion). A natural question regarding this finding is why institutional investors do not favor
ASR programs. Marquardt et al. (2007) find that compensation incentives based on re-
ported EPS figures play a determining role in the decision to engage in an ASR instead of an
OMR. Lehman and Hodgson (2006) argue that some share repurchase programs may actu-
ally damage shareholders’ value when they are purely created for the purpose of rewarding
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CEOs “per share” performance. Given that an ASR retires a number of shares immediately,
it produces to a sudden increase in firms’ EPS. Thus, managers whose annual bonuses are
evaluated based on EPS figures are incentivized to conduct ASR programs, regardless of the
fact that an ASR is more expensive than an OMR and it may hurt shareholders’ value. We
use a dummy variable EPS bonus as the proxy of a compensation incentive. This is equal
to one if EPS is explicitly mentioned as a measurement of managers’ annual bonuses in
firm’s proxy statement from the SEC filings. It takes on the value of zero otherwise. Table
3.7 indicates that the mean of having an EPS-based annual incentive for firms with OMR
programs is 0.301, and is 0.643 for firms which conduct ASR programs. In other words, a
higher percentage of ASR firms tie their CEO bonuses to EPS figures than that of OMR
firms, and the difference is significant at the 1% level.
Institutional investors do not favor ASR, and EPS manipulation is a plausible explanation
for conducting ASR programs. We will examine the percentage of EPS-based incentives for
low and high levels institutional ownership. Our hypothesis is that institutional investors
do not favor CEO bonuses which are tied to EPS, and thus do not favor ASR programs.
Formally, our first hypothesis is that firms with high levels of institutional ownership have
significantly lower average percentage of annual bonuses which are tied to EPS figures. The
Panel A in Table 3.8 reports the univariate tests for the difference in EPS bonuses between
ASR firms with high and low levels of institutional ownership. The levels of institutional
ownership are measured in five ways. We define a firm having high (low) levels of institutional
ownership if the percentage of institutional investors falls into the top (bottom) four deciles.
As regards ASR firms with high Total Institutional Ownership, the average percentage of
bonuses tied to EPS is 0.357, and it is 0.682 for firms with low Total Institutional Ownership.
Firms which conduct ASR programs with high Top 5 Institutional Ownership (0.308) have
a significantly lower percentage of EPS-based annual incentives than that among firms with
low Top 5 Institutional Ownership (0.772) occurring at a significant level of 1%. Similarly,
ASR firms with high Long-term Institutional Ownership, high Institutional Ownership Con-
centration or high Motivated Institutional Ownership exhibit lower average ratios of EPS
bonuses than is the case among firms with low institutional ownership, and the difference is
significant at the 5% level.
118
We also examine the percentage of incentives based on EPS figures for OMR firms with
high and low levels of institutional ownership measured in five ways. This is reported in
Panel B of Table 3.8. Similar to the finding that a higher level of institutional ownership
is associated with a significant lower level of EPS-based bonuses in ASR firms, we find
it also holds in OMR firms. We measure the level of institutional ownership in 5 ways
as above. For instance, among OMR firms with high Top 5 Institutional Ownership, the
average percentage of bonuses which are tied to EPS is 0.214, while being 0.381 for firms
with low Top 5 Institutional Ownership. The difference is statistically significant when using
all five institutional ownership measurements. OMR firms show stronger mean differences
than do ASR firms when using Institutional Ownership Concentration. Comparing Panel A
for ASR firms and Panel B for OMR firms, we can determine that ASR firms with high (low)
levels of institutional ownership have higher EPS incentives than is the case for OMR firms
with high (low) levels of institutional ownership. This is consistent with our prior finding
that compensation incentives based on reported EPS figures play a determining role in the
decision to choose an ASR instead of OMR programs.
So far, we find that firms with a high level of institutional ownership have significantly
lower percentages of annual bonuses which are tied to EPS figures. Moreover, ASR programs
are driven by managing EPS due to compensation incentives, which appears in the literature
and is checked using our data. Thus, these stories explain why institutional investors do not
favor ASR programs.
3.4.3 Do Institutional Investors Cause Firms to Have Less EPS Related
Bonuses?
In Table 3.8, we find that firms with high institutional ownership have a significantly lower
average percentage of an annual incentive tied to EPS figures. Next, we test whether this
relationship is causation or merely a correlation.
Chang et al. (2014) show that there is a discontinuity in institutional ownership around
the Russell 1000 index cutoff. To be specific, firms are ranked based on their market capi-
talization on May 31,and the largest 1,000 firms form the Russell 1000 index while the next
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largest 2,000 firms comprise the Russell 2000 index. Even though there is a small difference
between the smallest firms of the Russell 1000 and the largest firms of the Russell 2000,
the latter firms receive more weight in terms of institutional ownership. This is because
institutions that benchmark their performance against an index have the incentive to mini-
mize the tracking error relative to the benchmarks and thus hold big positions in the largest
components of the index (Crane et al., 2016). Besides, Russell 2000 is more popular as a
benchmark than Russell 1000, since S&P 500 is competing with Russell 1000. So our iden-
tification strategy is that there is a large gap in terms of institutional ownership near the
Russell 1000 and 2000 index threshold. The identification assumption is that the variation
in institutional ownership is driven by the inclusion in the Russell 2000 index, not by any
other differences in corporate policy. Figure 3.1 shows evidence that there is a discontinuity
in the percentage of Total Institutional Ownership, particularly in the narrow window of (-20
to 20) around the threshold. We plot the average Total Institutional Ownership over every
three adjacent observations. The x-axis represents the distance from the Russell 1000/2000
threshold, which is the observation’s rank minus 1000. In this narrow window, components
of the Russell 2000 index, which are on the right-hand side of the threshold, have significantly
higher percentage of institutional ownership than the firms on the left side.
Crane et al. (2016) find that higher institutional ownership causes better monitoring in
terms of lower cash holdings, higher investment in R&D and lower CEO compensation using
the regression discontinuity method. Using the fuzzy regression discontinuity framework,
we find that a high level of Total Institutional Ownership causes firms to have less EPS-
tied bonuses. The identification assumption is that Russell 2000 index inclusion affects a
bonus tied to EPS figures through no channels other than the level of institutional ownership.
Based on the construction of Russell index, the smallest firms in Russell 1000 and the largest
firms in Russell 2000 should be similar in market capitalization and other characteristics.
Table 3.9 reports the summary statistics for the smallest 20 firms in Russell 1000 and the
largest 20 firms in Russell 2000, along with p values from the difference tests. We find that
these firms are not statistically different at the 10% level in terms of cash holding, cash
flow, market-to-book value, leverage or profitability. But firm size in terms of log (sales) is
different at the 1% level, indicating firms in RS1000 are smaller than firms in RS2000 near
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the threshold.
Table 3.10 reports the reduced-form relation between being included in the Russell 2000
index and having a bonus tied to EPS. We estimate the following equation:
EPS Bonus = α + β1 ×Russell 2000 + β2 × rank + β3 ×Russell 2000× rank +X
EPS Bonus is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if a manager’s annual
bonus is tied to EPS in its proxy statement, or otherwise zero. Russell 2000 is a dummy
variable indicating that the observation falls on the right-hand side of the threshold. Rank is
the observation’s rank minus 1000, which captures the size of market capitalization. X is a
vector of control variables like cash holdings, cash flow, leverage, market-to-book value and
firm size in terms of log (sales). We focus on a narrow window, which includes observations
whose rank falls in the range of -20 to 20. Column (1) in Table 3.10 presents the result of
a linear regression using Rank, which is consistent with the literature. Column (2) shows
a linear regression using 1/Rank instead of Rank, in order to capture the closeness to the
threshold. We find that in both regressions, inclusion in the Russell 2000 index significantly
reduces the probability of having an EPS-tied bonus. For instance, the coefficient of the
dummy variable Russell 2000 is -1.436 at the 10% significant level in Column (1) and it is
-0.615 at the 5% significant level in Column (2). In other words, being on the right-hand
side of the threshold, which has higher institutional ownership, results in a lower probability
of having an EPS-tied bonus. Recall that firm size in terms of log (sales) is significantly
different between the smallest firms in RS1000 and the largest firms in RS2000 in Table
3.11, but it is not significant in the regression. Therefore, we conclude that a high level
of institutional ownership causes a significantly lower percentage of annual bonuses tied to
EPS figures.
3.4.4 Market Reaction To ASR Announcements
The prior findings regarding market reaction to ASR announcements vary because authors
have collected their own data using different news sources and time periods. Some papers
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find that positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) occur around the ASR announcement
days (Akyol et al., 2014; Kulchania, 2013). Bargeron et al. (2011) find that positive returns
are weakened for firms involved in multiple ASR programs. Dickinson et al. (2012) find that
ASR market adjusted returns are significantly negative when compared with OMR returns.
Dickinson et al. (2012) explain that the positive market reaction to ASR announcements
is due to market inefficiency with respect to two misreporting issues. When stock prices
increase, the firm will owe money to the investment bank, but the balance sheet does not
reflect the potential extra liability. In addition to the misrepresentation of balance sheets
among firms conducting ASR programs, earnings are misrepresented too. It is because
unrealized gains and losses will not be recorded as income but rather as adjustments to
equity. Some investors are not fully adjusted for financial misrepresentations, so an ASR
program can result in positive market abnormal reaction.
The market reaction to ASR announcements can be explained in terms of the level of
institutional ownership, which is used to measure corporate governance. Srivardhan (2009)
finds that institutional investors play an important role in corporate governance because
they monitor the decisions of the Board of Directors and contribute to effective corporate
governance practices. For instance, institutional investors can address agency problems
because they have incentives to monitor firm management due to the size of their holdings,
and also have the ability to put changes into effect through the use of voting blocks. The
level of Institutional Ownership is a proxy for corporate governance. As regards the market
reaction to ASR announcements, our second hypothesis is that firms with higher levels of
institutional ownership have much higher abnormal returns than firms with low, or no, levels
of institutional ownership. Market reaction is defined as the cumulative abnormal returns
around the time of the event. More specifically, we estimate the expected return using the
CRSP data and using a market model with 255 trading days which end 30 days prior to the
announcement. We then calculate the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns in the window of
-2 to +2 in trading days relative to the repurchase announcement.
Table 3.11 represents market reaction to ASR announcements in terms of 5-day cumulative
abnormal returns for firms with high and low institutional ownership, which is measured in
five ways. We define a firm having high (low) institutional ownership if the percentage of in-
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stitutional investors falls into the top (bottom) four deciles. As regards firms with high Total
Institutional Ownership, the average 5-day CAR is 0.024, and is -0.023 for firms with low To-
tal Institutional Ownership. The difference is significant at the 1% level. When we measure
the level of institutional investors using Top 5 Institutional Ownership, the means of CAR
are 0.02 and -0.02 for firms with high and low Top 5 Institutional Ownership respectively,
which is significant at the 1% level. Firms with high Long-term Institutional Ownership,
high Institutional Ownership Concentration or high Motivated Institutional Ownership have
significantly positive 5-day CARs, while their peers with low levels of institutional investors
have significantly negative CARs.
Figure 3.2 plots the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns around the event dates, separately
for firms with high and low institutional investors using five alternative measurements. The
solid line with circles represents the daily cumulative abnormal returns for high levels of
institutional ownership. The dashed line with triangles indicates the CAR for firms with
low levels of institutional investors. The plots show that the solid lines are above the dashed
lines for all five measurements of institutional investors. Therefore, having a high level of
institutional ownership, a signal of better corporate governance, mitigates the problem of
conducting ASRs to manipulate EPS for the purpose compensation.
For the purpose of comparison, we also plot the market reaction to OMR announcements.
In Figure 3.3, we plot the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns around the OMR announce-
ment days, seperately for firms with high and low levels of institutional ownership. There
are two differences to be noticed when comparing ASR to OMR announcements in Fig-
ures 3.2 and 3.3. First, OMR returns are positive regardless of the levels of institutional
ownership. For ASR announcements, only firms with a high level of institutional investors
receive positive returns. Second, OMR firms with a high level of institutional investors have
higher returns than those with a low level even before the repurchase announcements, and
their return gap shrinks on the OMR announcement days. For ASR firms, the gap between
firms with high and low institutional ownership enlarges on the ASR announcement days.
However, for both ASR and OMR announcements, firms with high levels of institutional
investors have higher returns than those with low levels. It indicates that the market reacts
favorably to high levels of institutional ownership, a signal of better corporate governance,
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but this reaction is more significant for ASR firms.
We find that having a high level of institutional investors causes reductions in EPS-based
compensation, and that institutional investors increase the market reaction to ASRs. Our
third hypothesis is that firms that do not have EPS-based compensation have much higher
abnormal returns than firms that have EPS-based compensation, because EPS bonus is the
underlying problem that managers manipulate for compensation through conducting ASR
programs. In Figure 3.4, we plot the market reaction in terms of 5-day cumulative abnormal
returns around the ASR announcement days, separately for firms with and without EPS-
based compensation. The dashed line with triangles indicates CAR for firms without EPS
bonus. The solid line with circles represents firms with EPS bonus. The dashed line is above
the solid line for all 5-day CARs, and the dashed line increases much more than the solid
line does after the ASR announcement days. Therefore, we conclude that the market return
to ASR announcements is higher for firms that don’t have EPS-based compensation.
We plot the market reaction to OMR announcements, seperately for firms with and with-
out EPS-based bonuses in Figure 3.5. Recall that ASR firms without EPS-based bonuses
have positive returns, while ASR firms with EPS bonuses have negative returns. In con-
trast, OMR firms have positive returns regardless of whether they have an EPS bonus or
not. Moreover, OMR firms with EPS bonuses have higher returns than those without EPS
bonuses, which is the opposite for ASR firms. Thus, manipulating EPS for earning manage-
ment through share repurchases is not a concern for OMR firms, as least from the perspective
of the market.
3.5 Robust Check
3.5.1 Do Institutional Investors Favor OMR Over ASR After Controlling
for EPS-based Compensation?
For a robust check, we add EPS-based compensation in the probit regression of repurchase
methods. We want to examine whether after controlling for EPS-based compensation, firms
with a high level of institutional ownership still favor OMR over ASR programs. Table 3.12
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reports the results of regression of repurchase methods on institutional ownership, which is
measured in four ways: Total Institutional Ownership, Top 5 Institutional Ownership, Long-
term Institutional Ownership and Motivated Institutional Ownership. We include control
variables such as EPS bonus, firm size, market-to-book value, cash, cash flow, dividends,
and leverage, as well as year and industry fixed effects. EPS bonus is equal to one if EPS
is explicitly mentioned as a measurement of managers’ annual bonuses in a firm’s proxy
statement from the SEC filings. It takes on the value of zero otherwise. The coefficients of
institutional ownership are significantly negative at the 1% level in Columns (1) to (4) in
Table 3.12, but they are slightly smaller than their coefficients in the regressions without
using the EPS bonus as a control variable in Table 3.3. Therefore, we conclude that firms
with higher levels of institutional ownership are less likely to conduct ASR programs after
controlling for EPS-based compensation.
3.5.2 Is the Reduction in EPS-based Compensation Purely Driven by
Active Funds?
In Section 3.4, we find that a high level of institutional ownership causes a significantly
lower percentage of annual bonuses tied to EPS figures using regression discontinuity. The
identification strategy is that there is a large gap in terms of Total Institutional Ownership
near the Russell 1000 and 2000 index threshold as in Figure 3.1. In this part, we can further
divide total institutional investors into active and non-active institutional investors. We
want to answer whether the reduction of EPS-based compensation is purely driven by active
institutional investors.
We plot the average institutional ownership over every three adjacent observations for 200
firms near the Russell 1000 and 2000 index threshold. Figure 3.6 plots the percentage of
Active Institutional Ownership in Panel A and Non-active Institutional Ownership in Panel
B. The x-axis represents the distance from the Russell 1000/2000 threshold, which is the
observation’s rank minus 1000. In Panel A, components of the Russell 2000 index, which
are on the right-hand side of the threshold, have a significantly higher percentage of Active
Institutional Ownership than the firms belonging to the Russell 1000 index on the left side.
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In Panel B, there is also a gap in terms of Non-active Institutional Ownership near the Russell
1000 and 2000 index threshold. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the large gap in terms of
Total Institutional Ownership near the threshold is purely driven by active investors for the
following two reasons. First, Crane et al. (2016) claim that even though index funds that
do not actively engage in shareholder activities, index funds have a fiduciary duty to their
investors. As a result, these non-active funds have to find ways to let their voice be heard.
For instance, index funds can affect firms’ policies by threat of voting and help from proxy
advisory services such as ISS or Glass-Lewis. Second, we classify the level of active and non-
active institutional investors by dedicated and quasi-indexer investors respectively. However,
as the data provider Brian Bushee points out some fund managers, especially managers who
have a lot of mutual funds, frequently shift between classifications. Therefore, some non-
active institutional investors may be active sometimes. We cannot conclude that having
a lower percentage of EPS-based compensation is purely caused by a high level of Active
Institutional Ownership, since we also find a gap of Non-active Institutional Ownership near
the Russell 1000 and 2000 index threshold.
3.5.3 Future Operating Performance of ASR Firms
In this part, we compare the future operating performance of ASR and OMR firms. Chem-
manur et al. (2010) claim that ASR firms are undervalued because they exhibit better
post-announcement operating and stock return performance. However, Michel et al. (2010)
find that the post-announcement performance in terms of 9-month cumulative abnormal
returns of ASR stock is poor and believe that ASR firms do not signal undervaluation. We
measure the changes in operating performance from year t-1 to year t in three ways: return
on assets, rerun on sales and operating cash-flow return on assets (Benartzi, Michaely, and
Thaler, 1997; Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Return on assets is defined as the operating
income before depreciation scaled by total assets. Return on sales is equal to the operating
income before depreciation scaled by sales. Operating cash-flow return on assets is equal to
the operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in
inventory, the increase in accounts payable, the increase in other current liabilities, and the
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decrease in other current assets. All the returns are calculated at the end of the year.
We match the ASR sample to the OMR sample based on having log (assets) within 1
unit and changes in return on assets from year t-2 to year t-1 within 0.01 unit. In order
to examine firms’ performance change after repurchase, we compare changes in operating
performance from year t-1 to year t between ASR and OMR firms. Table 3.13 reports the
changes in returns, as well as the p values of difference tests between ASR and OMR firms.
In all three measures of changes in future operating performance, we find that there is no
significant difference between firms that conduct ASR and OMR programs. Therefore, we
conclude that firms conducting an ASR program do not aim to signal undervaluation.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the preference of institutional ownership on the choice of repurchase
methods, namely Accelerated Share Repurchase (ASR) and Open Maker Share Repurchase
(OMR). We find that the higher the level of institutional ownership, the less likely it is
that the firm conducts an ASR program, both conditional and unconditional on stock re-
purchases. We further show that this result is driven by both a selection effect of investors,
who choose firms that are by themselves less likely to conduct ASR programs, and by the
influence of active investors, who affect firms’ payout methods. We then test the hypothesis
that EPS-based compensation plays an important role in the decision to conduct an ASR
instead of an OMR as proposed by Marquardt, Tan and Young (2007). Furthermore, we
find that firms with high institutional ownership have a significantly lower percentage of
annual bonuses tied to EPS figures in both ASR and OMR sub-samples. We further extend
this correlation to a causal relationship by using a fuzzy regression discontinuity framework.
Therefore, having a high level of institutional ownership causes a lower probability of hav-
ing an EPS-based incentive. This explains why institutional investors do not select ASR
firms, which have a significantly greater number of EPS-related incentives. Finally, we an-
alyze market reactions to ASR announcements and find that firms with higher institutional
ownership exhibit much higher abnormal returns than firms with low, or no, institutional
ownership. Therefore, having a high level of institutional ownership, a signal of better corpo-
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rate governance, mitigates the problem of conducting ASR for the purpose of manipulating
EPS for compensation. Similarly, we find that market reaction to ASR announcements is
higher for firms that do not have compensation that is based on EPS figures. In contrast,
market reacts more positively to OMR announcements for firms with EPS bonuses than firms
without EPS bonuses. Thus, earning management through share repurchases is a concern
for the shareholders towards ASR firms only. We end the paper by comparing the future
performance between ASR and OMR firms and find that there is no significant difference in
terms of operating returns. Therefore, we conclude that firms conducting ASR programs do
not aim to signal undervaluation.
Our paper contributes to the literature on share repurchase by offering new insight that
institutional investors prefer OMR to ASR. More importantly, our paper is the first one to
document that having a high level of institutional ownership causes a lower probability of
having an EPS-based incentive, which contributes to the literature on corporate governance
regarding institutional investors. Additionally, we find that the market reacts differently to
ASR announcements for firms with different levels of institutional investors and different
structures of compensation. However, we focus on 51 ASR programs, which is a relatively







Figure 3.1 Institutional ownership discontinuity around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold 
This figure shows that there is a discontinuity in the percentage of Total Institutional Ownership, 
particularly in the narrow window of (-20 to 20) around the threshold. The percentage of Total 
Institutional Ownership is averaged over every three adjacent observations. The X-axis represents the 
distance from the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold, which is the observation's rank minus 1000. Components 
of the Russell 2000 index are on the right-hand side of the threshold, while firms in the Russell 1000 
index are on the left side. Institutional ownership is measured as the total ownership of all institutions as a 
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Figure 3.2 Market reaction to ASR announcements by institutional ownership 
This figure plots the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns around the ASR announcements, separately for 
firms with high and low institutional investors using five alternative measurements. The solid line with 
circles represents the daily cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for high levels of institutional ownership. 
The dashed line with triangles indicates the CAR for firms with low levels of institutional investors. We 
define a firm as high (low) institutional ownership if the percentage of institutional investors falls into the 
top (bottom) four deciles. The market reaction is measured as the cumulative abnormal returns around the 
event. 
A: Total institutional ownership                                   B: Top 5 institutional ownership 
 
C: Long term institutional ownership                             D: Institutional ownership concentration  
 




Figure 3.3 Market reaction to OMR announcement by institutional ownership 
This figure plots the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns around the OMR announcements, separately for 
firms with high and low institutional investors using Total Institutional Ownership. The solid line with 
circles represents the daily cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for high levels of institutional ownership. 
The dashed line with triangles indicates the CAR for firms with low levels of institutional investors. We 
define a firm as high (low) institutional ownership if the percentage of institutional investors falls into the 













Figure 3.4 Market reaction to ASR announcement by EPS-based compensation 
This figure plots the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the ASR announcements, 
separately for firms with and without EPS-based compensation. The dashed line with triangles indicates 
CAR for firms without EPS bonus. The solid line with circles represents firms with EPS bonus. Firms 
have EPS-based compensation if EPS is explicitly mentioned as a measurement of managers' annual 
bonuses in firm's proxy statement from the SEC filings, and firms do not have EPS-based compensation 
otherwise. The market reaction is measured as the cumulative abnormal returns around the event. To be 
specific, we estimate the expected return using a market model with 255 trading days, and which ends 30 
days prior to the announcement using the CRSP data. We then calculate the 5-day cumulative abnormal 







Figure 3.5 Market reaction to OMR announcement by EPS-based compensation 
This figure plots the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the OMR announcements, 
separately for firms with and without EPS-based compensation. The dashed line with triangles indicates 
CAR for firms without EPS bonus. The solid line with circles represents firms with EPS bonus. Firms 
have EPS-based compensation if EPS is explicitly mentioned as a measurement of managers' annual 
bonuses in firm's proxy statement from the SEC filings, and firms do not have EPS-based compensation 
otherwise. The market reaction is measured as the cumulative abnormal returns around the event. To be 
specific, we estimate the expected return using a market model with 255 trading days, and which ends 30 
days prior to the announcement using the CRSP data. We then calculate the 5-day cumulative abnormal 








Figure 3.6 Active and non-active institutional investors near the Russell 1000/2000 
These figures plot the average percentage of active (Panel A) and non-active (Panel B) institutional 
ownership over every three adjacent observations for 200 firms. The X-axis represents the distance from 
the Russell 1000/2000 Threshold, which is the observation's rank minus 1000. Components of the Russell 
2000 index are on the right-hand side of the threshold, while firms in the Russell 1000 index are on the 
left side. In Panel A, the solid red line represents the linear regression of active institutional ownership on 
distance for Russell 1000 firms and dashed blue line is for Russell 2000 firms near the threshold. In Panel 
B, the red circles represent Non-active Institutional Ownership for Russell 1000 firms and the blue 
triangles are for Russell 2000 firms near the threshold. Bushee provides a list of dedicated (active) and 
quasi-indexers (non-active) institutional investors on his website. 
A: Active institutional investors  
 




Table 3.1 Summary statistics of institutional ownership	
Panel A reports the summary statistics for repurchases. The number of shares repurchased is measured in 
thousands and the value of share repurchase is measured in millions of dollars. Panel B summarizes the 
level of institutional ownership for the first, third, fifth, seven and ninth decile in five measurements. 
Total Institutional ownership is measured as the total ownership of all institutions as a percentage of 
firm's total shares outstanding. Top 5 institutional Ownership is calculated as the sum of the five largest 
institutional holdings as a percentage of firm's total shares outstanding. Long-term Institutional 
Ownership is defined as the percentage of a firm's shares outstanding held by institutional investors for at 
least four quarters. Institutional Ownership Concentration is measured in the following way. We first 
calculate the percentage of the firms' shares held by each institutional investor. We then square the 
percentages and sum the squared percentages across all institutional investors. Motivated Institutional 
Ownership is measured using the sum of the percentages of motivated institutional investors, where 
motivated institutional investors are defined as those whose holding values in the firm are in the top 10% 
of their portfolios. 
 
A: Repurchases   
 Method
s 
Mean Std Q1 Q2 Q3 N 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Num. of shares repurchased  ASR 2777.59 4288.43 16.6 791 3600 51 
Num. of shares repurchased OMR 3463.49 9195.09 250 500 2000 488 
Value of repurchase  ASR 654.90 1-92.23 150 250 800 51 
Value of repurchase OMR 833.54 2878.61 30 120 500 448 
 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
First decile   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
First decile 0.091 0.053 0.072 0.001 0.000 
Third decile 0.585 0.214 0.504 0.010 0.059 
Fifth decile 0.828 0.270 0.716 0.016 0.212 







Table 3.2 Summary statistics of firms characteristics 
This table presents summary statistics for firms' characteristics by groups of high and low institutional 
ownership, and these are measured in five ways. A firm falls into a low (high) institutional ownership 
group if its percentage of institutional investors is lower (greater) than the median. Leverage is the sum of 
debt in current liabilities (item 34) and long-term debt (item 9), divided by total assets (item 6). Book-to-
market value is the ratio of market value of the assets and the book value of total assets (item 6). The 
market value of the assets is calculated as the sum of the market equity, the debt in current liabilities (item 
34), long-term debts (item 9) and the preferred liquidation value (item 10), minus the preferred liquidation 
value (item 10) and the deferred tax and investment tax credits (item 35), where the market value of the 
equity is the product of share price (item 199) and shares outstanding (item 54). Log (sales) is the log of 
sales/turnover (item 12). Log (assets) is the log of total assets (item 6). Cash is measured as cash and 
short-term investments (item 1), scaled by total assets (item 6). Cash flow is measured in terms of net 
operating cash flow (item 13) minus capital expenditures (item 128), scaled by total assets (item 6). 
Dividend is calculated as the division of cash dividends (item 127) by the closing stock price (item 199). 
Definition of Institutional ownership measurements can be found in the description in table 3.1. 
 
A: Total institutional ownership 






 (1) (2) (3) 
    
MTB 1.760 2.951 <.0001 *** 
Cash 0.151 0.138 0.895 
Cash flow 0.065 0.090 0.0015*** 
Divides 5.075 5.483 0.520 
Log(assets) 7.164 8.550 <.0001 *** 
Log(sale) 5.803 8.028 <.0001 *** 
Leverage 0.212 0.245 0.120 
 
B: Top 5 institutional ownership 
 Low Top 5 
Institutional Ownership 




 (1) (2) (3) 
    
MTB 2.033 2.672 <.0001 *** 
Cash 0.158 0.132 0.605 
Cash flow 0.073 0.082 0.111 
Divides 6.851 4.120 0.404 
Log(assets) 7.662 7.281 0.085 * 
Log(sale) 6.568 8.028 0.037 ** 













Table 3.2, cont. 
C: Long-term institutional ownership 






 (1) (2) (3) 
    
MTB 1.812 2.901 <.0001 *** 
Cash 0.150 0.139 0.923 
Cash flow 0.065 0.090 0.002 *** 
Divides 3.891 6.447 0.480 
Log(assets) 5.816 8.587 <.0001 *** 
Log(sale) 7.125 8.016 <.0001 *** 
Leverage 0.224 0.233 0.344 
 
 
D: Institutional ownership concentration  






 (1) (2) (3) 
    
MTB 2.049 2.664 <.0001 *** 
Cash 0.158 0.132 0.729 
Cash flow 0.073 0.083 0.116 
Divides 7.243 3.788 0.186 
Log(assets) 7.669 8.063 0.095 * 
Log(sale) 6.574 7.283 0.034 ** 
Leverage 0.227 0.231 0.997 
 
 
E: Motivated institutional ownership 






 (1) (2) (3) 
    
MTB 1.471 3.243 <.0001 *** 
Cash 0.155 0.134 0.794 
Cash flow 0.061 0.095 0.0003 *** 
Divides 2.357 7.809 0.100 * 
Log(assets) 7.094 8.633 <.0001 *** 
Log(sale) 5.788 8.066 <.0001 *** 









Table 3.3 Probit regression of ASR and OMR 
This table presents the results of the Probit regressions, which explain ASR election in terms of five 
definitions of institutional ownership. The dependent is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of 
one for an ASR program and zero for an OMR program. The coefficients on the independent variables are 
reported, along with their p-values. All the regressions include industry fixed effect as the first two digits 
of SIC code and year fixed effect. All the independent variables are measured at the end year t-1. 
Definition of Institutional ownership measurements (table 3.1) and financial variables (table 3.2) can be 
found in the description in previous tables. 
 
 
                                         Probability (ASR=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Total Institutional 
Ownership 
-8.073 ***     
(0.006)     
Top 5 Institutional 
Ownership 
 -11.346 ***    
 (0.009)    
Long-term Institutional 
Ownership 
  -8.422 ***   
  (0.004)   
Institutional Ownership 
Concentration 
   -59.694 **  
   (0.037)  
Motivated Institutional 
Ownership 
    -7.514 *** 
    (0.009) 
Leverage -0.686 -1.969 -2.329 -2.154 -8.035 
(0.775) (0.393) (0.350) (0.321) (0.031) 
Market-to-book value -0.918 * 0.141 0.372 * -0.207 ** 0.462 
(0.059) (0.379) (0.059) (0.013) (0.101) 
Cash -4.401 -2.468 -4.458 -2.335 -13.434  
(0.153) (0.366) (0.144) (0.449) (0.020) 
Cash Flow -24.202 *** -15.461 ** -25.299 *** -14.265 ** -36.794 *** 
(0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) 
Dividends 1.018 0.015 0.015 -0.003 -0.017 
(0.167) (0.189) (0.215) (0.833) (0.393) 
Firm size  -0.918 ** -0.953 *** -0.785 ** -0.757 *** -0.513 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.218) 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 3.4 The relation between institutional ownership and repurchases  
This table presents the results of the OLS regressions of repurchase on institutional ownership. In Column 
(1), the dependent is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one for a repurchase and zero for a 
year-firm observation without a stock repurchase. In Column (2), the dependent variable is the percentage 
of shares repurchased, scaled by the number of shares outstanding. The coefficients on the independent 
variables are reported, along with their p-values.  All the regressions include industry fixed effect and 
year fixed effect, and the error is clustered. All the independent variables are measured at the end year t-1. 
Definition of Total Institutional ownership (Table 3.1) and financial variables (Table 3.2) can be found in 
the description in previous tables. 
 
 Probability of repurchase  Size of Repurchase  
 (1) (2) 
   
Institutional Ownership 0.207 *** 0.037 *** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.000 0.010 *** 
(0.868) (0.002) 
Market-to-book value 0.012 ** 0.005 
(0.040) (0.406) 
Cash 0.000 0.000 
(0.195) (0.347) 
Cash Flow 0.000 0.000 
(0.575) (0.966) 
Dividends 0.111 *** 0.162 
(0.000) (0.119) 
Firm size  0.613 0.001 
(0.669) (0.656) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 








Table 3.5 Probit regression of ASR and no repurchase 
This table presents the results of probit regression of ASR without conditional on doing a stock 
repurchase. The dependent is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one for an ASR program and 
zero for a year-firm observation without a stock repurchase. Column (1) has matched ASR samples 
(treatment) to no repurchase samples (control) based on being in the same industry and year, having log 
(assets) without in 1 and size of cash flow within 0.5. Column (2) has matched ASR samples (treatment) 
to no repurchase samples (control) based on being in the same industry and year, having log (assets) 
without in 1 and size of cash flow within 0.05. The coefficients on the independent variables are reported, 
along with their p-values. All the regressions include industry fixed effect and year fixed effect. All the 
independent variables are measured at the end year t-1. Definition of Institutional ownership 
measurements (table 3.1) and financial variables (table 3.2) can be found in the description in previous 
tables.  
 
 Probability (ASR=1) 
 (1) (2) 
   
Institutional Ownership -6.717 *** -9.057 ** 
(0.000) (0.012) 
Leverage -0.154 -0.178 
(0.970) (0.976) 
Market-to-book value -0.087 -0.029 
(0.220) (0.735) 
Cash -9.018 * -15.959 
(0.067) (0.448) 
Cash Flow -4.162 -4.802 
(0.252) (0.412) 
Dividends -4.662 -10.437 
(0.177) (0.605) 
Firm size  -0.204 0.105 
(0.632) (0.867) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations in 












Table 3.6 Probit regression with active and quasi-indexers institutional investors 
This table represents the probit regressions of the repurchase method on institutional investors categorized 
as active investors in Column (1) and non-active investors in Column (2). The dependent is a dummy 
variable, which takes on the value of one for an ASR program and zero for an OMR program. All the 
regressions include industry fixed effect as the first two digits of SIC code and year fixed effect. Brian 
Bushee provides a list of dedicated (active) and quasi-indexers (non-active) institutional investors on his 
website. The coefficients on the independent variables are reported, along with their p-values. All the 
regressions include industry fixed effect and year fixed effect. All the independent variables are measured 
at the end year t-1. Definition of financial variables can be found in the description in Tables 3.2. 
 
 Probability (ASR=1) 
 (1) (2) 
   
Active Institutional 
Ownership 
-3.495 ***  
(0.002)  
Non-active Institutional  
Ownership 
 -3.656 *** 
 (0.001) 
Leverage -0.867 -0.990 
(0.629) (0.585) 
Market-to-book value -0.169 ** -0.171 ** 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Cash 0.232 0.117 
(0.921) (0.117) 
Cash Flow -10.686 ** -11.021 ** 
(0.027) (0.023) 
Dividends 0.009 0.010 
(0.374) (0.329) 
Firm size  -0.532 ** -0.513 ** 
(0.015) (0.019) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 












Table 3.7 EPS bonus 
This table represents the mean of having an EPS-based annual incentive for ASR and OMR firms. The 
mean difference of having an EPS Bonus between ASR and OMR firms is tested and p-value is reported. 
EPS Bonus is a dummy variable, which equals to one if EPS is explicitly mentioned as a measurement of 
managers' annual bonus in firm's proxy statement from the SEC filings, and it takes on the value of zero 
otherwise. 
	
 ASR Firms OMR Firms Difference Test 
p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    







Table 3.8 EPS bonus for high and low institutional investors 
The Panel A in this table reports the univariate tests for the difference in EPS bonuses between ASR firms 
with high and low levels of institutional ownership. The levels of institutional ownership are measured in 
five ways. The mean difference of having an EPS Bonus between high and low institutional ownership is 
tested and p-value is reported. EPS Bonus is a dummy variable, which equals to one if EPS is explicitly 
mentioned as a measurement of managers' annual bonuses in firm's proxy statement from the SEC filings, 
and it takes on the value of zero otherwise. We define a firm as having high (low) levels of institutional 
ownership if the percentage of institutional investors falls into the top (bottom) four deciles. Panel B 
reports the univariate tests for the difference of EPS bonus between OMR firms with high and low 
institutional ownership. Definition of Institutional ownership measurements can be found in the 
description in table 3.1.  
 
A: ASR firms  
 EPS Bonus for ASR firms  
 Low Institutional 
Ownership 
High Institutional  
Ownership 
Mean Difference  
p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Total Institutional Ownership 0.682 0.357 0.035 ** 
Top 5 Institutional Ownership 0.773 0.308 0.004 *** 
Long-term Institutional 
Ownership 0.714 0.429 0.055 * 
Institutional Ownership 
Concentration 0.765 0.375 0.017 ** 
Motivated Institutional 
Ownership 0.682 0.429 0.076 * 
 
B: OMR firms  
 EPS Bonus for OMR firms  
 Low Institutional 
Ownership 
High Institutional  
Ownership 
Mean Difference  
p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Total Institutional Ownership 0.365 0.254 0.029 ** 
Top 5 Institutional Ownership 0.381 0.214 0.002*** 
Long-term Institutional 
Ownership 0.357 0.268 0.063 * 
Institutional Ownership 
Concentration 0.386 0.205 0.001 *** 
Motivated Institutional 













Table 3.9 Summary statistics around the Russell 1000/2000 threshold 
This table reports the summary statistics for the smallest 20 firms in Russell 1000 and the largest 20 firms 
in Russell 2000, along with p values from the difference tests. Profitability is measured by return on 
assets, which is the operating income before depreciation (item 13), divided by total asset (item 6). Other 
control variables are defined in the same way as in Table 3.2.  
 
 







 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Cash 0.262 0.094 0.315 
Cash flow 0.037 0.043 0.622 
Market-to-book value 1.133 0.928 0.414 
Leverage  0.329 0.336 0.380 
Profitability  0.088 0.107 0.314 





Table 3.10 Regression discontinuity results 
This table reports the reduced-form relation between being included in the Russell 2000 index and having 
a bonus tied to EPS. We estimate the following equation: EPS Bonus =  𝛼! + 𝛽!* Russell 2000 + 𝛽!* 
rank + 𝛽!* Russell 2000* rank + X. EPS Bonus is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if a 
manager's annual bonus is tied to EPS in its proxy statement, zero otherwise. Russell 2000 is a dummy 
variable indicating that the observation falls on the right-hand side of the threshold. Rank is the 
observation's rank minus 1000, which captures the size of market capitalization. X is a vector of control 
variables like cash holdings, cash flow, leverage, market-to-book value and log (sales) which are defined 
in the same way as in Table II. We focus on a narrow window, which includes observations whose rank 
falls in the range of -20 to 20. Column (1) presents the result of a linear regression using Rank, which is 
consistent with the literature. Column (2) shows a linear regression using 1/Rank instead of Rank to 
capture the closeness to the threshold. 
 
 EPS Bonus 
 (1) (2) 
   
Russell 2000 -1.426 * -0.615 ** 
(0.068) (0.021) 




  -0.633 
 (0.283) 




  -0.145 
 (0.839) 
Cash -0.209 -0.215 
(0.782) (0.775) 
Cash flow -0.603 -0.593 
(0.720) (0.689) 
Leverage  -0.544 -0.466 
(0.147) (0.186) 
Market-to-book value 0.024 0.010 
 (0.604) (0.822) 
Firm size  0.088 0.101 










Table 3.11 Abnormal returns at ASR program announcements 
This table represents market reaction to ASR announcements in terms of 5-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) for firms with high and low institutional ownership, which is measured in five ways. We 
define a firm as high (low) institutional ownership if the percentage of institutional investors falls into the 
top (bottom) four deciles. The market reaction is measured as the cumulative abnormal returns around the 
event. To be specific, we estimate the expected return using a market model with 255 trading days, and 
which ends 30 days prior to the announcement using the CRSP data. We then calculate the 5-day 
cumulative abnormal returns using a window of -2 to +2 trading days relative to the time of the 
repurchase announcement time. Definition of Institutional ownership measurements can be found in the 
description in table 3.1. 
 
 5-day CAR for ASR firms  
 Low Institutional 
Ownership 
High Institutional  
Ownership 
Mean Difference  
p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Total Institutional Ownership -0.023 0.024 0.001*** 
Top 5 Institutional Ownership -0.020 0.020 0.009*** 
Long-term Institutional 
Ownership -0.026 0.024 0.001*** 
Institutional Ownership 
Concentration -0.020 0.020 0.009*** 
Motivated Institutional 





Table 3.12 Probit regression with EPS compensation 
This table presents the results of the Probit regressions, which explain ASR election in terms of four 
definitions of institutional ownership. The dependent is a dummy variable, which takes on the value of 
one for an ASR program and zero for an OMR program All the regressions include industry fixed effect 
as the first two digits of SIC code and year fixed effect. All the independent variables are measured at the 
end year t-1. EPS Bonus is a dummy variable, which equals to one if EPS is explicitly mentioned as a 
measurement of managers' annual bonuses in firm's proxy statement from the SEC filings, and it takes on 
the value of zero otherwise. Definition of Institutional ownership measurements (table 3.1) and financial 
variables (table 3.2) can be found in the description in previous tables.  
 
                                         Probability (ASR=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Total Institutional 
Ownership 
-5.632 ***    
(0.000)    
Top 5 Institutional 
Ownership 
 -8.959 ***   
 (0.001)   
Long-term Institutional 
Ownership 
  -6.038 ***  
  (0.000)  
Institutional Ownership 
Concentration 
   -4.341 *** 
   (0.006) 
Motivated Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.816 -1.457 -1.731 -2.389 
(0.661) (0.435) (0.369) (0.207) 
Leverage 0.063 -0.053 0.049 0.039 
(0.646) (0.661) (0.717) (0.761) 
Market-to-book value -1.272 -0.515 -1.479 -1.561 
(0.610) (0.831) (0.546) (0.520) 
Cash -10.087 * -9.984 ** -10.156 * -7.751 
(0.071) (0.044) (0.076) (0.101) 
Cash Flow 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.014 
(0.305) (0.218) (0.330) (0.186) 
Dividends 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.014 
(0.305) (0.218) (0.330) (0.186) 
Firm size  -0.672 ** -0.768 *** -0.551 ** -0.308 
(0.012) (0.001) (0.029) (0.197) 
EPS Bonus 0.336 0.488 0.426 0.315 
 (0.283) (0.108) (0.174) (0.271) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 3.13 Changes in future operating performance 
This table reports changes in firms operating performance in terms of return on assets, return on sales and 
cash-flow return on assets from year t-1 to year t, along with p values from the difference tests. ASR 
sample of firms (treatment) are matched to OMR sample of firms (control) based on having log (assets) 
within 1 and changes in return on assets from year t-2 to year t-1 within 0.01. Return on assets is defined 
as the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. Return on assets is calculated as the 
operating income before depreciation (item 13), divided by total assets (item 6). Return on sales is equal 
to the operating income before depreciation (item 13) scaled by sales (item 12). Operating cash-flow 
return on assets is equal to the operating income before depreciation (item 13) plus the decrease in 
receivables (item 2), the decrease in inventory (item 3), the increase in accounts payable (item 70), the 
increase in other current liabilities (item 72), and the decrease in other current assets (item 68). All the 
returns are calculated at the end of the year. 
 
 ASR Firms OMR Firms Difference Test 
p-value 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Change in Return on Assets -0.006 -0.004 0.798 
Change in Return on Sales -0.107 -0.035 0.410 
Change in Cash-flow Return 





DO DIVIDENDS AFFECT STOCK OPTION
AWARDS?
In this chapter, we analyze the choice between option awards and stock awards for executives’
annual compensation. Stock options are not dividend-protected, while restricted stocks are
dividend-protected. Thus, increase in dividend payments produces a negative effect on the
value of option holdings, and produces a positive monetary effect on holdings of restricted
stock. The hypothesis is that payouts affect CEOs’ wealth, and their future compensation
plans will be adjusted to reflect the expected changes in payouts. Using the JGTRRA tax
cut as an exogenous shock in a difference-in-difference framework, we find that the exogenous
change in shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences leads to a new equilibrium in terms of
executive compensations and payout choices. When there is an expected increase in dividend
payments during the JGTRRA tax cut, the annual option awards decrease significantly.
4.1 Introduction
This paper investigates how managerial incentives are adjusted for expected changes in
corporate payout polices in the future. On May 28, 2003, the Bush administration enacted
the Job and Growth Tax Relief Reconstruction Act (JGTRRA), where the tax rate on
individual level dividends was cut to 15.8% from 38.6% until December 2010. The dividend
tax cut was also extended in December of 2010 through December 2012, leaving the dividend
tax rate increased to 20% during the Obama Administration. The period with the lowest
dividend tax in JGTRRA was from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2012. With a
133.3% rate change on dividends, dividend payment became much less expensive.
Using the JGTRRA dividend tax cut as an exogenous shock to shareholders’ payout
preferences, we examine how changes in payout lead to changes in the components of annual
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incentives. Our hypothesis is that firms subject to the dividend tax cut would increase their
dividend payments during the tax cut period, which will shift managerial option awards
towards stock awards in order to maximize managers’ wealth. We selected the control firms
using the following two criteria. First, we determined which firms announced open market
share repurchase programs during 2001 and 2002, immediately before the dividend tax cut
shock in 2003. Second, we chose firms which had lower pre-shock repurchase completion
rates by the end of 2002 than their average historical completion rates during the 1980 to
2000 period. We defined the treated firms as dividend-paying firms and they are not included
in the control firms. Since the control firms were expected to continue to repurchase at the
beginning of the shock, they would respond less to the dividend tax cut shock by increasing
dividend payments less compared with the treated firms. Thus, we should observe less option
decrease for the control firms than among the treated firms. The identification assumption
is that the JGTRRA tax incentive does not affect the component change in managerial
incentives through any channels other than the payout policy. We found that for firms in
the treated group, the annual stock option awards dropped from 59% of the sum of the
dollar value of stock option awards and restricted stock awards to 39% of the equity awards,
which is a decline of 20 percentage points relative to their per-shock level. For the firms
in the control group, the annual option awards decreased from 59% to 50% of the equity
awards, a drop of 9 percentage points. The Abadie-Imbens estimate of the difference-in-
difference in annual option awards suggests a fall of 9.2 percentage points. The decline in
annual option awards is economically significant, representing a decrease of one-sixth of the
pre-shock annual option awards.
Papers have examined how firms changed their payout policies in response to the tax
cut and which firms responded to a greater degree. The number and the value of the
regular dividends increased and there were more dividends issued after the tax cut (Hanlon
and Hoopes, 2014; Poterba, 2004). Chetty and Saez (2005) found that firms with large
degrees of top executive ownership and low option ownership responded to the tax cut to
a greater degree. Perez-Gonzalez (2002) found that dividend policy was heavily influenced
by the tax status of the largest shareholders. Insider ownership is a proxy for insiders’ tax
preferences, since it measures how insiders are affected by the tax cut, and also measures the
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controls that insiders have over corporate decisions (Hsieh and Wang, 2008). Thus, firms
with large degrees of insider ownership were more likely to increase their dividends during
the tax cut periods (Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford, 2004; Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner,
2007; Fos, Kim, and Kronlund, 2014). Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford (2011) found that
individuals were switching to firms which paid high dividend after the tax cut. Meanwhile,
firms mostly held by individuals increased their dividends, using simultaneous equations.
Similar to individuals, institutional shareholders sorted themselves across firms based on
their dividend policies and shareholders shaped the dividends policy of the firms based on
their tax preferences (Desai and Jin, 2011; Hotchkiss and Lawrence, 2007).
We focus on the component changes in annual managerial incentives, namely stock awards
and option awards, which are affected differently by the dividend payments (Aboody et al.,
2008). Managers prefer to receive stock awards rather than option awards in the case of
dividend payments for the following three reasons. First, stock options are not dividend-
protected, and their value decreases with the payment of dividends. In contrast to stock
options, restricted stocks are dividend-protected because managers receive dividends on their
holdings of restricted stocks. The assumption here is that the payment of dividends will
result in a decrease in the stock price. Even though the payment of dividends may have a
signalling effect on stock prices, the cumulative reduction in share prices due to the payment
of dividends dominates the signalling effect (Lambert et al., 1989; Richardson, Sefcik, and
Thompson, 1986). Second, even though managers can hedge the risks of equity-based awards
(Gao, 2010; Ofek and Yermack, 2000), the options should be non-tradable and restricted
from hedging in order for the options to achieve their goal of mitigating agency problems
(Hall and Murphy, 2002). For instance, in contrast to outside investors who can trade or
sell their options, executives are forbidden from hedging the risks by short-selling company
securities. In addition, stock-selling by executives can be interpreted by investors as a bad
signal regarding firms’ prospects. Third, firms do not usually consider the impact of dividend
payments on executives’ compensation. For example, only 9 firms out of the Fortune 200
in 1986 used dividend protection (Cook, 1987). Additionally, some firms restrict repricing
to prevent managers from over-ruling the board or compensation committee in order to
increase their compensation value (Chen, 2004). In conclusion, whether being awarded in
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the form of options or stocks matters in the shock of dividend increase since options and
stocks are affected in different ways by dividend payments, managers are not free to trade
their incentives, and stock option plans are not dividend-protected.
Papers have assumed that managerial incentives are exogenously determined and focused
on how managerial incentives affect payout policy in the following three ways. First, manage-
ment stock ownership aligns managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests. Thus, the level
of payout increases due to fewer free cash problems (Mehran, 1995). Second, since manage-
rial stocks are not dividend-protected but managerial stock options are dividend-protected,
firms with high levels of managerial stock options will use more stock repurchases rather
than dividends (Lambert et al., 1989). Empirically speaking, Fenn and Liang (2001) find
that having a high level of stock options reduces dividend payouts and increases repurchase
payouts, while having a high level of stock ownership does the opposite for firms with agency
problems. Aboody et al. (2008) similarly find that having a large value in restricted stock
grant value increases dividend payments. Carrion and Kolay (2011) claim that the negative
relationship between options and dividends is due to the agency hypothesis instead of the
optimal contract hypothesis. Third, having a high level of stock options provides firms with
incentives to increase repurchases in order to avoid earnings dilution due to option exercise
(Kahle, 2002). Given that cash used to repurchase the shares comes from paid-in-capital,
instead of earnings, firms can avoid the EPS dilution by engaging in share repurchasing at
the time of option exercise.
This is the first paper to document that an expected increase in dividends leads to a shift in
option awards towards stock awards, using the event of the JGTRRA dividend tax cut. There
are several distinctions between this paper and the papers in the literature mentioned above.
First, we treated managerial incentives as endogenous variables, at least during the periods
when there were expected changes in firms’ payout policies, while others assumed that the
managerial incentives were exogenously given. Therefore, we studied how changes in payout
affect managerial incentives, while the literature has instead focused on how insiders’ stock
ownership affects payouts. Second, we used a cleaner identification strategy through the
difference-in-difference framework. We compared the changes in option awards before and
after the dividend tax cut shock. We also compared the option awards between the treated
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firms, which responded more to the shock, and the control firms, which were devoted to
share repurchases and responded to a lesser degree to the dividend shock. Third, comparing
the options between 2002 and 2003, Aboody et al. (2008) did not find that an increase in
dividends lead to changes in the components of executive compensation. We believe that it
took time to adjust compensation with respect to dividend changes, especially given that
the JGTRRA was enacted in May of 2003. In addition, options in the fiscal year of 2002
were in transition, since firms whose fiscal year of 2002 ended in the calendar year 2002 or
2003 might respond differently to the shock. Thus, we dropped the options in the fiscal year
of 2002. We found that option awards increased significantly in response to an increase in
dividends in fiscal years of 2003, 2004 and 2005.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses our methodology and the con-
struction of the sample. Section 4.3 presents the quantitative results and consists of an
analysis of these findings. Section 4.4 provides robustness check and Section 4.5 summarizes
our paper.
4.2 Empirical Design
4.2.1 The Job and Growth Tax Relief Reconstruction Act
On May 28, 2003, the Bush administration enacted the Job and Growth Tax Relief Recon-
struction Act (JGTRRA), which lowered the individual dividend income tax to a maximum
of 15% through December 31, 2012. Previously, the dividend tax rate followed the regular
progressive individual income tax schedule, which could be as high as 39.6% (Hanlon and
Hoopes, 2014). The tax cut was officially signed into effect on May 28, 2003, but it had
been initially proposed by President Bush on January 7, 2003, which let firms know that
the dividends might face a lower tax rate. In addition, the reform was retroactive to the
beginning of 2003. Thus, we define the aftershock period as starting at the beginning of
2003.
With a 133.3% decrease in the dividend tax rate, the largest decrease ever, dividends
became much less expensive. Unlike a permanent legislative change, this reform was tem-
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porary. Firms responded to the tax cut rapidly by increasing their dividend payments in
the form of issuing special dividends and increasing the amounts of regular dividends. The
increase in firms’ dividend payments and the initiation of regular dividends began as early
as January 2003 (Chetty and Saez, 2005). Poterba (2004) found that the reform ultimately
increased dividends by twenty percent.
4.2.2 The Effect of Dividend Payments on Option Values
Dividend payments affect the value of managerial stock awards and option awards differently.
The payments of dividend result in a decrease in stock prices since the cumulative reduction
in stock prices by dividends dominates the signalling effect of dividends if there is any
(Lambert et al., 1989; Richardson et al., 1986). Stock options are not dividend-protected
since their value decreases with the payment of dividends. In contrast to the value of stock
options, restricted stocks are dividend-protected because managers receive dividends on their
holdings of restricted stocks (Aboody et al., 2008).
In addition, even though managers can hedge the risks of equity-based awards (Gao, 2010;
Ofek and Yermack, 2000), the options should be non-tradable and restricted from hedging
in order for options to achieve their goal of mitigating agency problems (Hall and Murphy,
2002). For example, executives are forbidden from hedging the risks by short-selling company
securities. Furthermore, selling stocks by executives can be interpreted by investors as a bad
signal regarding the firms’ prospects. Moreover, firms do not usually consider the impact of
dividend payments on executives’ compensation. For instance, there were only 9 firms with
dividend-protected options in the Fortune 200 in 1986. Some firms even have restrictive
repricing policies in order to prevent managers from over-ruling the board or compensation
committee for increasing the value of their compensation (Chen, 2004).
4.2.3 Open Market Share Repurchase and Repurchase Completion Rate
Open market repurchase programs are not as flexible as people once thought (Huang, 2017).
The completion rate of repurchases in 1988 to 2007 was 72.57% (Bonaimé, 2012). We selected
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firms which announced open market share repurchase programs during 2001 and 2002, which
was immediately before the tax cut shock at the beginning of 2003, and they repurchased
fewer shares by the end of 2002 than they did on average from 1980 through 2000. Thus,
we suspect that these firms would continue to repurchase immediately after the shock and
respond to the dividend tax cut to a lesser degree by increasing dividend payments less,
assuming dividends and repurchases are substitutes.
4.2.4 Identification Strategy
In order to determine how dividend payments affect option awards, we employed the difference-
in-difference framework. We selected the control firms using the following two criteria. First,
we determined which firms announced open market share repurchase programs during 2001
and 2002. Second, we chose firms which had lower pre-shock repurchase completion rates
than their average historical completion rates. We defined the treated firms as dividend-
paying firms and they are not included in the control firms, which might increase their
dividend payment in response to the dividend tax cut. We defined the pre-shock period
as 2001 and 2002 and the post-shock period as 2003, 2004 and 2005. However, since the
options granted for the fiscal year of 2002 might be paid either during the calendar year of
2002 (before the shock) or 2003 (after the shock), we dropped the options granted in 2002
and used the options granted in 2000 and 2001 as the pre-shock outcome variable. Our first
and prerequisite hypothesis is that the treated firms will increase dividend payments more
than will be the case among the control firms after the shock.
If dividends have a negative effect on the value of executives’ options, we should find that
firms with more dividend increase will have fewer option awards than firms with less dividend
increase after the shock. In other words, the second and primary hypothesis is that treated
firms will have fewer option awards than the control firms after the shock. The identification
assumption is that the dividend tax cut shock affects managerial incentives through no
channels other than the payout policy. Since the timing of announcing open market share
repurchase programs is endogenous, we mitigated this concern by matching. To be specific,
we matched the treated and control groups based on the pre-trend of option awards, firm
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size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, cash, cash flow, return-on-assets and industry. We also
performed placebo tests where we applied the same strategy of selecting the placebo control
and treated firms, and compared their dividend and option changes after the placebo tax
cut shock, which took place at the beginning of 2000.
4.2.5 Data and Variables Construction
The data used in this paper came from four sources. First, we used the Securities Data
Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database for the open market share repurchase
data, including announcement data, the percentage of shares outstanding sought in the
repurchase, the intended dollar value of the repurchase, and repurchase status. Second,
we used the Compustat database to compute firms’ characteristics. We chose firms’ size,
leverage, cash, cash flow, return-on-assets, market-to-book ratio, and industry in 2002, which
are related to the level of option awards. In order to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we
measured all of the firms’ characteristics prior to the shock. Third, we used the CRSP daily
stock information to compute the dividend payments. Fourth, we used the ExecuComp
database for annual executive compensation information. We constructed the following
variables using these datasets:
The pre-shock repurchase completion rate is defined as the value of repurchases between
the announcement date and December 31, 2002, divided by the announced repurchase
value, where the repurchase is measured as the purchase of common and preferred
stock minus any decrease in redeemable preferred stock.
The actual total repurchase completion rate is calculated as the value of actual repur-
chases including the repurchases after the shock in 2003, normalized by the announced
repurchase value.
The average past repurchase completion rate is measured as the mean of the value of actual
repurchases during 1980 to 2000, normalized by the announced repurchase value.
Option ratio is calculated as the dollar value of the annual stock option divided by the
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sum of the dollar value of the stock option and restricted stock grants, where the stock
option is the annual option granted at the Black Scholes value in million dollar units.
Dividend is measured by the sum of annual dividend payments.
Leverage is the sum of debt in current liabilities (item 34) and long-term debt (item 9),
divided by total assets (item 6).
Book-to-market value is the ratio of market value of the assets and the book value of
the total assets (item 6). The market value of the assets is calculated as the sum of
the market equity, the debt in current liabilities (item 34), long-term debts (item 9)
and the preferred liquidation value (item 10), minus the preferred liquidation value
(item 10) and the deferred tax and investment tax credits (item 35), where the market
value of the equity is the product of share price (item 199) and the number of shares
outstanding (item 54).
Firm size is the log of total assets (item 6)
Cash is measured as cash and short-term investments (item 1), scaled by total assets (item
6).
Cash flow is measured in terms of net operating cash flow (item 13) minus capital expen-
ditures (item 128), scaled by total assets (item 6).
Return on assets is calculated as the operating income before depreciation (item 13),
divided by total assets (item 6).
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Summary Statistics
Let us begin by presenting summary statistics regarding repurchase completion rates for
the control firms. The actual repurchase is the value of purchase of common and preferred
stocks minus any decreases in redeemable preferred stock (Bonaimé, 2012). We summed the
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repurchases for two years after the announcements because few shares are repurchased during
the third year or later following repurchase announcements (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998).
We normalized the repurchase values by using the intended dollar value of repurchases in
the announcements in order to calculate the completion rates of repurchases. If the intended
dollar value of a repurchase was missing, we estimated it by multiplying the percentage of
shares outstanding sought in the repurchase by the number of shares outstanding and by the
share price at the end of the previous year. The firms had to report either the percentage of
shares outstanding sought in the repurchase or the intended dollar value of the repurchase.
We chose the control firms which announced open market share repurchase in 2001 and
2002 and had smaller repurchase completion rates than had been the case in the period
from 1980 to 2000. Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics of the completion rates for the
172 control firms. The pre-shock repurchase completion rate is for firms which announced
repurchase programs during 2001 and 2002, and we discarded repurchases made after the
shock at the beginning of 2003 when we calculated the completion rates. The mean of the
pre-shock completion rate for the control group is 0.5165 and the median is 0.482. The
average past repurchase completion rate is for firms that announced open market repurchase
programs between 1980 and 2000 and we averaged their completion rates. The average past
repurchase completion rate for the control firms is 0.6814 and the median is 1. Bonaimé
(2012) found that the average completion rate for repurchases between 1988 and 2007 was
0.7257, which approximates to our finding. The actual total repurchase completion rate is
for firms which announced open market share repurchases during 2001 and 2002, and we
included the repurchases made after the shock in 2003 when calculating the completion rate
for the total repurchases. The actual total repurchase completion rate for the control group
is 0.0788 with a median of 1. The actual total repurchase completion rate is greater than the
pre-shock repurchase completion rate. This shows that the control firms that we selected
continued to repurchase after the tax cut shock.
The outcome variable of interest is the option award. Firms use equity-based compensation
to align the interest of shareholders with managers to mitigate agency problems. Mehran
(1995) finds that stock option awards and restricted stock awards motivate managers to
increase firm value. Thus, if firms decrease the level of option awards, it is likely that
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they compensate managers by granting more restricted stock awards. The option awards
are normalized by using the total value of equity awards. For the entire sample of 16,340
managers, the mean for stock options granted at the Black Scholes value is 750.65 million
dollars, with a median of 155.16 million dollars. The option ratio is calculated as the dollar
value of annual option awards divided by the sum of the dollar value of stock option and
restricted stock grants. We use this normalized stock option award as the outcome variable
in our paper. The mean is 0.5458 and the median is 0.6331. The treated group has a mean
of 0.5409 and the control group has a mean of 0.6328, which are reported in the Table 4.2.
Firms’ characteristics are measured at the end of 2002, before the dividend shock in
2003. The treated and control groups have different characteristics in terms of market-
to-book ratio, return-on-assets, firm size, cash holdings, cash flow, and leverage. These
variables are related to firms’ managerial incentives. Yermack (1995) claims that firms with
substantial growth opportunities should provide more stock-based compensation since the
board has difficulty in evaluating managers’ success in making investment decisions as the
information asymmetry grows. John and John (1993) find that firms will use fewer option
awards as financial leverage increases in order to reduce the agency costs of debt. If managers
are compensated heavily using equity-based awards, they will have strong incentives to
increase the value of their equity compensation. For instance, they may choose overly risky
investments to transfer wealth from debt holders to equity holders. Thus, debt holders
will require a high risk premium on their capital. Firm size and industries are associated
with the level of stock option awards (Yermack, 1995). For instance, some industries are
highly regulated and they receive lower stock option incentives. Table 4.2 reports firms’
characteristics for the control and treated groups. Market-to-book value of the treated
group is 1.6529 and it is 2.0512 for the control group. The control group has 0.0718 more
units of return-on-assets than the treated group. Firm size in terms of log (assets) is 7.9595
for the control group and 7.3702 for the treated group. Cash holding is around 0.05 and
there is no difference between the two groups at the 10% level of significance. Control firms
have more cash flow (0.1372) than the treated group (0.0722). The leverage for the treated
group is 0.2403 and it is 0.1877 for the control group.
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4.3.2 Matching
We matched the treated and control group based on the pre-trend of option awards and
firms’ characteristics, including market-to-book ratio, return-on-assets, firm size, cash hold-
ings, cash flow, leverage, and industry. We employed the nearest neighbourhood matching
procedure, which minimizes the Mohalanobis distance between a vector of observed covari-
ates across treated and control groups to find the matched observations (Abadie and Imbens,
2011). We used exact matching for the industry using a one-digit SIC code. We selected
one matched treated observation for each control observation since the treated group is sub-
stantially larger than the control group. We allowed ties, adjusted for biases and chose the
robust option in the matching algorithm.
Table 4.3 reports the summary statistics for the pre-trend of option awards and firms’
characteristics after matching. There are 651 observations in the control group and 736 ob-
servations in the treated group. In order to properly use the difference-in-difference frame-
work, we have to ensure that the outcome variable between the treated and control groups
follows a parallel trend before the shock. The pre-trend option is defined as the difference in
annual option awards between 2001 and 2000. The pre-trend is -0.002 for the treated group
and it is -0.0098 for the control group. The difference is not significant at the 10% level. The
market-to-book ratio for the treated group is 2.1234 and it is 2.2385 for the control group,
which is significant at the 10% level, but not significant at the 1% or 5% level. Return-on-
assets is 0.1925 and 0.2099 for the treated and control groups, respectively. The firm size
in terms of log (assets) is 7.6753 for the treated group and 7.7936 for the control group.
Cash is around 0.16 for both the treated and control groups. The treated group has less
leverage (0.1616) than the control group (0.1717), but this is not significant at the 10% level.
Cash flow is 0.1485 and 0.1616 for the treated and control groups, respectively. In summary,
the treated and control groups are not statistically different in terms of pre-trend of option,
return-on-assets, firm size, cash, cash flow, and leverage at the 10% level of significance, and
the market-to-book ratio is not statistically different at the 5% level of significance.
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4.3.3 Dividends Increase After the Shock
We chose control firms as those with open market share repurchases announced in 2001
and 2002, and with lower pre-shock repurchase completion rates than their average past
repurchase completion rates. Thus, we suspected that the control firms would continue to
repurchase immediately after the shock and respond less to the dividend tax cut by increasing
dividend payments less, assuming that dividends and repurchase are substitutes. In other
words, our first and prerequisite hypothesis is that the treated firms will increase dividend
payments more than the control firms after the dividend tax cut shock.
Table 4.4 reports the dividend changes before and after the dividend tax cut shock for
the treated and control groups. The dividend is measured by the annual sum of dividend
payments. We find that for the treated firms there is a 0.2253 unit of dividends increase
from the pre-shock period to the post-shock period. The dividend increase is significant at
the 5% level. As regards the control group, the increase is 0.1491 and it is significant at the
10% level. The dividend increase for the treated group is 0.0761 greater than the increase
for the control group, and this difference-in-difference change is significant at the 5% level.
Thus, we conclude that the treated firms increase dividend payments more than the control
firms do after the tax cut shock.
4.3.4 Option Awards Decrease After the Shock
Dividend payments affect the value of managerial stock awards and option awards differ-
ently. Even though the payment of dividends may have a signalling effect on stock prices,
the cumulative reduction in share prices due to the payment of dividends dominates the
signalling effect, which results in a decrease in stock prices (Lambert et al., 1989; Richard-
son et al., 1986). Stock options are not dividend-protected since their value decreases with
the payment of dividends. In contrast to the value of stock options, restricted stocks are
dividend-protected because managers receive dividends on their holdings of restricted stocks
(Aboody et al., 2008). If dividends have negative effects on the value of executives’ options,
we should see that firms with more dividend increase will have fewer option awards than
firms with less dividend increase after the shock. That is to say, our second and primary
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hypothesis is that the treated group will have fewer option awards than the control group after
the dividend tax cut shock.
Table 4.5 reports the difference-in-difference changes in option awards before and after
the shock for the treated and control groups. The option is measured as the dollar value
of the annual option awards divided by the dollar value of the stock option and restricted
stock grants. The option decreases by 0.1989 for the treated group after the shock of the
dividend tax cut and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. The stock option de-
creases by 0.09 for the control group after the shock and it is also significant at the 1%
level. These option decreases are consistent with our hypothesis since we observe that both
treated and control groups experienced dividend increase after the shock in Table 4.4. The
option award decreases 0.1089 more in the treated group compared to the control group and
this difference-in-difference change is significant at the 1% level. The Abadie and Imbens
Matching Estimator, which is the average treatment effect on the treated group(ATT), is
-0.0915 with a significance level of 1%. Figure 4.1 plots the annual stock option awards
before and after the shock of dividend tax reduction in 2003 after matching. The green
triangles represent the treated group and the red circles are for the control group.We can
see that the green triangles have a sharp decrease compared to the red circles in the after
shock period. Thus, the treated group experiences greater option award decrease than the
control group after the dividend tax cut shock.
4.4 Placebo Tests
4.4.1 Placebo Shock
The identification assumption is that the dividend tax cut shock does not affect managerial
incentives through any channels other than the payout policy. Since the timing of announc-
ing the open market share repurchase program is endogenous, we mitigate this concern by
matching the treated and control groups based on the pre-trend of option awards and firms’
characteristics. We have shown that the treated and control groups follow a parallel trend
of the outcome variable before the shock and there is no statistical difference in terms of
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return-to-assets, firm size, cash, cash flow, and leverage at the 10% level of significance, and
the market-to-book ratio at the 5% level of significance. However, we cannot rule out the
possibility that there is a latent variable other than the payout policy that affects both the
treated and control groups such that they experience different option awards after the shock.
In order to strengthen the results, we replicated the same experiment using the placebo
period. More specifically, we assumed the shock of the dividend tax cut took place at the
beginning of 2000. The placebo control group was selected by firms which announced open
market share repurchase programs in 1998 and 1999, and had smaller pre-shock repurchase
completion rates than their average past repurchase completion rates. The placebo treated
firms are dividend-paying firms and they are not included in the placebo control firms. We
defined the pre-shock period as 1998 and 1999 and the post-shock period as 2000, 2001 and
2002. However, since the options granted for the fiscal year of 1999 might be paid either
in the calendar year of 1999 (before the shock) or 2000 (after the shock), we dropped the
options granted in 1999 and used the options granted in 1997 and 1998 as the pre-shock
outcome variable.
Table 4.6 summarizes the repurchase completion rates for the placebo control firms. The
pre-shock repurchase completion rate is the value of actual repurchases between the an-
nouncements in 1998 or 1999 and the placebo shock at the beginning of 2000, divided by
the intended value of repurchases. The mean of the pre-shock repurchase completion rate is
0.6892 and the median is 0.8452. The average past repurchase completion rate is the mean
of the value of actual repurchases from 1980 to 1997, normalized by the value of intended
repurchases. The mean of the average past completion rate is 0.7587 with a median of 1.
The actual total repurchase completion rate is calculated as the actual repurchases after the
announcements in 1998 or 1999, including the repurchases that took place after the placebo
shock, divided by the intended value of repurchases. The mean of the actual repurchase
completion rate for the placebo control firms is 0.8650. Since the actual total repurchase
completion rate is greater than the pre-shock repurchase completion rate, it shows that the
placebo control firms continued to repurchase after the placebo tax cut shock. Thus, the
placebo control group has the same repurchase behaviour as the control group.
Table 4.7 reports the pre-crisis characteristics of the placebo treated and control groups.
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We measured the firms’ characteristics at the end of 1999, which is before the placebo shock
at the beginning of 2000. The market-to-book of the treated group is 2.5080 and is 2.0747
for the control group, which is statistically different. The treated group has a return-on-
assets of 0.1406, which is smaller than that for the control group (0.1968). The firm size in
terms of log (assets) is 7.1229 and 7.5947 for the treated and control groups, respectively.
The treated group has 0.0367 more units of cash holdings than the control group, while the
control group has 0.0558 more units of cash flow than the treated group. The leverage is
0.2407 and 0.2243 for the treated and control groups, respectively. The firms’ characteristics
between the placebo treated and control groups are statistically different. Thus, we will
perform a matching procedure to mitigate the endogeneity concerns between these placebo
groups.
We employed the nearest neighbourhood matching procedure between the placebo treated
and control group based on the pre-trend of option awards and firms’ characteristics, includ-
ing of market-to-book, return-on-assets ratio, firm size, cash holdings, cash flow, leverage
and industry. We used the exact matching for the industry with a one-digit SIC code.
We selected one matched treated observation for each control observation since the treated
group is substantially larger than the control group. Table 4.8 reports the characteristics
after matching for the placebo treated and control groups. The pre-trend of option awards
is the difference in the annual option awards between 1998 and 1999. The pre-trend option
is 0.0238 for the treated group and 0.0041 for the control group, which not is statistically
different at the 10% level of significance. The market-to-book ratio is 1.7034 and 2.0485 for
the treated and control groups, respectively, which is different at the 1% level of significance.
The treated group has a return-on-assets of 0.1875, while the control group has 0.1968. Firm
size is around 7.4 for both the treated and control groups. The treated group has 0.0061
less cash holdings and 0.0082 less cash flow than the control group. The leverage is 0.2129
and 0.2199 for the treated and control groups, respectively. The treated and control groups
are not statistically different in terms of return-on-assets, firm size, cash holding, cash flow,
and leverage after matching.
164
4.4.2 Dividends and Option Awards Changes After the Placebo Shock
We chose the placebo control firms as those with open market share repurchases announced
in 1998 and 1999, and with lower pre-shock repurchase completion rates than their average
past repurchase completion rates. Thus, we suspected that the placebo control firms would
continue to repurchase immediately after the shock and respond less to the placebo dividend
tax cut by increasing dividend payments less. We have seen in Table 4.6 that the placebo
control firms continue to repurchase after the placebo shock. But both the placebo and
control groups do not experience dividend increase with statistical significance after the
placebo shock. Table 4.9 reports the dividend changes for the treated and control groups
after the placebo shock of dividend tax reduction in 2000. The dividend is measured by
the annual sum of the dividend payments. The dividend increases by 0.0796 units for the
treated group after the shock and it is not statistically significant at the 10% level. For the
control group, the increase is 0.0485, which is not significant at the 10% level. The dividend
increase for the treated group is 0.0311 more than the increase for the control group, but
this difference-in-difference change is not significant at the 10% level. Thus, we conclude
that the placebo treated firms did not increase dividend payments more than the control
firms after the placebo tax cut shock.
If there is a latent variable other than dividend payments that affects both the treated
and control groups such that they experience different option awards after the dividend tax
cut shock, we should see that the placebo treated group has fewer option awards than the
placebo control group after the placebo shock. Table 4.10 reports the difference-in-difference
changes in option awards before and after the placebo shock for the placebo treated and
control groups. The option is measured as the dollar value of the annual option awards
divided by the dollar value of the stock option and restricted stock grants. The option
increase is 0.0579 and 0.0518 after the shock for the treated and control groups, respectively,
and the increase is significant at the 1% level. The option increase for both groups may
be driven by the time trend when the option awards are becoming more popular. The
option increase for the treated group is 0.0061 more than the option increase for the control
group, but the difference-in-difference change is not statistically different at the 10% level of
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significance. The Abadie and Imbens Matching Estimator, meaning the average treatment
effect on the treated group (ATT), is 0.0068 and this is not significant at the 10% level.
Thus, we do not observe any statistically significant difference in option awards between
the treated and control groups during the placebo period. In other words, in the absence
of dividend increase, we do not observe the option decrease in the placebo replication. In
conclusion, the previous finding that the treated group experiences fewer option awards
than its control group after the dividend tax cut shock is driven by having a higher level of
dividend payments post-shock.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines how managerial incentives are affected by the dividend increase after
the dividend tax cut at the beginning of 2003. The Bush administration enacted the Job
and Growth Tax Relief Reconstruction Act, which decreased the tax rate on dividends from
38.6% to 15.8%. Firms responded to this shock by increasing their regular dividend payments
and issuing special dividends (Chetty and Saez, 2005). Since the cumulative reduction in
share prices dominates the signalling effect due to dividend payments (Lambert et al., 1989;
Richardson et al., 1986), and managers are not free to trade or hedge the risks (Hall and
Murphy, 2002), the value of stock options decreases with the dividends. In contrast to
stock options, restricted stocks are dividend-protected as managers receive dividends on
their holdings of restricted stocks (Aboody et al., 2008). Papers in the past have assumed
that the managerial compensation is exogenously given and find that having a high level
of stock options reduces dividend payouts (Fenn and Liang, 2001). In this paper, we treat
managerial incentives as endogenous variables. Using the JGTRRA dividend tax cut as an
exogenous shock to shareholders’ payout preferences, we examine how changes in payout lead
to changes in option awards in a difference-in-difference framework. We chose firms which
announced open market repurchases before the shock and completed fewer repurchases than
they did in the past as the control group. The treated firms are dividend-paying firms and
they are not included in the control firms. We find that the control firms continued to
repurchase after the shock and responded less to the tax cut by increasing dividends less
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than the treated group. The main finding is that the treated group had fewer option awards
than the control group after the dividend tax cut shock. We mitigated the endogeneity
concerns by matching the pre-trend of option awards and firms’ pre-crisis characteristics.
We also performed placebo tests and found that in the absence of dividend increase, we
did not observe option decrease after the placebo shock. Using the shock of the JGTRRA
dividend tax cut, we are the first paper to document that an expected increase in dividends
leads to a decrease in option awards.
For future research, it would be helpful to study whether the decrease in options due to
dividend increase is driven by the optimal contract hypothesis or agency problems. Hayes,
Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) found that option grants decreased after an exogenous shock in
the accounting treatment of option compensation under FAS 123R in June of 2005. Carrion
and Kolay (2011) find that the negative correlation between dividends and option awards
is driven by the agency hypothesis instead of the optimal contracting hypothesis using the
FAS 123R accounting treatment shock. However, they did not consider that both the option
awards and dividends changed due to the FAS 123 accounting treatment and the JGTRRA






Figure 4.1 Stock option awards decrease after the shock 
We matched the treated and control firms based on the pre-trend of options and firms' characteristics, 
including market-to-book ratio, return-on-assets, firm size, cash, cash flow, leverage and industry. This 
figure plots the annual stock option awards before and after the shock of dividend tax reduction in 2003 
after matching. The green triangles represent the treated group and the red circles are for the control 
group. The option is defined as the dollar value of the annual option awards dividend by the sum of the 
dollar value of stock option awards and restricted stock awards. 
 
  
4.6 Figure and Tables
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Table 4.1 Repurchase completion rate for control firms 
Control firms are selected by firms which announced open market share repurchases during 2001 and 
2002 and had lower pre-shock repurchase completion rates than their average past repurchase completion 
rates. The pre-shock repurchase completion rate is defined as the value of repurchases between the 
announcement dates and December 31, 2002, divided by the intended value of repurchases in the 
announcements. The actual total repurchase completion rate is defined as the value of actual repurchases 
including the repurchases made after the shock in 2003, normalized by the intended value of repurchases 
in the announcements. The average past repurchase completion rate is defined as the mean of the actual 
repurchases during 1980 to 2000, normalized by the intended value of repurchases announced. 
 
 Mean Median Std 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Pre-shock repurchases completion rate  0.617 0.482 0.412 
Average past repurchases completion rate 0.681 1.000 0.427 




Table 4.2 Pre-crisis characteristics of treated and control firms 
The following table represents the firms' characteristics in terms of market-to-book ratio, return-on-assets, 
firm size, cash, cash flow, and leverage at the end of the 2002, which is before the tax cut shock in 2003. 
 
 Treated group Control group  Treated – control  
Difference Test  
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Option Ratio  0.541 0.633 -0.092 *** 
   (0.000) 
Market-to-book 1.653 2.051 -0.398 *** 
   (0.000) 
Return-on-assets 0.119 0.191 -0.072 *** 
   (0.000) 
Log(assets)  7.370 7.960 -0.589 *** 
   (0.000) 
Cash 0.1524 0.157 -0.004 
   (0.250) 
Cash flow  0.072 0.137 -0.065 *** 
   (0.000) 
Leverage  0.240 0.188 0.053 *** 
   (0.000) 
Number of 




Table 4.3 Pre-crisis characteristics and pre-trend of treated and control firms after matching 
We matched the treated and control groups based on the pre-trend of options, which is the difference of 
annual option awards between 2001 and 2000, and firms' characteristics, including market-to-book ratio, 
return-on-assets, firm size, cash, cash flow, leverage and industry. The following table represents the pre-
trend of annual option awards and firms' characteristics in terms of market-to-book ratio, return-on-assets, 
firm size, cash, cash flow, and leverage after matching. The option is defined as the dollar value of annual 
option awards dividend by the sum of the dollar value of stock option awards and restricted stock awards. 
 
 Treated group Control group  Treated – control  
Difference Test  
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Option in 2001 - Option in 2000  
 
0.002 0.010 -0.008 
  (0.866) 
Market-to-book 2.123 2.239 -0.115 * 
   (0.070) 
Return-on-assets 0.193 0.210 0.017 
   (0.231) 
Log(assets)  7.675 7.794 -0.118 
   (0.247) 
Cash 0.165 0.166 0.001 
   (0.122) 
Cash flow  0.149 0.162 0.013 
   (0.166) 
Leverage  0.167 0.172 0.005 
   (0.269) 





Table 4.4 Dividends increase after the shock 
The following table reports the dividend increase for treated and control firms after the shock of dividend 
tax reduction. Dividend is measured by the sum of annual dividend payments. 
 
 Before the shock  After the shock   After – before  
dividends increase 
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treated group  0.659 *** 0.897 *** 0.225 ** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) 
Control group 0.193 0.589 *** 0.149 * 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) 
Treated increase – control 
increase   
  0.076 ** 




Table 4.5 Stock option awards decrease after the shock 
The following table reports the annual stock option decrease for the treated and control firms after the 
shock of dividend tax reduction. The option is defined as the dollar value of annual option awards divided 
by the sum of the dollar value of stock option awards and restricted stock awards. 
 
 Before the shock  After the shock   After – before  
dividends increase 
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treated group  0.589 *** 0.390 *** -0.199 *** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control group 0.589 *** 0.499 *** -0.090 *** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treated – Control   0.000 -0.109 *** -0.109 *** 
 (0.991) (0.000) (0.000) 
ATT   -0.092 *** 




Table 4.6 Repurchase completion rate for placebo control firms 
We assumed the shock of the dividend tax deduction took place at the beginning of 2000. The placebo 
control firms are selected by firms which announced open market share repurchases in 1998 and 1999, 
and had lower pre-shock repurchase completion rates than their average past repurchase completion rates. 
The pre-shock repurchase completion rate is defined as the value of repurchases between the 
announcement dates and December 31, 1999, divided by the intended value of repurchases in the 
announcements. The actual total repurchase completion rate is defined as the value of actual repurchases 
including the repurchases made after the shock in 2000, normalized by the intended value of repurchases 
in the announcements. The average past repurchase completion rate is defined as the mean of the value of 




 Mean Median Std 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Pre-shock repurchases completion rate  0.689 0.845 0.343 
Average past repurchases completion rate 0.759 1.000 0.360 




Table 4.7 Pre-crisis characteristics of placebo treated and control groups 
The following table represents the firms' characteristics in terms of market-to-book ratio, return-on-assets, 
firm size, cash, cash flow, and leverage measured at the end of 1999, which is before the placebo shock in 
2000. 
 
 Treated group Control group  Treated – control  
Difference Test  
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Market-to-book 2.508 2.075 0.433 *** 
     (0.000) 
Return-on-assets 0.141 0.197 -0.056 *** 
     (0.000) 
Log(assets)  7.123 7.595 -0.472 *** 
     (0.000) 
Cash 0.141 0.105 0.037 *** 
     (0.007) 
Cash flow  0.082 0.137 -0.056 *** 
     (0.000) 
Leverage  0.241 0.224 0.016 ** 
     (0.019) 




Table 4.8 Pre-crisis characteristics and pre-trend of placebo treated and control after matching 
We matched the placebo treated and control firms based on the pre-trend of options, which is the 
difference of annual options awards between 1998 and 1997, and firms' characteristics, including market-
to-book ratio, return-on-assets, firm size, cash, cash flow, leverage and industry. The following table 
represents the pre-trend of annual option awards and firms' characteristics after matching in terms of 
market-to-book ratio, return-on-assets, firm size, cash, cash flow, and leverage. The option is defined as 
the dollar value of the annual option awards dividend by the sum of the dollar value of stock option 





Control group  Treated – control  
Difference Test  
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Option in 1998 - Option in 1997  
 
0.024 0.004 0.020 
    (0.288) 
Market-to-book 1.703 2.048 -0.345 *** 
     (0.005) 
Return-on-assets 0.187 0.197 -0.009 
     (0.104) 
Log(assets)  7.396 7.434 -0.038 
     (0.260) 
Cash 0.094 0.100 -0.006 
     (0.230) 
Cash flow  0.135 0.143 -0.008 
     (0.209) 
Leverage  0.213 0.220 -0.007 
     (0.292) 




Table 4.9 Dividends changes after the placebo shock 
The following table reports the dividend increase for the treated and control firms after the placebo shock 
of dividend tax reduction at the beginning of 2000. Dividend is measured by the sum of annual dividend 
payments. 
 
 Before the shock  After the shock   After – before  
dividends increase 
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treated group  0.440 *** 0.520 *** 0.080  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.192) 
Control group 0.449 *** 0.497 *** 0.049  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.661) 
Treated increase – control 
increase   
  0.031  





Table 4.10 No stock option awards decrease after the placebo shock 
The following table reports the annual stock option awards for the placebo treated and control firms 
assuming that the shock of dividend tax reduction took place at the beginning of 2000. The option award 
is defined as the dollar value of annual option awards divided by the sum of the dollar value of stock 
option awards and restricted stock awards. 
 
 Before the shock  After the shock   After – before  
dividends increase 
(p-value) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treated group  0.494 *** 0.552 *** 0.058 ***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Control group 0.529 *** 0.581 *** 0.052 ***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Treated – control  
 
-0.035 ** -0.029 ** 0.006  
(0.042) (0.047) (0.698) 
ATT   0.007 










PREDICTING THE PERFORMANCE OF
PEER-TO-PEER LOANS USING MACHINE
LEARNING
In this chapter, joint work with Robert Brunner, we apply machine learning techniques to
predict the performance of Peer-to-Peer loans. We show that machine learning algorithms
provide a higher accuracy than the benchmark model in prediction loan default, especially
for out-of-sample predictions. We compare algorithms among logistic regression, K-Nearest
Neighbor, Decision tree, and Naive Bayes. To overcome the problem of over-fitting, we
also incorporate ensemble algorithms such as Bagging, Random Forest, and Boosting to
improve predictive power. Moreover, using feature selection mechanism, we identify inde-
pendent variables of borrower and loan characteristics that are the most important features
in predicting default. Therefore, machine learning algorithms are valuable to select the
most relevant features and can achieve higher accuracy than the benchmark model in out-
of-sample predictions. The results hold promise for understanding why some loans default,
and have potential value for lenders to improve their selection process.
5.1 Introduction
This paper studies loan defaults in the online peer-to-peer lending market. Traditional
banking is getting less popular comparing to non-bank lending because of regulation burden
and disruptive technology (Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2017)). For example,
traditional banks are under intensive legal scrutiny and increasing capital requirement with
the passage of Dodd Frank Act in 2010. Non-bank lenders reply solely on making loans and
they make profit through the sale of the loans to the third party. These non-bank lenders
offer lower interest rate, as they pass through some regulatory savings to borrower. With
the advancement of fintech lending technology, online non-bank lenders grow explosively in
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the past decade. The online peer-to-peer lending market is equipped with lower operating
cost and faster online application process.
Online peer-to-peer lending market competes with banks and credit unions for making
loans. Collectively, this competitive lending environment provides consumers with more fa-
vorable terms such as a low interest rate (Alyakoob, Rahman, and Wei (2017)). However,
online funding platform substitutes banks in area that are more affected by financial crisis,
and have high lending market concentration or experience a significant decrease in the num-
ber of bank branches (Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017), Butler, Cornaggia, and Gurun (2016)).
For example, peer-to-peer lending expands faster in counties that were affected more by
the financial crisis, or places where consumers lost trusts in traditional banks (Havrylchyk,
Mariotto, Rahim, and Verdier (2017)).
The two main online lenders in the United States are Prosper and Lending Club. They
facilitate the matching process between borrowers and lenders. First, a potential borrower
places a loan request online and provides his personal information and credit history, in-
cluding income, loan amount, employment, earliest credit line, home ownership and so on.
Then P2P lender checks the borrower’ application report and credit score, may or may not
choose to verify income and employment information, and then assign a credit risk sub-grade
and a interest rate. If the borrower is satisfied with the interest rate assigned, the loan is
listed online. Individual investors will shop for loans that they want to fund, and decide
how much to fund for each loan. If a listing is funded, even before the verification, a loan
is issued to the borrower without verifying the borrower s information. The borrower will
make monthly payment to the platform, which is facilitated by the third party bank. If the
borrower defaults, the platform will assign an agency to collect the money from the borrower
and the loan is announced as default.
Peer-to-peer leading market attracts individual investors. Prospective lenders can browse
the loans online, together with the borrowers’ credit and personal information. They can
choose a unique combination of expected risk and return, fund on many loans, while each loan
is funded with as little as twenty dollars. A portfolio contains traditional equity, fixed income
and peer-to-peer loans have higher returns after adjusting for the risk. This is because these
loans are less correlated with other investment in the portfolio. Thus, investors on peer-to-
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peer loans receive low return and even lower risk, resulting in a high risk-adjusted return
(Marot, Fernandez, Carrick, and Hsi (2017)).
Online lending platforms may have less incentive and methods to screen and select qual-
ified borrowers comparing to the traditional banks, which results in a higher default rate.
Carmichael (2017) finds that online platforms are subject to adverse selection problem, as a
borrower who is rejected by the Lending Club but granted a loan by Prosper has poor loan
performances. This adverse selection can be extended to the online lending market, which
offers credit to risker borrowers with poor or short credit history (Jagtiani and Lemieux
(2017)). For example, small businesses that are denied from the traditional banks use fintech
lenders to finance their business. Similarly, consumers who are not qualified for traditional
banks’ credit will seek for funding through the online alternative.
Not all the listings can be funded, thus borrowers compete for credit in the online platform.
Small businesses’ listings are twice as likely to be fulfilled comparing to non-business listings,
even though their default rates are higher (Mach, Carter, and Slattery (2014)). Online
investors are more likely to fund listings that locate geographically close to them. Lin and
Viswanathan (2015) document home bias in online investment using exogenous shocks that
borrowers move across state boundaries. In Prosper, borrowers can form groups and be
recommended by their group leader for receiving loans. Berger and Gleisner (2010) claim
that borrowers’ group affiliation reduces information asymmetry, and borrowers from groups
with sound reputation can be funded with lower interest rates.
Online borrowers can be strategically report their credit information to receive a loan,
which could not otherwise being granted. For example, Eid, Maltby, and Talavera (2016)
find that borrowers who intentionally round up their incomes have higher tendency to receive
loans with larger amount and lower interest, but they are subject to high delinquency. As
some loan listings are funded and issued before borrowers’ information is verified, borrowers
take advantage of this nature to receive a loan. For instance, Michels (2012) finds that
borrowers with poor credit quality tend to voluntarily disclose more unverifiable information,
such as intended use of proceeds, explanation for poor credit ratings, which makes them easier
to receive a loan, even with low interest rates. Askira Gelman (2013) claims that income
verification has positive value in reducing the loan default for peer-to-peer lending. However,
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the online platforms have not verified all the borrowers’ income and employment information
before a loan is issued. Verification is not cost efficient for the platforms, it creates an adverse
selection problem, and peer-to-peer lending companies are lack of motivations to verify
borrowers’ information as they make profit when loans are issued regardless of delinquency.
Consumer lending market is regulated by disclosure acts. The 1968 Truth-in-Lending Act
(TILA) mandates APR disclosure, prior to which lenders quoted the terms using simple or
add-on interest rate that was half amount of APR (Stango and Zinman (2011)). However,
TILA has weak enforcement to non-bank lenders until 1981. For payday loan lenders, staring
in 2008, states have enacted regulations to mitigate the problem that payday loan borrowers
use these short-term expensive loans repeatedly and are trapped in the debt cycle (Kaufman
(2013)). Burke, Leary, and Wang (2016) find that Texas payday disclose act in 2011 lowered
fresh payday loan volume, and reduced repeated payday borrowing, indicating consumers
have imperfect understanding about the cost of borrowing.
State usury law regulates the maximum legal interest that can be charged on a loan
regardless of the risk, which applies to the location of the loan originated or the borrower’s
residence. However, usury law was not to protect the poor, but to extract rent for the political
incumbents in 19th century. Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010) find that state usury law is
driven by political private interest to reduce potential competition, rather than protecting
the public interest. But if the usury law is strictly enforced, an exogenous increase in the
interest cap will increase the funding probability for the borrowers in the online peer-to-
peer platform, especially for the risky borrowers who would have been denied under a lower
interest rate cap (Rigbi (2013)).
Usury statutes have marginal effect on consumer lending because lenders find a way to
be exempted from the usury law though the originate-to-distribution model (Honigsberg,
Jackson Jr, and Squire (2017), Marvin (2016)). The National Bank Act (NBA) regulates a
national bank’ s usury cap to be equal to the state’s limit where the bank is located. Thus,
a national bank locates in states without usury limit, such as South Dakota and Utah, can
charge any interest rate. Federal Deposit Insurance Act expands the NBA to state-chartered
banks. Non-bank lenders, such as online peer-to-peer platforms, can also be exempted from
usury law by partnering with a national or chartered bank that originates the loans. For
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example, Lending Club works with WebBank, which locates in Utah that has no usury law.
Analyzing loan default is essential for the online peer-to-peer lending market. Carmichael
(2014) uses a discrete-time hazard model to understand the default probability, and finds
borrower initiated credit inquiries, income and loan purpose are the most important deter-
minants. In this study, we design machine learning algorithms to predict whether a borrower
will pay back or be charged off. We first present fundamental models, followed by algorithms
that mitigate over-fitting problems. We show that these machine learning models have more
accurate prediction compared to a baseline model.
This paper proceeds as following. Section 5.2 presents sample selection and variable
construction. Section 5.3 evaluates machine learning predictions. Section 5.4 concludes the
paper.
5.2 Sample Selection and Variable Construction
We use 677.510 loans issued during 2007 to 2015 to build machine learning models. Specif-
ically, loans issued during these years already have results on the total payback amount,
which is necessary to define whether a loan is default. The number of Peer-to-Peer loans
issued has grown rapidly in recent years. For example, there were $8000 million dollars’
worth of loans issued in 2014, $16,000 million in 2015 and $22,000 million in 2016. For
each loan, Lending Club provides a detailed list of characteristics about the loan and the
borrower. The loan features include the amount requested, loan purpose, loan grade, in-
terest rate, loan length, note status and loan submitting date. For each borrower, we have
biographic information on ownership, job title, length of employment, gross income, debt-
to-income ratio, and residence location. Moreover, Lending Club also reports the borrower’s
credit history, which includes the range of credit score, the date of the earliest credit line,
the number of open credit lines, the total number of credit lines, revolving credit balance,
the number of inquiries in the last 6 months, the number of accounts delinquent now, and
the number of public records on file.
The dependent variable of interest is the note status, whether the borrower has paid back
fully or been charged off. Thus, the default indicator takes on a value of one if the borrower
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defaults; and it is zero, otherwise. The independent variables include numeric and categori-
cal features about the borrower and the loan. For numeric features, we include loan amount,
installment amount, debt-to-income ratio, FICO range, and the number of delinquent, in-
quiries, open accounts, public records and total accounts. Categorical characteristics contain
loan length, income verification status, loan grade, home ownership, loan purpose and the
state of residence.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the numeric characteristics. The average
amount of loan is 14,265 dollars, and the installment amount is 433 dollars. Borrower
on average has an income of 74,063 dollars, which results in a debt-to-income ratio of 17.73.
The number of delinquent in the past 3 years and the number of inquiries in the past 6
months are 0.3 and 0.73, respectively. The upper bound of credit score is 699 and the lower
bound is 695. The number of open accounts is 11.42 on average with a revolving balance of
11,147 dollars.
We split the whole sample into training and testing data sets, which consists of 60%
and 40% of the observations, respectively. As a significant portion of loans have received
the full amount of repayment, we split the sample to the training and test datasets using
the stratification technique. Specifically, 75 percentage of loans in the training and testing
samples have the dependent variable of the default indicator that is equal to zero. In other
words, if the Lending Club lends loans to every borrower, the probability that a borrower
will repay the full amount is 75 percentage. This is the baseline model that predicts all the
borrowers will pay back the full amount and it has a rate of accuracy of 75%.
5.3 Algorithms and Results
5.3.1 Fundamental Algorithms
In this section, we explore the fundamental machine learning algorithms to predict loan
default. We start with Decision Tree models, followed by Support Vector Machine, SGD
classifier, Logistic regression and K-Neighbor.
A Decision Tree model is constructed by recursively splitting data set into new subsets
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based on the attributes of input variables. Specifically, at each internal node, it measures
data along each different dimension and decides which variable to use and how to split based
on rules. These rules include entropy, Geni impurity and variance reduction. The recursion
is completed when the grouping at a node has all the same value of the dependent variable
or when splitting does not provide extra value. The advantages of the a Decision Tree model
include its simplicity, good performance with large datasets, and incorporating both numeric
and categorical input variables into analysis. However, it tends to over-fitting, which means
that the model preforms well on the training data but poorly on the testing data.
Table 2 reports the results of a Decision Tree model using entropy as the metrics. Entropy
measures the extent of information gain to quantify how much information is contained.
Panel A presents the classification reports. Precision measures the ratio of true positive
and positive. In other words, it measures how many people (do not) default given they are
predicted to (not) default. It is 82% for the no default group and 28% for the default group.
Recall measures the ratio of true positive and the sum of true positive and false negative.
Using the decision tree, 81% people are predicted to not default out of people who do not
default. There are 29% people who are predicted to be default out of people who default.
F1 score is the multiplication of precision and recall, divided by the sum of precision and
recall, multiplied by 2. It measures a test’s accuracy using harmonic average. The F1 scores
are 0.82 and 0.28 for the no default group and default group, respectively. Panel B reports
the confusion matrix. From the table, 65% people who are predicted to not default do not
default, while 6% borrowers who are predicted to default indeed default.
We further use other fundamental algorithms in predicting the loan performance. First,
K-Nearest Neighbor builds on the concept that the value of the dependent variable is similar
for points located nearby in an N-dimensional space. To determine neighbors, K-Neighbor
model measures the distance for a data set using Euclidean metrics. The accuracy for
this K-Neighbor model is 76.59%. Second, as the dependent variable in our framework is
an indicator, we use logistic regression models. It calculates the odds ratio, which is the
probability of default dividend by the probability of not default. In this logistic regression,
the accuracy is 79.98%. Third, we use Gradient Descent model, which first employs a
linear regression to predict the dependent variable and then applies the logistic function.
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In Stochastic Gradient Descent model, the goal is to minimize the cost function, which is
the squared errors between the actual class and the predicted class. Its accuracy is around
79.72%. Lastly, we use the Support Vector Machine. It is a supervised learning that divides
data into resulting classes by constructing hyperplanes based on the independent variables.
It performs well when the number of features is large. The accuracy using Linear Support
Vector Machine is 79.99%.
5.3.2 Algorithms Mitigating Over-Fitting the Data
As the increase of the model complexity, the risk of over-fitting increases as well. In other
words, machine learning models fit the signal and the noise in the training data. Thus, these
models predict very accurately in the training data set, but they fail to generalize to new
data, because the noise is different across the data. Models with the issue of over-fitting
achieve high accuracy rates in the training data set, which provides a false confidence in the
model performance. In this section, we examine machine learning models that mitigate the
over-fitting problems, as well as techniques including cross validation and grid search.
In order to overcome the weak prediction, we use bootstrap aggregation (bagging) to ran-
domly sample the data and construct multiple Decision Trees based on random samples. We
then aggregate over these decision trees to build models. This bootstrap aggregation tech-
nique is applied in Random Forest models. A Random Forest model creates a set of Decision
Trees and aggregates the prediction of the individuals. Moreover, at each internal node, it
randomly selects a set of features to estimate which feature has the largest information gain
if the sample splits based on that feature. Thus, in addition to bagging, Random Forest
introduces another form of randomness. By aggregating their predictions over different sets
of random samples and features, Random Forest models are less affected by the over-fitting
problem.
Technique like cross-validation ensures that the test data is not revealed until the final
fitting. If we create multiple models using the training data set and choose the best one using
the testing data set, we are still at the risk of over-fitting. In order to overcome this issue, we
use cross-validation which splits the data into training, validating and testing data sets. The
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training data is used for creating multiple models, validating data set is used for selecting the
model with the best hyper-parameters and testing data is used to evaluate the performance
of the final model. For example, a K Fold cross validation iterator splits the sample into
k samples and uses k-1 folds for the purpose of training and 1 fold for validating. In this
study, we use Stratified K Fold iterator, which preserves the relative ratio of the dependent
variable in each fold.
Moreover, we use grid search algorithm to choose the best combination of hyper-parameters
in the machine learning model. Grid Search approach applies a model over a set of values
of a hyper-parameter and computes the resulting accuracy score. If we intend to search
of the values of multiple hyper-parameters, Multi-dimensional Grid Search technique ap-
plies on a dictionary that maps the hyper-parameters to their values. For a large number
of hyper-parameters, multi-dimensional grid search may take excessive amount of time for
processing, because it evaluates the model for each combination of the hyper-parameters. In
this case, Randomized Grid Search provides a computationally efficient alternative, which
randomly select hyper-parameters from the supplied dictionary of values and choose the op-
timal values. Even though it does not guarantee the best combination of hyper-parameters,
it provides reasonable estimation.
First, we apply a Random Forest model with Cross-validation and Grid Search techniques.
We define a dictionary of hyper-parameters and their values, which includes the number of
Decision Trees, the number of features, the maximum depth of the Tree and the minimum
number of samples required at a leaf node. Specifically, the gird of the number of Decision
Trees ranges from 5 to 120 with an interval of 5. The number of features regulates how
many dependent variables to choose for splitting the internal nodes. The default value is
the squared root of the number of the features, and we also allow it to be the log value of
the number of features. The value of the maximum depth of the Trees is from 1 to 60 with
an internal of 5. The minimum number of samples required at a lead node regulates when
to stop splitting the nodes. That it, when all leaf nodes contain less than the minimum
number of samples. This value can range from 1 to 10 with an interval of 2 in our design of
the grid. The cross validation technique is the Stratified K Fold iterator, which divides the
sample into 5 folds for the purpose of training and validating. The best model has the best
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predictive power in terms of having the lowest cross-validation error.
Table 5.3 presents the results of Random Forest models. The model has lowest cross-
validation mean squared error has the number of Decision Tress of 105, the maximum number
of depth of 60, the minimum number of samples in the leaf nodes of 1, and an auto feature
selection mechanism. The prediction accuracy in the testing sample is 80.19%, which is much
higher than that of the Decision Tree model. Panel A of Table 5.3 presents the classification
report that shows the average precision and recall are 76% and 80%, respectively. Specifically,
81% people do not default out of people who are predicted to not default. There are 54%
people who default out of the sample that is predicted to default. For people who actually
do not default, 98% of them are predicted to not default. For people who default eventually,
only 8% of them are predicted to default. This is because machine learning models do not
preform very well in unbalanced data. Panel B reports the confusion matrix. 72% people
who are predicted to not default do not default, while 1.56% borrowers who are predicted
to default indeed default.
One application of machine learning is to identify which features have the most predictive
power. Figure 5.2 plots the features based on their importance. The most important feature
is the note grade, which weights 15%. The second important observable is the debt to
income ratio, which weights 9.68%, followed by annual income, installment amount, and
revolving balance. Loan amount, the number of total accounts, the number of terms of the
loan are also important in predicting the loan default. FICO credit score is ranked as the 9th
important feature, indicating relying too much on credit score may bias the loan granting
decision. On the other hand, the state of residence is the least important feature, followed
by the purpose of the loans.
To mitigate the problem of over-fitting, we use bagging to create random samples and
aggregate weak learners built based on these samples. In addition to Random Forest, we
also use Boosting models to predict the performance of loans. Boosting algorithm applies a
sequential learning in building the final model. Specifically, it starts with shallow Decision
Trees and the predictions from these weak learners are combined to generate weights. These
weights boost the algorithm by emphasizing instances that predict incorrectly, and deem-
phasizing instances that predict correctly. The weights are adjusted each time when new
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weak learners are created. This learning process continues until weaker learners have more
accurate predictions. We explore two boosting algorithms. First, Ada boosting algorithm
minimizes the derivation between the predicted and the actual value of the dependent vari-
able. Second, Gradient Tree Boosting extends the above minimization problem with a loss
function.
We first design Ada Boosting algorithms with Cross-validation and Grid Search techniques.
We define a dictionary of hyper-parameters and their values, which includes the number of
estimate and learning rate. For example, the number of estimate is defined as the number of
base learners, which ranges from 10 to 250 with an interval of 10 in our grid search. Learning
rate measures shrinkage, which controls the impact of each tree on the weights calculation
in each interaction. This learning rate is from 0.01 to 0.1 with an interval of 0.01, and from
0.1 to 1 with an interval of 0.1. We use Stratified K Fold cross validation technique, which
divides the sample into 3 folds for training and validating. We apply Grid Search mechanism
to select the best combination of the learning rate and the number of estimator in forming
the Ada Boosting algorithm.
Table 5.4 presents the results of the Ada Boosting algorithm that has the highest predictive
power through grid search. The best Ada Boosting model has a learning rate of 0.5 and the
number of estimator of 240. The accuracy over the testing sample is 80.32%. Panel A reports
the classification report, indicating that 81% of people do not default out of borrowers who
are predicted to not default, and 57% of people default out of borrowers who are predicted
to default. The average precision and recall are 76% and 80%, respectively. Moreover, Panel
B presents the confusion matrix, indicating that 78.75% people who are predicted to not
default do not default, while 1.56% borrowers who are predicted to default indeed default.
Lastly, we use Gradient Boosting models to predict the performance of the loan. We design
a Randomized Grid Search algorithm that chooses the best combination of the learning rate,
the number of estimator, the maximum number of features, the maximum of depth and the
minimum number of samples in a leaf node. To be specific, learning rates can be 0.01, 0.02,
0.05 and 0.1 and the number of estimators ranges from 10 to 150 with an interval of 10.
The maximum number of depth ranges from 1 to 30 with an interval of 5, and the minimum
number of samples in a leaf node ranges from 10 to 150 with an interval of 10. The maximum
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number of features can be either the squared root or log of the number of features. To be
computationally efficient, we use Randomized Grid Search, which randomly combine the
value of hyper-parameters and choose the best model after 10 interactions.
Table 5.5 shows the Gradient Boosting model with the best predictive power. The model
has lowest cross-validation mean squared error has the number of estimators of 110, the
maximum number of depth of 10, the minimum number of samples in the leaf nodes of 70,
an auto feature selection mechanism and a learning rate of 0.05. The prediction accuracy on
the testing data set is 80.38%. Panel A shows the classification reports and Panel B presents
the confusion matrix. The results are similar to those of Ada Boosting models.
5.3.3 Probabilistic and Other Algorithms
In this section, we explore other algorithms to predict the loan performance. First, we apply
dimension reduction process on the Gradient Boosting model. Next, we examine Extremely
Randomized Trees and Neural Network algorithms. Lastly, we show the results of Naive
Bayes and Gaussian models. The results on accuracy of these models are reported in Figure
5.3.
First, we apply a dimension reduction technique on the Boosting model. As we have a rich
set of features, which may include observables that have less predictive power. Therefore,
we can first reduce the number of features to only include the most relevant ones. We use
Principal Component Analysis to select a subset of new features. Specifically, it calculates the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of linear equations to transform the data into a new dimensional
space. We specify to keep two components in PCA. After reducing the dimensions and
splitting the sample into the training and testing datasets, we apply the Gradient Boosting
model with the maximum number of depth of 10 and the number of estimator of 110. The
accuracy using PCA on the boosting model is 79.96%.
Next, we examine the results using the Extremely Randomized Tree algorithm. It is similar
to the Random Forest model except two differences. A Random forest model uses bootstrap
sampling, which randomly selects a subsample for creating decision trees. A Extremely
Randomized Tree algorithm uses the whole sample for creating a tree each time. Second,
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a Random forest model splits the nodes from the top to the bottom, while a Extremely
Randomized Tree model randomly select a node for sample splitting. Using the Extremely
Randomized Trees, the accuracy is 78.99%.
We also use a Neural Network model, which a powerful supervised learning approach.
It builds a network of interconnected nodes, which are connected to other hidden layers
of networks through activation functions. These functions can be a simple threshold or
complex functions that assign weights to the inputs. The final output layer is a single
node, indicating the binary classification, such as an indicator that denotes loan default. To
minimize the possibility of over-fitting in large networks, the model applies regularization.
In this study, we design a grid search technique on the hyper-parameters, including the
regularization parameter, the number of hidden layers and activation functions. Specifically,
the regularization parameter can be 0.0001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 or 0.7. The tuple whose length
specifies the number of hidden layers can be (5,10,5), (10,20,10), (50,50,50), (150,200,150),
(5,10,10,5), (10,10,10,10,10), (20, 20, 50, 20, 20), (20, 50, 50, 50, 20), (100, 100, 100, 100,
100), or (100, 150, 150, 150, 100). The activation function can be identity, logistic, hyperbolic
tan, or rectified linear unit. The best model that has the lowest cross validation error is the
one that has a regularization parameter of 0.1, hidden layer size of (150, 250, 150) and an
activation function of a rectified linear unit function. The accuracy score is 79.93%.
Moreover, we explore Naive Bayes models. This algorithm relates the probabilistic re-
lationship between features and the final classification. That is, a Naive Bayes algorithm
calculates the probability of being a class conditional on its features using Bayes theorem.
Gaussian Naive Bayes algorithm assumes features are sampled from normal distributions.
Alternatively, we can use Multinomial Naive Bayes or Bernoulli Naive Bayes, which assume
the features follow a multinomial or binomial distribution. The accuracy rate for predicting
loan performance using Gaussian Naive Bayes algorithm is 79.40%.
Lastly, we examine the results of Gaussian models. Gaussian process uses the mean and
covariance functions of the features in the training data set, which are input for constructing
the Gaussian distribution. As the number of observations in the training data set increases,
the model is constrained. The covariance is constructed using kernel functions. For Gaussian
Mixture model, it generates a model to cluster data based on a combination of multiple
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Gaussians. In this study, we create a Gaussian Mixture model by specifying the number
of components and the covariance type that controls the shape of the cluster. Specifically,
the number of clusters to use in the mixture model is two and each component has its own
general covariance matrix. The accuracy based on this Gaussian Mixture model is 75.76%.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we design machine learning algorithms to predict whether a borrower will pay
back the full amount or be charged off. We show that these machine learning models have
more accurate predictions compared to a baseline model. The baseline model is created
based on the unbalanced data: 75 percentage of loans in the whole sample are paid back
fully. In other words, if the Lending Club lends loans to every borrower, the probability that
the borrower will repay is 75 percentage. This is the baseline model that predicts all the
borrowers will pay back the full amount and has a rate of accuracy of 75%.
We have explored the fundamental machine learning algorithms to predict loan default,
including Decision Trees models, Support Vector Machine, SGD classifier, Logistic regression
and K-Neighbor. However, as the increase of the complexity of the models, the risk of over-
fitting increases as well. In other words, the machine learning models fits the signal and
the noise in the training data. Thus, these models predict very accurately in the training
data set, but they fail to generalize to new data, because the noise is different across data.
Models with the issue of over-fitting achieve high accuracy rates in the training data set,
which provides a false confidence in model performance.
Therefore, we also examined machine learning models that mitigate the over-fitting prob-
lems, as well as techniques including cross validation and grid search. These machine learning
algorithms that mitigate over-fitting issues include Random Forest, Extremely Randomized
Trees, Gradient Boosting, and Ada Boosting models. We apply dimension reduction and
feature importance techniques to identify observables that have the most predictive power.
Lastly, we examined Neural Network, Naive Bayes and Gaussian Mixture models.
In summary, using feature selection mechanism, we have identified features about the
borrower and the loan that are the most important in predicting loan default. Therefore,
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machine learning algorithms are valuable to select the most relevant features and can achieve
higher accuracy than the benchmark model in out-of-sample predictions. The results hold
promise for understanding why some loans default, and have potential value for lenders to
improve their selection process. Furthermore, our approach can be applicable to further








Figure 5.1 Accuracy for fundamental algorithms  
The following graph plots the accuracy score for various models. These fundamental machine learning 









































Figure 5.2 Feature importance  








































Figure 5.3 Accuracy for other models  
The following graph plots the accuracy score for various models. These machine learning models include 
Principle Components Analysis using Gradient Boosting model, Extremely Randomized Trees, Neural 










































Table 5.1 Summary statistics 
The following table reports the summary statistics of the numeric characteristics of the borrower and the 
loan.  
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median N 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan amount  14,265 8,335 12,000 677,512 
Installment  433 248 377 677,512 
Annual income  74,063 60,923 63,160 677,512 
Debt to income 17.73 8.20 17.27 677,512 
Delinquent in past 2 years 0.3 0.84 0.00 677,512 
FICO lower bound 695 30.87 690 677,512 
FICO higher bound 699 30.87 694 677,512 
N. Inquiry in 6 months 0.73 1.00 0.00 677,512 
No. open accounts 11.42 5.22 11 677,512 
Public record 0.19 0.57 0.00 677,512 


























Table 5.2 Decision Trees 
The following tables summarize the classification report and confusion matrix for the Decision Tree 
model. Precision measures the ratio of true positive and positive. Recall measures the ratio of true positive 
and the sum of true positive and false negative. F1 score measures a test’s accuracy using harmonic 
average.  
 
A: Classification report  
 Precision Recall F1-score Support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
No default  0.82 0.81 0.82 216705 
Default  0.28 0.29 0.28 54299 
average/total  0.71 0.71 0.71 271004 
 
 
B: Confusion matrix  
 Predicted no default Predicted default 
 (1) (2) 
Actual no default  176085 (64.98%) 40620 (14.99%) 




























Table 5.3 Random Forest  
The following tables summarize the classification report and confusion matrix for the Random Forest 
model. Precision measures the ratio of true positive and positive. Recall measures the ratio of true positive 
and the sum of true positive and false negative. F1 score measures a test’s accuracy using harmonic 
average.  
 
A: Classification report 
 Precision Recall F1-score Support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
No default  0.81 0.98 0.89 216625 
Default  0.54 0.08 0.14 54379 
average/total  0.76 0.80 0.74 271004 
 
B: Confusion matrix 
 Predicted no default Predicted default 
 (1) (2) 
Actual no default  213070 (78.62%) 3555 (1.31%) 





























Table 5.4 Ada Boosting  
The following tables summarize the classification report and confusion matrix for the Ada Boosting 
model. Precision measures the ratio of true positive and positive. Recall measures the ratio of true positive 
and the sum of true positive and false negative. F1 score measures a test’s accuracy using harmonic 
average.  
 
A: Classification report 
 Precision Recall F1-score Support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
No default  0.81 0.99 0.89 216625 
Default  0.57 0.08 0.14 54379 
average/total  0.76 0.80 0.74 271004 
 
 
B: Confusion matrix 
 Predicted no default Predicted default 
 (1) (2) 
Actual no default  213417 (78.75%) 3208 (1.18%) 




























Table 5.5 Gradient Boosting  
The following tables summarize the classification report and confusion matrix for the Gradient Boosting 
model. Precision measures the ratio of true positive and positive. Recall measures the ratio of true positive 
and the sum of true positive and false negative. F1 score measures a test’s accuracy using harmonic 
average.  
 
A: Classification report 
 Precision Recall F1-score Support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
No default  0.81 0.98 0.89 216625 
Default  0.57 0.09 0.16 54379 
average/total  0.76 0.80 0.74 271004 
 
B: Confusion matrix 
 Predicted no default Predicted default 
 (1) (2) 
Actual no default  212834 (78.54%) 3791 (1.40%) 
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Figure A.1 Option exercises and price gaps in a larger bandwidth  
The following figure shows option exercises on bins of price gaps on the option expiration date. The 
graph is limited to awards with a normalized price gap in the range of [-0.5, 2] with a bin size of 0.2.  
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Figure A.2 Only post-2006 dataset 
The following figures show option exercises (Panel A) and repurchases (Panel B) for option awards that 
are still outstanding after the 2006 compensation disclosure reform. Panel A is analogous to Figure 2.1.B, 
and Panel B is analogous to Figure 2.3. 
 
A: Option exercises normalized by award size, post-2006 dataset 
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Table A.1 Summary statistics of payout variables for all firms in Compustat 
This table reports summary statistics of payout variables for all firms in Compustat between 1991 and 
2017. The payout variables are quarterly share repurchases in millions of dollars, repurchases normalized 
by lagged assets, and dividend payments normalized by assets. Column 1 presents statistics for all firm-
quarters in the Compustat; Column 2 includes all firms matched between Compustat and ExecuComp; 
Column 3 limits the sample to only firms that have not awarded any options during the sample period; 
Column 4 limits the sample to only firms that have awarded options at some point during the sample 
period; and Column 5 limits the sample to firm-quarters after having first awarded options. The reported 
figures are the mean values (standard deviation in parentheses). 
 




















































      
N 823,843 217,703 5,472 212,231 189,973 





Table A.2 Share repurchases in the quarter of option expiration: Only firms with positive income  
This table replicates Table 2.7 among only those firms that have positive net income in the quarter.  
 
A: Repurchases in Q0  
Dependent variable: Repurchases in Q0  
 All awards Large awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
















     
R2 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.01 
N 648 648 212 212 
     
 
B: Changes in repurchase in Q0  
Dependent variable: Changes in repurchases in Q0  
 All awards Large awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
















     
R2 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.024 
N 607 607 204 204 





Table A.3 Delayed share repurchases  
This table is similar to Table 2.7, except that the dependent variable (share repurchases) is measured as of 
the quarter immediately after the option expiration (Panel A), or as the sum of repurchases during the four 
quarters that follow the option expiration (including the quarter of expiration (Panel B). 
A: Quarter after option expired 
Dependent variable: Repurchases in Q1  
 All awards Large awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
















     
R2 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.004 
N 801 801 269 269 
     
 
B: Full year after option expired 
Dependent variable: Repurchases in the first year 
 All awards Large awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
















     
R2 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.013 
N 801 801 283 283 







Table A.4 Interacting with firms that explicitly use EPS in compensation 
The following table tests whether the effect of price gap on accruals-based earnings management is 
different between firm explicitly uses EPS in the design of compensation-based incentives and firms that 
do not use it. We limit the sample to awards that fall in the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. *, **, and *** 























Dependent variable: ∆ Discretionary Accruals 
   
 (1) (2) 
   
I(Price Gap>0)*Use EPS  2.757** 2.880** 
 (2.12) (2.23) 
I(Price Gap>0) 0.429 0.419 
 (0.52) (0.51) 
Price Gap -2.638 1.661 
 (-0.62) 0.36 
I(Price Gap>0)* Price 
Gap -1.74 -10.552 
 (-0.33) (-1.58) 
Use EPS  -0.687 -1.955** 
 (-0.92) (-2.05) 
I(Price Gap>0)* Price 
Gap*Use EPS  
 23.039** 
 (2.13) 
   
R2 0.081 0.101 
N 218 218 
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Table A.5 Subsample analysis: Splitting based on top 5 managers stock ownership  
The following tables report results for the effect of the option price gap on exercises, share repurchases 
and earnings management splitting the sample based on whether the stock ownership of top 5 managers is 
above the median of the sample. Panel A reports the results on option exercises and repurchases. Panel B 
reports the results on accruals-based earnings management for positive income earners. We limit the 
sample to awards that fall in the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
A: Option exercises and repurchases  
 
 
B: Accruals-based earnings management (positive income earners) 
Dependent 
variable: 
∆ Total Accruals ∆ Discretionary Accruals, 
Jones Model 
∆ Discretionary Accruals, 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       












       
Linear controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 0.024 0.011 0.015 0.035 0.015 0.014 









Exercise indicator  Exercise size  Repurchase size  












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       












       
Linear controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
R2 0.240 0.182 0.129 0.086 0.021 0.002 
N 431 431 431 431 410 399 
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Table A.6 Adding time fixed effect and clustering the errors by firm    
The following tables report results for the effect of the option price gap on option exercises (column 1), 
repurchases (column 2), investment (column 3) and accruals (column 4). Panel A includes year fixed 
effect, and Panel B clusters the error terms by firm. Columns 1-2 use all options, and Columns 3-4 are 
conditional on having positive income (as in Table 2.8). We limit the sample to awards that fall in the 
price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
A: Time fixed effect  
Dependent variables: 




∆ Investment   ∆ discretionary 
accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     








     
Linear controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.157 0.044 0.218 0.089 
N 893 826 269 541 
     
 
B: Firm clustered errors  
Dependent variables: 
 Exercise  
size  
Repurchase 
size   
∆ Investment   ∆ discretionary 
accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     








     
Linear controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.103 0.002 0.030 0.023 
N 894 827 270 541 










Table A.7 Bias-corrected estimates and robust standard errors     
The following tables report results for the effect of the option price gap on option exercises (column 1), 
repurchases (column 2), investment (column 3) and accruals (column 4). Panel A reports conventional 
RD estimators with conventional standard errors, Panel B reports bias-corrected RD estimators with 
conventional standard errors and Panel C reports bias-corrected RD estimators with robust standard 
errors. Columns 1-2 use all options, and Columns 3-4 are conditional on having positive income (as in 
Table 2.8). The Stata commend “rdrobust” does not include linear controls. We limit the sample to 
awards that fall in the price gap range of [-0.2, 0.2]. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
A: Conventional RD estimators with conventional standard errors 
Dependent variables: 




∆ Investment   ∆ discretionary 
accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     








     
N 894 827 270 541 
      
 
B: Bias-corrected RD estimators with conventional standard errors 
Dependent variables: 




∆ Investment   ∆ discretionary 
accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     








     
N 894 827 270 541 
      
 
C: Bias-corrected RD estimators with robust standard errors 
Dependent variables: 




∆ Investment   ∆ discretionary 
accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     








     
N 894 827 270 541 





Table A.8 Pre-trends of outcome variables   
The following table reports results for the effect of the option price gap on lagged changes in shares 
outstanding in Columns 1-2, and earnings management variables in Columns 3-5. The lagged variables 
are defined as the average change from q-5 to q-4, q-4 to q-3, q-3 to q-2, and q-2 to q-1. Columns 1-2 use all 
options, and Columns 3-5 are conditional on having positive income, as in Table 2.8. *, **, and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variables: 
 ∆ shares 
outstanding 
∆ log shares 
outstanding 





Modified Jones  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      










      
Linear controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
R2 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.002 0.003 
N 898 777 276 553 550 
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